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Abstract 
This thesis is a volume comprised of four independent chapters: The overarching topic of the thesis is 
pensions and fiscal sustainability. An overriding problematic throughout the different chapters is that of 
demographic ageing. This ageing process, in the form of higher longevity and lower fertility, will most 
certainly bring changes to the way our economic lives work, whether the individual or society at large is 
considered. Each chapter, described below, sheds light on issues related to: fiscal sustainability and optimal 
public debt levels under demographic change; reform to pension systems as a response to increased 
longevity; and saving behaviour for retirement - a topic which is more and more relevant, as higher 
longevity implies a fundamental shift in how individuals ought to save for retirement. More specifically: 
Chapter one, titled “Sustainable Fiscal Strategies under Changing Demographics”, develops an 
overlapping generations model to evaluate, first, the steady state growth maximizing level of public debt 
around which an economy needs to stabilize; second, how the optimal level of public debt varies as a 
function of key population parameters; third, how fiscal rules designed to stabilize the economy around 
that debt level need to vary with the population parameters; and fourth, how well the model performs as a 
reasonable and plausible representation of advanced economies that face fiscal strain and deteriorating 
demographics. The main conclusion is that despite diminished fiscal space and flexibility due to 
deteriorating population parameters, a relatively benign steady state is feasible and available under mild 
fiscal restraints. The bigger problem will be how to get there without financial or fiscal breakdowns along 
the way. We offer some political economy perspectives on how best to manage that risk. 
Chapter two, titled “Pensions, Public Debt and Equilibrium Dynamics under Demographic Change”, 
shows how demographic change impacts the optimal debt-GDP ratio under the golden rule of public 
finance and balanced-budgets, and evaluates how the existence of a PAYG pension system impacts that 
optimality. For the average OECD economy, very small impacts to the optimal debt-GDP ratio occur when 
fertility and mortality rates decline according to their projected values for the following 85 years (2015-
2100). The size of the impact depends on how generous the PAYG pension system is: Countries with 
stronger PAYG schemes are more vulnerable to demographic ageing in terms of their fiscal balances. The 
sign of the effect of demographic change on the optimal debt-GDP ratio is also shown to depend on GDP’s 
private capital-intensity. Labour-intensive countries will automatically converge towards the maximal 
growth steady state by using optimal public investment flows, with no fiscal austerity measures being 
required. Private capital-intensive countries face the possibility of having to apply austerity measures to 
control the public debt stock. Overall, fiscal reforms to ensure both sustainability and transition towards 
maximal economic growth steady states do not imply significant decreases to future public investment 
rates, even for countries with very generous public pensions. 
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Chapter three, titled “Reform and Backlash to Reform: Longevity Adjustment of the Retirement Age”, uses 
an overlapping generations model ad modum Blanchard-Yaari to analyze the effects of retirement reform 
on labour supply. It is found that there is not a one-to-one relationship between an increase in the statutory 
retirement age and the corresponding increase in labour supply. Rather, a backlash effect is observed, 
where a reform aimed at broadening the labour supply on the extensive margin will have the unintended 
effect of decreasing labour supply on the intensive margin. A calibration exercise is performed to analyse 
the robustness of these backlash effects to different designs of the pension scheme. Here, it is found that, 
under a defined-benefit scheme, the effects on the intensive margin of labour supply are drastically 
increased compared to the defined-contributions scheme and the fully-funded scheme. 
Chapter four, titled “The Residual Group in Denmark: Who Is at Risk”, evaluates saving behaviour in 
Denmark. For the past decades, Denmark has fostered the funded component of its pension system via 
quasi-mandatory labour-market pension schemes alongside the strengthening of old-age public insurance 
in the form of means-tested unfunded supplementary benefits. Within this institutional setting, which 
requires a higher individual responsibility to save for retirement, the group of individuals that are eligible 
to the full public pension supplement (folkepensionstillæg) is analysed - a group termed the “residual 
group” in Denmark. This pension supplement is means-tested, making this group the collection of 
individuals with the lowest pension savings in Denmark and which can become a fiscal pressure on the 
public pillar of the Danish pension system. We investigate the factors associated with higher or lower risk 
of belonging to this group. We then quantify that risk for cohorts that will reach retirement in the next 
decade and provide a framework that can be used to measure what level of means-tested pension 
expenditures the government could expect to pay out in the future.  
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Resumé (Abstract in Danish) 
Denne afhandling består af fire selvstændige kapitler under det overordnede tema ”pensioner og 
finanspolitisk holdbarhed”. Det gennemgående tema i alle kapitlerne er demografisk aldring. Denne 
aldringsproces, forårsaget af længere levetid og lavere fertilitet, vil utvivlsomt betyde ændringer i den 
måde, vores økonomiske liv udfolder sig på, både individuelt og for samfundet generelt.  
Hvert kapitel, beskrevet herunder, belyser problemstillinger relateret til: Finanspolitisk holdbarhed og 
optimale offentlige gældsniveauer ved demografiske ændringer; reform af pensionssystemer som 
konsekvens af længere levetid; samt opsparingsadfærd til tilbagetrækning – et emne som bliver mere og 
mere relevant, i takt med at den længere levetid indebærer en fundamental ændring i den måde, vi hver 
især bør spare op til vores tilbagetrækning på. Mere specifikt:    
Kapitel et med titlen “Sustainable Fiscal Strategies under Changing Demographics” (“Bæredygtige 
finanspolitiske strategier under ændret demografi”), præsenterer en overlappende generationsmodel til 
evaluering af 1) Det maksimale niveau af langsigtsvækstraten, omkring hvilket en økonomi bør stabilisere 
sig; 2) Hvordan det optimale niveau af offentlig gæld varierer som en funktion af væsentlige 
befolkningsparametre; 3) Hvordan økonomiske indgreb, som har til formål at stabilisere økonomien 
omkring dette gældsniveau, er nødt til at variere i forhold til befolkningsparametrene; og 4) Hvor godt 
modellen fungerer som en fornuftig og plausibel repræsentation af de avancerede økonomier, der går en 
fremtid i møde med svækket demografi og pres på de offentlige finanser. Hovedkonklusionen er: På trods 
af det formindskede økonomiske råderum og fleksibilitet som konsekvens af svækkede 
befolkningsparametre, er en relativt gunstig langsigtsligevægt stadig mulig og opnåelig ved mildere 
økonomiske indgreb. Sværere vil det være at nå dertil uden finansielle eller fiskale sammenbrud undervejs. 
Vi fremlægger nogle politisk-økonomiske perspektiver på, hvordan man kan håndtere denne risiko bedst 
muligt.  
Kapitel to med titlen “Pensions, Public Debt and Equilibrium Dynamics under Demographic Change” 
(“Pensioner, offentlig gæld og dynamisk ligevægt under demografiske ændringer”) viser, hvordan 
demografiske ændringer påvirker det optimale gælds-BNP-forhold under den gyldne regel om offentlige 
finanser og balancerede budgetter, og evaluerer hvordan et offentligt, skattefinansieret pensionssystem 
som den danske folkepension påvirker det optimale gælds-BNP-forhold. For den gennemsnitlige OECD-
økonomi ser man en meget lille påvirkning af det optimale gælds-BNP forhold, når fertilitets og 
dødelighedsraten falder i forhold til deres forventede værdier for de næste 85 år (2015-2100). Hvor stor 
påvirkningen er, afhænger af hvor generøst det offentlige pensionssystem er. Lande med meget generøse 
ordninger er mere sårbare over for demografisk aldring i forhold til deres finanspolitiske balance. Tegnene 
på effekten af de demografiske ændringer på det optimale gælds-BNP-forhold viser sig også at være 
afhængig af den private kapitalintensitet. Arbejdsintensive lande vil automatisk hælde mod maksimal 
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langsigtsvækstrate ved at anvende optimale offentlige investerings-flows, der ikke kræver en finanspolitisk 
sparepolitik. Privatkapital-intensive lande kan være nødt til at implementere en stram sparepolitik for at 
kontrollere den offentlige gæld. Generelt indebærer økonomiske reformer til at sikre både økonomisk 
bæredygtighed og en bevægelse mod maksimal økonomisk langsigtsvækstrate ikke nogen betydelige 
reduceringer i de fremtidige offentlige investeringer, selv for lande med meget generøse offentlige 
pensionsordninger.  
Kapitel tre med titlen “Reform and Backlash to Reform: Longevity Adjustment of the Retirement Age” 
(“Reform og modreaktion mod reform: levetidsindeksering af tilbagetrækningsalderen”) anvender en 
overlappende generationsmodel ad modum Blanchard-Yaari til at analysere effekterne af en 
tilbagetrækningsreform på arbejdsudbuddet. Resultaterne viser, at der ikke er et et-til-et forhold mellem en 
forhøjelse af den lovbestemte tilbagetrækningsalder og tilsvarende forøgelse af arbejdsudbuddet. 
Tværtimod observeres der en modsatrettet effekt, hvor en reform, der har til hensigt at øge arbejdsudbuddet 
på den ekstensive margin, vil have den ikke-intenderede effekt, at den mindsker arbejdsudbuddet på den 
intensive margin. Der gennemføres en kalibreringsøvelse for at analysere betydningen af disse 
modsatrettede effekter på forskellige pensionsmodeller. Her ses det, at effekterne øges kraftigt på den 
intensive margin for arbejdsudbuddet ved en ydelsesbaseret ordning sammenlignet med en bidragsbaseret 
ordning og en opsparingsbaseret ordning.  
Kapitel fire med titlen “The Residual Group in Denmark: Who Is at Risk?” (“Restgruppen i Danmark: 
Hvem er i risiko?”) ser på opsparingsadfærd i Danmark. I de sidste årtier har Danmark opbygget de private 
arbejdsmarkedspensioner som en central del af det samlede pensionssystem. Samtidig er en del af den 
offentlige folkepension gjort indkomst- og formueafhængig. Inden for denne institutionelle ramme, som 
kræver et højere individuelt ansvar for at spare op til sin tilbagetrækning fra arbejdsmarkedet, analyseres 
den gruppe, som er berettiget til det fulde folkepensionstillæg – en gruppe der betegnes som ”restgruppen” 
i Danmark. Vi undersøger de faktorer, der er forbundet med højere eller lavere risiko for at høre til i denne 
gruppe. Derefter kvantificerer vi denne risiko for kohorter, der vil nå pensionsalderen i det næste årti, og 
opstiller en model, der kan bruges til at måle, hvilket niveau af behovsvurderede pensionsudgifter 
regeringen kan forvente at skulle udbetale i fremtiden.  
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Introduction 
This thesis is a volume comprised of four independent chapters: The overarching topic of the thesis is 
pensions and fiscal sustainability. The driving force behind these two topics is the demographic ageing 
process under way since the middle of the 20th century. All contributions in each article are original in their 
respective topics. 
The figure below shows that since 1950, the number of children per woman has been declining up to 
nowadays. This number is projected to stabilize from now onwards, but nonetheless, the drop in the fertility 
rate seen in the 20th century represents a near halving of the fertility rate well below the population 
replacement rate (children per woman≥2). The figure below also shows the population growth rate, taking 
into account migration. Since the migration force is a net positive, on average, among high income 
countries, the population growth rate is not below 0%, but is projected to stabilize around 0% over the 
course of the 21st century. 
 
Source: UN (2019). Note: Data refers to average within high income countries, as classified by the UN. 
Turning to the other side of the demography problematic, in terms of longevity, the figure above shows 
that life expectancy at birth has increased from 65 years in 1950-1955 being projected to increase up to 90 
years by 2100. Such a dual decrease to mortality and fertility rates has economic implications at many 
levels, some of which are studied in this thesis. In this thesis, topics related to fiscal sustainability issues, 
in terms of the taxation problematic, the maintenance of public debt stocks, and also in terms of the 
sustainability of pension systems, are addressed. Issues related to how individuals save for retirement also 
receives focus. 
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With the worsening of the old-age dependency ratio, it will arguably become increasingly difficult to 
finance given levels of public benefits, or other public spending for that matter, if these benefits are both 
increasing with demographic ageing and if the level of benefits is to be kept constant. Impacts of 
demographic ageing also affect each of us individually, as we are facing longer and longer lifespans 
surrounded by less and less children. With longer lives comes a necessity to finance a longer retirement 
period, if the official pension age offered by governments is not reformed to track expected increases in 
longevity. With higher longevity, there may come a necessity for stronger saving behavior. 
All chapters included in this PhD thesis touch on all these issues raised in the paragraph above. A question 
that has gone by largely unanswered is how demographic change can affect the optimality of public capital. 
Chapter 1 evaluates optimal debt policy under demographic change, showing how it depends on different 
demographic parameters. The idea is that the optimal schedule of public debt issuing might be connected 
to the demographic structure of an economy, if the government is both responsible to fund productive 
activities and re-distribute income in the form of benefits that are demography related. Chapter 2 builds on 
this idea and expands the framework to include a more complete set of demography related public transfers. 
It also evaluates the implications of demographic ageing to the transition dynamics OECD economies can 
expect throughout the 21st century.  
A common observed reform applied by policymakers worldwide has been to increase the official pension 
age to relieve financial pressure from the pension system by reducing the number of recipients versus 
contributors (see for example OECD, 2017). Chapter 3 evaluates precisely these types of reforms to the 
official pension age as means to face demographic ageing. A problem may arise in the process: inducing 
individuals to work for more years might induce these individuals to work less each year. This is an effect 
termed the “Backlash effect”, and its impact is evaluated under different pension schemes.  
Lastly, the 4th chapter focuses on saving behavior of Danish individuals. We measure the number of Danish 
individuals that are likely going to become eligible to pension supplements at retirement, supplements that 
are means-tested. As such, those that become entitled to the full pension supplement are the group of lowest 
savers in Denmark, a group called the “Residual group”. Characteristics associated with being part of this 
group are found, as well as an estimate of its size over the population that will retire in the following 10-
15 years. This is done by developing a new framework that is risk based. Such a framework is very useful 
to policymakers, since it enables to quantify risk associated with certain individual types. By knowing the 
probability distribution of becoming part of the group in Denmark with the lowest savings, more targeted 
action can be applied to reduce potential under-saving behavior, a topic that is of high relevance nowadays 
in the Danish public discussion forum. It also informs policymakers what level of supplementary pension 
benefits they can expect to pay out in the incoming years. 
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Abstract: This paper shows how demographic change impacts the optimal debt-GDP ratio under the 
golden rule of public finance and balanced-budgets, and evaluates how the existence of a PAYG pension 
system impacts that optimality. For the average OECD economy, very small impacts to the optimal debt-
GDP ratio are found when fertility and mortality rates decline according to their projected values for the 
following 85 years (2015-2100). The size of the impact depends on how generous the PAYG pension 
system is. Countries with stronger PAYG schemes are more vulnerable to demographic ageing in terms of 
their fiscal balances. The sign of the effect of demographic change on the optimal debt-GDP ratio is also 
shown to depend on GDP’s private capital intensity. Labor-intensive countries will automatically converge 
towards the maximal growth steady state by using optimal public investment flows, with no fiscal austerity 
measures being required. Private capital-intensive countries face the possibility of having to apply austerity 
measures to control the public debt stock. Overall, fiscal reforms to ensure both sustainability and transition 
towards maximal economic growth steady states do not imply significant decreases to future public 
investment rates, even for countries with very generous public pensions. 
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1. Introduction 
Given expected developments of fertility and mortality rates for advanced economies, the future 
sustainability of fiscal policy is being questioned when the current level of public spending is considered. 
For a given structure of public transfers, lower mortality rates imply future increases in public expenditure. 
Adding lower fertility rates to the socio-economic conjuncture, balanced-budget policies will require 
higher contributions per taxpayer, if the current level of benefits and pension age is to be maintained.  
Remarkably, demographic ageing impacts to fiscal policy are not so obvious when public debt is 
considered. One reason is that the benefits stemming from public debt creation are much less measurable 
when compared to pecuniary public transfers. But the benefits do exist, with two main examples being that 
public debt enables governments to smooth the taxation schedule along business cycles and it enables 
governments to finance public capital investments. Focusing on the latter point, since governments are 
usually responsible for the provision of a significant proportion of an economy’s public capital stock (an 
average of 26,2% for the OECD for the last 45 years1), the question becomes whether a government should 
shift the size of productive public capital in response to increasing old-age dependency ratios.  
In this paper, I address the question of whether and by how much demographic change can impact the 
optimal public debt schedule and its sustainability in the long-run in the context of a government that 
follows the golden rule of public finance and a PAYG pension scheme. By utilizing adjustments to public 
investment as the policy tool, I focus on two policy objectives: one is just achieving fiscal sustainability, 
the other is achieving maximum economic growth under demographic change. I do not consider changes 
to the level of public benefits (see for example Ueshina, 2018, Haan and Prowse, 2014, or Maebayashi, 
2013, for such analyses). The sole focus is on determining the existence of appropriate steady states after 
demographic change takes place, and if feasible transition paths are available. This is done without 
considering the benefits system as a policy tool, though I evaluate the steady state and transition paths 
under different intensities of unfunded public pension benefits. 
The approach used here is one of maximizing intergenerational welfare by maximizing long-run 
economic growth2. This approach is in line with arguments made by Barr (2009), who states that economic 
growth is the important metric for pension systems, and not just how to fund these systems. This is because 
pensions, one way or another, are claims made in present time on future output. Maximizing long-run 
growth is then a proper goal to ensure increasing welfare of future generations when benefit accrual rules 
remain static. Under such a goal, the optimal public debt-GDP ratio is evaluated as well as the implications 
to this ratio of providing more or less generous unfunded public transfers to retirees. 
Since public investment requires obtaining the resources through taxation and/or attracting private 
 
1 Derived from IMF Investment and Capital Stock Dataset, 2017. See IMF (2015) for more details. 
2 Barro (1990) shows that maximizing economic growth is equivalent to maximizing social welfare in that model. The model in the current paper has the same 
feature in what (total) consumption is concerned (ignoring utility derived from having children). 
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investment (ignoring cases of monetary seigniorage), these public funding activities may compete for 
resources with other types of public spending. For example, if a PAYG pension system is in place and 
demographic ageing takes place, that PAYG system will now be collecting more resources from the 
common pool of private production to non-productive objectives3, making it harder to finance the creation 
and maintenance of a given stock of productive public capital. This poses a question of optimality in terms 
of the level of productive public capital when the government is also mandated to respect the transfer of 
public benefits such as old-age pensions and child-care related benefits. As such, models that do not 
consider public investment may be missing on relevant transmission mechanisms when evaluating the 
impact of demographic change on the optimal schedule of public investment and public debt (if a golden 
rule of public finance is in place). 
In short, the taxation process will change along with a demographic shift if there are pecuniary public 
benefits that require more funds when that demographic shift takes place. The availability of private funds 
for public investment will also change along with a demographic shift, if the existence of certain public 
transfers introduces incentives to save more or less. These two transmission channels, the tax and the 
saving ones, imply that increased non-productive spending due to a hike in the old-age dependency ratio 
makes it relatively harder to finance a given stock of public capital/debt. Thus, the optimality of public 
debt, in view of its use to finance public investment, may well depend on the demographic ageing process.  
When considering the impacts of demographic change on the production side of the economy, I focus on 
two mechanisms: First, on the saving side of the economy, where the existence of, for example, a PAYG 
pension scheme might disincentivize private savings, affecting the growth capacity of the economy; 
Second, the taxation side, where a given level of public debt might be harder to sustain in an economy with 
higher old-age dependency ratios, when this ageing process induces higher old-age public transfers 
competing more strongly for resources from the “common pool” of production. 
This model is rooted in the work of Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993). A model of endogenous 
growth is built with a productive public capital stock. The model is enriched with finite lives, endogenous 
fertility decisions, fertility-dependent labor supply, variable life-expectancy, and public transfers, like in 
Hughes Hallett et al. (2019). But where Hughes Hallett et al. (2019) consider only private funded saving, 
this paper develops the framework further by also considering unfunded pension benefits. Labor supply is 
tied to child-rearing commitments, as it introduces a realistic channel by which demographic change 
impacts GDP growth and public fiscal balances. For example, Cruz and Ahmed (2018) find that a reduction 
to the child-dependency ratio is the main driver of growth per capita increases within projected 
demographic changes).  
Within the literature of models incorporating productive public capital and public debt, Checherita-
 
3 Non-productive here means activities that do not yield produced goods to be marketed. It is of course simple to conceptualize how the provision of old-age pensions 
can be socially “productive”, or in other words, useful. 
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Westphal et al. (2014) provide the first optimal debt-GDP ratios rooted under a theoretical approach based 
on Aschauer (2000). This approach includes the assumption that governments follow the golden rule of 
financing, by which public debt is only used for the purpose of public investment. Under this fiscal rule, 
they find an average optimal debt-GDP ratio of 55-65% for 22 OECD countries, an optimal target if the 
maximization of economic growth is the objective. Bokan et al. (2016) take a further theoretical step and 
consider a theoretical approach that combines productive public capital, public debt, and a fully-fledged 
demographic structure, where, again under the golden rule of financing, the optimality of public debt is 
shown to depend on demographic parameters. Hughes Hallett et al. (2019) builds on the same model as 
Bokan et al. (2016), it shows how demographic change impacts the optimal schedule of public debt and 
provides a numerical exercise. They find an optimal debt-GDP ratio of 49.7%, again, with the objective of 
maximizing economic growth, as well as negligible impacts to the optimal schedule of public debt with 
expected incoming demographic shifts. 
Under the Hughes Hallett et al. (2019) framework, optimality of public debt is directly related to fertility. 
With lower fertility comes a higher old-age dependency ratio. This results in a decreased tax base from 
which public transfer costs are financed from, pushing the optimal debt-GDP ratio downwards. A missing 
component there was unfunded public pensions, which is a public transfer that is expected to face 
considerable pressure from demographic ageing. In this paper, and its original contribution, is to introduce 
public pensions and consider how it is linked to the saving and taxation mechanisms described above in 
determining the optimality of public debt.  
This paper finds that, for the average OECD economy, there are both reasonable steady states and 
transition paths available under a golden rule of public finance for the expected demographic ageing 
processes throughout the 21st century. Under this golden rule, the optimal public debt-GDP ratio suffers 
very small impacts stemming from demographic ageing. The model indicates an initial optimal public 
debt-GDP ratio of 40.6%, suffering negligible changes throughout the expected demographic structure for 
the rest of the 21st century. As the old-age dependency ratio increases, public debt sustainability does not 
require significant reductions in public investment. 
It is also concluded that countries with more generous unfunded pension systems are at a higher risk of 
seeing their public debt stocks turning unsustainable upon a reduction in fertility and mortality rates. 
Demographic ageing processes imply strong reductions to the optimal public debt-GDP ratio, though 
ensuring its sustainability requires relatively small reductions to public investment. Hence, the outlook for 
public debt seems benign. The problem with strong unfunded pension benefits is the dramatic increase in 
funding requirements in order to finance increased unfunded pension outlays upon demographic ageing. 
Focus should be posited on reforming the pension system and its benefits level, and not in managing the 
public debt stock that finances public investment for a country that follows the golden rule of public 
finance. 
Moreover, this paper finds that the transition mechanics depend on the labor intensity of the economy. 
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For labor intense countries, demographic ageing processes do not de-stabilize the public stock of debt. 
Convergence is automatically ensured upon demographic ageing. The situation is reversed for capital 
intensive countries, where demographic ageing turns a sustainable public debt stock into an unsustainable 
one. Though the numerical results show that sustainability-inducing policies require negligible 
interventions to the public investment schedule, this result reveals a potential for trouble: With the advent 
of robotics, IT technologies, artificial intelligence and automation, economies that are becoming more 
capital intensive may need to re-evaluate their unfunded pension systems, or risk having to cut on public 
investment in the future, yielding lower economic growth prospects for future generations. 
A brief structure of the rest of the paper follows: Section 2 lays the foundation of the model, and section 
3 derives its equilibria and transitional dynamics. Section 4 introduces the baseline calibration and the 
initial steady state. Section 5 reveals the main results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The model 
This model features overlapping generations, changing demographics, welfare spending, and productive 
public and private capital accumulation as in Yakita (2008), Bokan et al., (2016) and Hughes Hallett et al., 
(2019). Each generation of individuals is homogenous in their characteristics. Firms are also homogenous 
and operate in perfectly competitive markets. There are two overlapping generations, one comprising 
working individuals and the other retirees. I introduce a demographic structure featuring both endogenous 
and exogenous factors by having individuals make fertility decisions during their working period and face 
an exogenous risk of death upon the transition from the working to the retired period of life. Public 
investment decisions are made by a government that issues debt and levies taxes to fulfil its objectives, 
namely servicing debt and financing social security. These public investments are productive in nature and 
introduce a component of endogenous growth. This model is thus specified in terms of growth and not 
levels4. 
2.1. Firms 
The production technology of each homogeneous firm 𝑗 is characterized by constant returns to scale 
between the private capital firm 𝑗 employs and its productivity-augmented labor force: 
𝑌𝑗,𝑡 = 𝐴𝐾𝑗,𝑡
𝛼 (ℎ𝑡𝐿𝑗,𝑡)
1−𝛼
;  0 < 𝛼 < 1                                           (1) 
𝑌𝑗,𝑡, 𝐾𝑗,𝑡 and 𝐿𝑗,𝑡 respectively symbolize the output level, the private capital stock, and labor input in firm 
𝑗 for period 𝑡. 𝛼 is the income share of private capital for each firm 𝑗. There are two productivity structures: 
One, total factor productivity (TFP), which is not time dependent, denoted by 𝐴; Two, labor-augmenting 
productivity, which is not firm specific, described by ℎ𝑡. 
 
4 Endogenous growth differentiates the type of analysis from the classical setting of, for example, Diamond (1965), where long-run growth is exogenous and equal 
to population growth. Since our objective is to analyze optimal public debt in the context of demographic change and public unfunded pensions, I focus on endogenous 
growth and not on dynamic efficiency considerations. 
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With homogenous firms operating in perfectly competitive markets, firm 𝑗’s profit maximization problem 
yields the following equilibrium rental rate of capital, 𝑟𝑡, and wage rate, 𝑤𝑡: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝐴𝛼(𝑘𝑗,𝑡)
𝛼−1
(ℎ𝑡)
1−𝛼                                                  (2) 
𝑤𝑡 = 𝐴(1 − 𝛼)(𝑘𝑗,𝑡)
𝛼
(ℎ𝑡)
1−𝛼                                                   (3) 
Lower case letters refer to variables expressed in per unit of labor form, such as 𝑘𝑗,𝑡 ≡ 𝐾𝑗,𝑡 𝐿𝑗,𝑡⁄ . The 
labor augmenting productivity, ℎ𝑡, seen in equations (2) and (3) is modelled as being determined by the 
level of aggregate public and private capital, where ℎ𝑡 is then not firm specific. 
As Hughes Hallett et al. (2019) argues, the inclusion of public capital in the production process is taken 
as an important feature to study optimal public debt in the context of demographic change, since one 
important objective of public debt is to raise high amounts of funds for public capital5. A measure of 
aggregate capital is included in the labor productivity factor in spirit of Arrow’s (1962) Learning by Doing 
model. These productivity effects are not interpreted as non-rivalrous public goods; here, productive 
externalities from capital are taken as rival goods that are universally available to workers6. The rival use 
of these externalities imply that they are effective to the extent of the value of capital per capita, and not 
its absolute level.  
The productivity adjustment process ℎ𝑡 is defined as: 
ℎ𝑡 =
𝐾𝑡
𝛽
𝐺𝑡
1−𝛽
𝐿𝑡
= 𝑋𝑡
−𝛽
𝑔𝑡 ;  0 < 𝛽 < 1                                               (4) 
The public capital stock per unit of labor is denoted by 𝑔𝑡 ≡ 𝐺𝑡 𝐿𝑡⁄ , β is the labor productivity share of 
private capital, and 𝑋𝑡 is the ratio of public-to-private capital, 𝐺𝑡 𝐾𝑡⁄ . The aggregate private capital stock 
and the aggregate labor input are, respectively, defined as 𝐾𝑡 = ∑ 𝐾𝑗,𝑡𝑗  and 𝐿𝑡 = ∑ 𝐿𝑗,𝑡𝑗 . 
In order to derive the aggregate production and factor prices, note that the labor-augmenting productivity 
process, ℎ𝑡, is not firm specific; it instead reflects a macro-level measurement. Since all firms are assumed 
to be symmetric and each firm’s size is assumed to be small compared to the size of the economy, the 
decision making of the individual firm does not consider its own impact on ℎ𝑡. As such, this firm 
environment implies that all the market participants share the same optimal solution. We thus have that 
𝑘𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡. Furthermore, defining 𝑌𝑡 = ∑ 𝑌𝑗,𝑡𝑗  and 𝜔 ≡ 𝛼 + 𝛽(1 − 𝛼) allows us to rewrite expression (1) in 
terms of aggregate output at time 𝑡: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝐾𝑡
𝛼(ℎ𝑡𝐿𝑡)
1−𝛼 = 𝐴𝐾𝑡
𝛼+𝛽(1−𝛼)
𝐺𝑡
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛼)
= 𝐴𝑋𝑡
−𝜔𝐺𝑡                            (5) 
Remarkably, expression (5) does not include aggregate labor input, 𝐿𝑡. This is a simple consequence of 
the definition of the (endogenous) labor productivity input, ℎ𝑡, where it is not how many workers that 
 
5 There is relative wide (though not unanimous) support for the idea that public capital plays a key role in production (see Makuyana and Odhiambo (2016) for a 
literature review). Moreover, in a model of endogenous growth, it is important to consider motivations for the existence of public debt beyond dynamic efficiency-type 
arguments. 
6 Barro (1990) argues that actual nonrival government activities are relatively few. 
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matters for total production, but it is how much capital per capita there is for that labor to produce and how 
this capital is balanced between public and private sources. 
As for the aggregate factor prices, they become: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝐴𝛼(𝑋𝑡)
1−𝜔                                                                (6) 
𝑤𝑡 = 𝐴(1 − 𝛼)(𝑋𝑡)
−𝜔𝑔𝑡                                                 (7) 
Expression (7) reveals how growth in wages depends on public capital per unit of labor as well as the 
ratio of public to private capital in 𝑋. As Dalenberg and Partridge (1997) argue, government productive 
activities, measured in 𝐺, can be seen as acting both as an unpaid factor to firms, boosting productivity, 
and as an amenity to individuals, boosting employment levels. Such an amenity channel tends to attract 
workers, consequently reducing wages. Here, equation 7 reveals that both channels, factor/productivity 
and amenity/employment, are present. For the first channel, higher public capital contributes to increase 
wage rates up to a certain point of the optimal mix of public and private capital (as measured in 𝑋). For the 
second channel, public capital benefits equilibrium wage rates only to the extent of how much capital there 
is per unit of labor input. 
2.2. Population 
The population is composed of homogeneous individuals who plan for two distinct periods of their lives: 
a working and a retirement period. Each period is of fixed length, but survival into retirement is not 
ensured. At the end of the working period, a fraction of the working agents dies while the rest move into 
retirement. The probability of dying at the beginning of retirement period 𝑡 is given by the hazard rate 𝜆𝑡, 
which is the same for all agents. This implies that the current size of the retiree group is proportional to 
(1 − 𝜆𝑡) of the working population in the previous period. Using 𝑁𝑡 as the number of currently working 
individuals, current population size at time 𝑡 is equal to 𝑁𝑡 + (1 − 𝜆𝑡)𝑁𝑡−1. With changing fertility and 
mortality profiles, the period-to-period population growth factor is: 
𝛾𝑡+1
𝑁 ≡
𝑁𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝜆𝑡+1)𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝑡 + (1 − 𝜆𝑡)𝑁𝑡−1
=
𝑛𝑡 + (1 − 𝜆𝑡+1)
𝑛𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜆𝑡)
𝑛𝑡−1 
This expression considers both the effects of death at old-age and the number of children at different time 
points. It shows that when the population is at a growth steady state, with 𝜆𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡+1 and 𝑛𝑡−1 = 𝑛𝑡 = 𝑛, 
we obtain the usual population growth factor 𝛾𝑁 = 𝑛 (note that 𝛾 always denotes the growth factor of 
variables). Moreover, the old-age dependency ratio, denoted 𝜇𝑡, becomes: 
𝜇𝑡 ≡
(1−𝜆𝑡)𝑁𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡
=
(1−𝜆𝑡)
𝑛𝑡−1
                                                              (8) 
So, lower fertility and/or higher longevity in this model both produce a higher old-age dependency ratio. 
As individuals enter the economy, they become workers and make fertility and saving-consumption 
choices. They receive labor income and a child-rearing subsidy. Upon reaching retirement, conditional on 
survival, no more decisions are made, on fertility or otherwise, where individuals simply consume out of 
their savings and PAYG pension benefits. Within this structure, individuals enter the economy and make 
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choices at the beginning of time 𝑡 to maximize lifetime utility as expressed by: 
ln 𝑐𝑡 + (1 − 𝜆𝑡+1)𝜌 ln 𝑑𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑡 ln 𝑛𝑡                                         (9) 
In the expression above, 𝑐𝑡 (𝑑𝑡+1) is consumption in the working (retirement) period, 𝑛𝑡 is the number of 
children the individual has, 𝜀𝑡 measures the importance of having children in a person’s life-time utility, 
and 𝜌 denotes the usual time discount factor, being a value between 0 and 1. Following Eckstein and 
Wolpin (1985), fertility choices are modelled in a weak sense, where parents derive utility only from the 
number of children they have7. 
The time endowment for a working individual is normalized to 1. Having children comes with a child-
rearing time-penalty, reducing the time an individual can spend working. Parameter 𝑧 measures rearing 
time per child. It is assumed that agents never stop working due to child-rearing commitments: 
(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡) > 0. After-tax labor income is then allocated between current consumption, 𝑐𝑡, and savings, 𝑠𝑡. 
The individual receives a child-rearing subsidy, which is taxable (thus modelled as a tax 
deduction/allowance8 for simplicity). The child-rearing subsidy, denoted by 𝜌𝑤, is a fixed proportion of 
the lost wage income to child-rearing, 𝑤𝑡𝑧𝑛𝑡. The tax rate, denoted by 𝜃𝑡, is the same for wages and the 
child-rearing subsidy. The budget constraint of the working agent at time 𝑡 becomes: 
[(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡) + 𝜌𝑤𝑧𝑛𝑡](1 − 𝜃𝑡)𝑤𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡                                   (10) 
Following the methodology in Blanchard (1985), the existence of homogenous actuarially fair insurance 
companies operating in a perfectly competitive market is assumed. Individuals exclusively save by means 
of this insurance market, and the insurance companies invest the savings proceeds in private capital and 
public debt. Survival into retirement plays a key role in the return to the insurance product, as the assets of 
those who die before retirement get re-distributed to surviving individuals by means of a higher return to 
savings conditional on survival. Assuming full depreciation of capital over a period, we have that the real 
interest rate is the rental rate of capital subtracted of depreciation. Given a zero-profit condition being 
assumed on the insurance market, the surviving retirees therefore receive a rate of return of 
𝑟𝑡+1−1
(1−𝜆𝑡+1)
 on 
their savings. 
The PAYG public pension system is set up in a defined-benefit fashion. Pension benefits are calculated 
as a fraction 𝜌𝑝 of total income earned in the working period of life and are tax-free
9. This income 
measurement considers income lost due to child-rearing and the compensatory subsidy, so that labor supply 
effects impact accrued public pension benefits. The accrued pension benefits are indexed according to a 
 
7 Parents do not incorporate their children’s lifetime utility as their own, nor do they consider any measure of the “quality” of children or explicit benefits 
(transfers/help at old-age, for example). See Zhang and Zhang (1998) for an analysis over alternative motives for having children and how it relates to social security. 
8 An alternative to this approach would be to model child-rearing subsidies like a tax credit. I do not follow this path for simplicity reasons, as introducing tax credits 
unnecessarily complicates the model, thus diluting the focus of the analytical results, which is public pensions. 
9 Most OECD economies do not levy social contribution taxes on public pension transfers (OECD, 2017). I follow this setup, except that the taxation of pension 
income is removed altogether for simplicity. Introducing other non-social contributory taxes on public pensions unnecessarily introduces distortions into the model that 
dilute the mechanism being evaluated in this paper. It will not change the theoretical results of the paper, but it may have a limited impact on the numerical results. 
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given criteria via the variable 𝑖𝑡+1, which, in this setting, is wage indexation
10. In what follows, I define11:  
𝑖𝑡+1 =
𝑤𝑡+1
𝑤𝑡
                                                                 (11) 
The second period budget constraint, relating consumption at retirement with savings returns and PAYG 
pension benefits, reads as follows: 
𝑑𝑡+1 =
𝑟𝑡+1
(1−𝜆𝑡+1)
𝑠𝑡 + [(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡) + 𝜌𝑤𝑧𝑛𝑡]𝜌𝑝𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑡+1                              (12) 
The maximization problem that individuals face is described as follows: 
max
𝑐𝑡,𝑑𝑡+1,𝑛𝑡
ln 𝑐𝑡 + (1 − 𝜆𝑡+1)𝜌 ln 𝑑𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑡 ln 𝑛𝑡  
𝑠. 𝑡.  (𝑖) 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡 = [(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡) + 𝜌𝑤𝑧𝑛𝑡](1 − 𝜃𝑡)𝑤𝑡 
        (𝑖𝑖) 𝑑𝑡+1 =
𝑟𝑡+1
(1 − 𝜆𝑡+1)
𝑠𝑡 + [(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡) + 𝜌𝑤𝑧𝑛𝑡]𝜌𝑝𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑡+1 
Solving the maximization problem of individuals, indexing the pension benefits via expression (11), and 
defining the “pseudo” saving rate12 ?̃?𝑡 ≡
(1−𝜆𝑡+1)𝜌
1+(1−𝜆𝑡+1)𝜌+𝜀𝑡
, we obtain the Euler equation and the optimal 
saving, 𝑠𝑡, and fertility, 𝑛𝑡: 
𝑑𝑡+1
𝑐𝑡
= 𝜌𝑟𝑡+1                                                            (13) 
𝑠𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡(1 − 𝜃𝑡)𝑤𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡
𝜌𝑝
𝜌
𝑤𝑡+1
𝑟𝑡+1
                                                 (14) 
𝑛𝑡 =
𝜀𝑡
[1+(1−𝜆𝑡+1)𝜌+𝜀𝑡](1−𝜌𝑤)𝑧
                                                   (15) 
Expression (14) reveals that how much is saved is a function of demography related factors and 
impatience, hidden in ?̃?𝑡, as well as PAYG pension benefits. Unsurprisingly, the existence of a PAYG 
pension system decreases the amount saved by individuals, since these pension benefits are at least an 
imperfect substitution to own savings. This decrease is dictated by the replacement rate of the PAYG 
pension weighed by impatience factor and the ratio of future wages to the future interest rate. Higher 
pension replacement rates naturally disincentivize private savings further, whereas a higher subjective 
discount rate makes an individual care less for consumption during retirement, which attenuates the 
negative effect PAYG pension benefits have on private saving. As for factor prices: On one hand, the 
higher future wages are, the higher pension benefits an individual expects to get, making private saving 
less appealing; On the other hand, the higher future interest rates are, the more one earns from private 
savings, incentivizing private saving. 
 
10 This indexation regime is the most common one in indexing the valorization of pension contributions of earnings-related PAYG pensions. During the pay-out 
phase, price indexation is most commonly seen (Piggott and Sane, 2009). 
11 We do not consider other indexation schemes. Price (nominal) indexation is not possible in the setting of the model. One could consider GDP growth indexation. 
In fact, wage indexation is equivalent to GDP per capita growth. If pensions are indexed to GDP growth, then pension benefits get proportionally increased by growth 
in the labor supply, relative to wage indexation. 
12 This variable is the saving rate out of disposable income if the public pension system did not exist. This can be confirmed by looking at expression (14) and setting 
𝜌𝑝 to 0.  
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Expression (15), governing fertility choices, is composed of demographic factors, the subjective discount 
rate, the child-rearing subsidy rate 𝜌𝑤 and how much time is spent child-rearing, 𝑧. First, 𝑛𝑡 is increasing 
in 𝜌𝑤. This should not come as a surprise, since the existence of the subsidy 𝜌𝑤 lowers the financial burden 
of raising children. Second, higher longevity (lower 𝜆) or lesser future discounting behavior (higher 𝜌) 
both decrease fertility choices, since the individual then decides to derive more utility from consumption 
during retirement at the cost of deriving less utility by having children. Third, it is important to note that 
fertility choices are not impacted directly by the equilibrium market wage rate or GDP levels, but fertility 
choices are directly related to how much income a household obtains through labor activities. Higher 
fertility choices imply lower personal income due to more time being spent on non-labor activities (child-
rearing)13. 
2.3. Government 
The government provides public capital, child-rearing subsidies and public pensions, financing these 
activities via taxation and public debt. Issued public debt, denoted 𝐵𝑡, can only finance investment in public 
capital, 𝐺𝑡. This implies that deficit spending is impossible. Via the usual arbitrage argument, the interest 
cost of public debt is equal to the real interest rate (𝑟𝑡 − 1). The government budget constraint becomes: 
𝐵𝑡+1 = 𝐵𝑡 + (𝑟𝑡 − 1)𝐵𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡+1 + 𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑧𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑡 + [(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡−1) + 𝜌𝑤𝑧𝑛𝑡−1]𝑤𝑡−1𝑖𝑡𝜌𝑝(1 − 𝜆𝑡)𝑁𝑡−1 −
 𝜃𝑡(𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑡 + 𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑧𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑡)                                         (16) 
In line with the no debt deficit-financing assumption, interest payments and public transfers are solely 
tax-financed. Public debt’s existence is defined by the need to finance public capital formation. In other 
words, the model is stated in terms of the “golden rule” of public finance14: 
𝑏𝑡 = 𝑔𝑡                                                      (17) 
Given expressions (5) and (17), the debt to GDP ratio in this model is now: 
                                              𝑑𝑡 =
𝑋𝑡
𝜔
𝐴
                                                                (18) 
The government budget can be further simplified using the pension indexing rule (11), the dependency 
ratio, 𝜇𝑡, defined in (8) and some algebra. The budget constraint, in per unit of labor form, becomes: 
𝑟𝑡𝑏𝑡 + 𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑡
𝑧𝑛𝑡
(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡)
+ [(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡−1) + 𝜌𝑤𝑧𝑛𝑡−1]
𝜇𝑡
(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡)
𝑤𝑡𝜌𝑝 
= 𝜃𝑡 (𝑤𝑡 + 𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑡
𝑧𝑛𝑡
(1−𝑧𝑛𝑡)
)                              (19) 
We can use conditions (17) and (19), combine them with capital rents and wages, expressions (6) and (7), 
as well as  𝐿𝑡 = (1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡)𝑁𝑡 (labour supply equals the time endowment less child-rearing time), to derive 
an expression for the income tax rate, 𝜃𝑡 , needed to satisfy current public spending: 
 
13 In fact, the model also displays the observed link between higher fertility rates and lower GDP per capita. Whenever a fertility-related parameter gets changed, 
such as 𝑧, 𝜀 or 𝜌𝑤, producing a higher fertilty rate, this change will yield a decreased GDP per capita as expected (see for example Doepke and Tertilt, 2016). 
14 This rule is discussed by Musgrave (1939). The rationale for this golden rule is given in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) and Fatas et al. (2003). 
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𝜃𝑡 = 1 −
1−
𝛼
(1−𝛼)
𝑋𝑡−𝐶𝑝,𝑡
1+𝐶𝑐,𝑡
                                                          (20) 
where I define expressions: 
𝐶𝑐,𝑡 ≡ 𝜌𝑤
𝑧𝑛𝑡
(1−𝑧𝑛𝑡)
                                                            (21) 
𝐶𝑝,𝑡 ≡ [(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡−1) + 𝜌𝑤𝑧𝑛𝑡−1]
𝜇𝑡
(1−𝑧𝑛𝑡)
𝜌𝑝                                       (22) 
Expression (21) captures costs related to the child-rearing subsidy, and expression (22) captures costs 
related to the PAYG pension system. Note that the balanced-budget tax rate in expression (20) only 
depends on variables at time 𝑡, with exception for the number of children at time 𝑡 − 1, 𝑛𝑡−1, in expression 
(22). The equilibrium tax rate in expression (20) thus depends on two generations’ fertility choices.  
The relevant dimension of analysis in this paper is demographic ageing in the form of slowing population 
growth and longer-living individuals. These two dimensions have key consequences for the balanced-
budget tax rate. Considering slowing population growth, say we start with higher past fertility, at time 𝑡 −
1. This implies more time spent outside of labor activities for this past generation (from the perspective at 
time 𝑡), meaning that generation 𝑡 − 1’s public pension benefits will equally be reduced. Similarly, higher 
fertility at time 𝑡 − 1 implies a lower old-age dependency ratio, creating more future workers versus 
retirees, ceteris paribus. In other words, higher fertility in the past creates more taxpayers today, which 
relieves pressure that the pension system exerts on each member of the working population. Both these 
effects reduce the taxation effort needed to balance the PAYG pension system.  
If population growth then slows at time 𝑡 with a lower fertility rate, it impacts both the costs associated 
with the child rearing subsidy and public pensions. For the former, lower current fertility implies both a 
decrease in the benefit level an individual is entitled to and an increase in labor activities of that same 
individual. Naturally, the combined effect here is a drop in expenses with the child-rearing subsidy. For 
the latter, in terms of public pensions, a lower fertility at time 𝑡 increases labor market participation of the 
workers in the economy, increasing labor income balances and decreasing the fiscal burden the public 
pension system exerts on each of these taxpayers. 
Turning to increased longevity, reflected as a drop in 𝜆, it is a part of the balanced-budget tax rate 
expression (20), through the old-age dependency ratio in the public pension balance ,𝐶𝑝,𝑡, and the fertility 
rate 𝑛𝑡 present in 𝐶𝑐,𝑡 and 𝐶𝑝,𝑡. The total effect of current and future longevity on pension payouts per unit 
of income is: 
𝑑𝐶𝑝,𝑡
𝑑𝜆𝑡
=
𝜕𝐶𝑝,𝑡
𝜕𝜇𝑡
𝜕𝜇𝑡
𝜕𝜆𝑡
+
𝜕𝐶𝑝,𝑡
𝜕𝑛𝑡−1
𝜕𝑛𝑡−1
𝜕𝜆𝑡
= −
[1 + 2(1 − 𝜆𝑡)𝜌]𝜌𝑝(1 − 𝜌𝑤)𝑧
𝜀𝑡−1(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡)
< 0 
𝑑𝐶𝑝,𝑡
𝑑𝜆𝑡+1
=
𝜕𝐶𝑝,𝑡
𝜕𝑛𝑡
𝜕𝑛𝑡
𝜕𝜆𝑡+1
=
(1 − 𝜆𝑡)(1 − 𝜌𝑤)[1 − 𝑛𝑡−1(1 − 𝜌𝑤)𝑧]𝜀𝑡𝜌𝑝𝜌
𝑛𝑡−1[1 + (1 − 𝜆𝑡+1)(1 − 𝜌𝑤)𝜌 − (1 + 𝜀𝑡)𝜌𝑤]2
> 0 
When current longevity increases (lower 𝜆𝑡), current pension costs increase since more individuals 
survive into retirement. When future longevity increases (lower 𝜆𝑡+1), we see the opposite result where 
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current pension costs decrease. The reason for it is that current fertility choices, 𝑛𝑡, drop when future 
longevity increases, since individuals require more labor income to sustain consumption in the now longer 
lifetime. This implies a higher labor supply and lower future pension benefits, consequently lowering 
public pension contributions per working individual. For the effect of longevity on the costs with the child-
rearing subsidy, current longevity 𝜆𝑡 does not affect 𝐶𝑐,𝑡, whereas future longevity does: 
𝑑𝐶𝑐,𝑡
𝑑𝜆𝑡+1
=
𝜕𝐶𝑐,𝑡
𝜕𝑛𝑡
𝜕𝑛𝑡
𝜕𝜆𝑡+1
=
(1 − 𝜌𝑤)𝜌𝑤𝜌𝜀𝑡
[1 + (1 − 𝜆𝑡+1)(1 − 𝜌𝑤)𝜌 − (1 + 𝜀𝑡)𝜌𝑤]2
> 0 
As with the effects described above, higher future longevity (lower 𝜆𝑡+1) reduces the fertility rate, which 
reduces child-rearing benefits to be transferred. 
Overall, these results reveal two key details: one is the importance of acknowledging the different cohorts 
in society when accounting for demography-specific social spending; the other is the importance of 
analyzing longevity effects alongside fertility choices. These insights make it so that an increase in 
longevity together with a decrease in fertility provokes both an inflationary and a reductionist impact on 
pension costs. The net effect remains ambiguous and requires further numerical evaluation. 
3. The Aggregate Economy 
3.1. Equilibria and transition  
In this section, the transition function and the steady state curve are characterized, as well as the public-
private capital ratio, 𝑋, that maximizes economic growth. The representative insurance company, and 
hence the working generation, invests in both private and public capital. Equilibrium in capital markets 
requires that: 
𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡+1 + 𝐺𝑡+1 ⟺
𝑠𝑡
(1−𝑧𝑛𝑡+1)𝑛𝑡
= 𝑘𝑡+1 + 𝑔𝑡+1                             (23) 
Using the equilibrium condition for capital markets (23) and the solution for 𝑠𝑡 in (14), we obtain: 
?̃?𝑡
(1−𝑧𝑛𝑡+1)𝑛𝑡
(1 − 𝜃𝑡)𝑤𝑡 −
?̃?𝑡
(1−𝑧𝑛𝑡+1)𝑛𝑡
𝜌𝑝
𝜌
𝑤𝑡+1
𝑟𝑡+1
= 𝑘𝑡+1 + 𝑔𝑡+1                             (24) 
To determine transitional dynamics, expressions (6), (7) are used, along with the definition 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
≡
𝑔𝑡+1
𝑔𝑡
 
to solve expression (24) for next period’s public-private capital ratio, 𝑋𝑡+1: 
𝑋𝑡+1(𝑋𝑡 , 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
) =
?̃?𝑡
(1−𝛼)
𝛼
𝜌𝑝
𝜌
+(1−𝑧𝑛𝑡+1)𝑛𝑡
(1−𝜃𝑡)
𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔 ?̃?𝑡𝐴𝑋𝑡
−𝜔−(1−𝑧𝑛𝑡+1)𝑛𝑡
                                       (25) 
This solution is dependent on the policy variable 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
, which is the growth factor of the public capital 
stock per unit of labor. I assume that the government always preserves a balanced-budget tax rate. Even 
though the denominator of (25) reveals that increases to the growth of public capital, 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
, or discretionary 
increases to the tax rate, 𝜃𝑡, both increase 𝑋𝑡+1, it is assumed that the government only uses public 
investment, ∆𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
, as a policy tool to perform the desired fiscal adjustments to ensure convergence or 
maintenance of a steady state. 
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Expression (25) shows that the existence of a public pension system creates an inflationary pressure on 
the future public-private capital ratio. The reduction in private savings due to the public pension system, 
seen in the numerator of (25), is proportional to the ratio of future wages to the interest rate. Since this 
ratio decreases when future public-private capital ratio increases, 𝑋𝑡+1, higher public pension replacement 
rates apply positive pressure on the future public-private capital ratio, ceteris paribus. The implication is 
that sustaining a given level of public capital becomes more cumbersome the higher public pension 
replacement rates are. 
Through expression (5), we can define the economic growth factor per unit of labor: 
                   𝛾𝑡+1
𝑦
≡
𝑦𝑡+1
𝑦𝑡
= (
𝑋𝑡
𝑋𝑡+1
)
𝜔
𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
                                                  (26) 
Expression (26) tells us that the balanced growth path is a situation where public and private capital grow 
at a constant rate equal to economic growth, since the ratio of public to private capital should remain 
constant at steady state. We thus have at steady state (no time subscript implies time stationarity): 𝛾𝑔 =
𝛾𝑘 = 𝛾𝑦 = 𝛾𝑌 𝑛⁄ . It implies that the tax rate, 𝜃𝑡, and the interest rate, 𝑟𝑡, are constant at steady state, 
whereas wages grow at the same rate as GDP per capita. But most importantly, a steady state implies that 
the growth in the public capital stock per unit of labor, 𝛾𝑔, must be equal to the economic growth 
counterpart, 𝛾𝑦. 
Using expression (24) and definition (26), we can obtain the general endogenous expression for the 
economic growth factor per unit of labor from period 𝑡 to +1, 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑦
: 
𝛾𝑡+1
𝑦 (𝑋𝑡 , 𝑋𝑡+1) =
𝐴?̃?𝑡(1−𝛼)𝑋𝑡
−𝜔
?̃?𝑡
𝜌𝑝
𝜌
(1−𝛼)
𝛼
1
𝑋𝑡+1
+(
1
𝑋𝑡+1
+1)(1−𝑧𝑛𝑡+1)𝑛𝑡
(1 − 𝜃𝑡)                          (27) 
Next, I use expression (27) and substitute all variables by their steady state counterparts, most notably 
introducing a constant fertility rate, 𝑛, and public-private capital ratio, 𝑋, to obtain an expression for the 
economic growth factor per labor unit at steady state, the steady state curve (the conditions for short- and 
long-run equilibria can be found in Appendix A): 
𝛾𝑦(𝑋) =
𝐴?̃?(1−𝛼)
?̃?
𝜌𝑝
𝜌
(1−𝛼)
𝛼
𝑋𝜔−1+(𝑋𝜔−1+𝑋𝜔)(1−𝑧𝑛)𝑛
(1 − 𝜃𝑡)                                  (28) 
Expression (28) is proportional to 
𝑋1−𝜔
(1+𝑋)
. Given that 0 < 𝜔 < 1, we have that expression (28) initially 
grows while the numerator dominates, until the denominator becomes dominant and expression (28) starts 
to permanently decrease. Hence, expression (28) admits one maximum. 
 
3.2. Growth-Maximizing Public Debt 
The steady state curve expressed in (28) can be used to determine the steady state public-private capital 
ratio that maximizes economic growth. There are essentially three layers to this optimality problem. One 
is determining the optimal 𝑋 that would maximize growth if the financing of public capital was free and 
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no public transfers existed. This can be thought of as the “pure” 𝑋 ratio that maximizes production. If one 
removes public transfers and taxation from expression (28), this “pure” optimal 𝑋 would be determined 
by: 
(1 − 𝜔)
𝜔
 
This is simply the equalization of the marginal product of public capital with the marginal product of 
private capital, as determined by aggregate production in expression (5). Since public capital must be 
financed by public debt, it requires taxation to fund the interest rate payments on that debt. Expression (28) 
shows that taxation hinders growth proportionally to it. So, adding the second layer to the growth 
optimization problem, which is the tax rate (but still ignoring public transfers), the optimal public-private 
capital ratio becomes:  
−2𝛼(1 − 𝜔) − 𝜔 + √4𝛼(1 − 𝜔) + 𝜔2
2𝛼(1 − 𝜔)
 
The introduction of the taxation system lowers optimal 𝑋 due to the fiscal effort exerted on each 
individual’s income as measured by the relative composition of capital vs. labor intensity: 𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)⁄  (see 
the numerator of the tax rate in expression 20). Notably, no demographic parameters are part of this 
solution. This tells us that the impact of demographic change on the optimality of public debt (or public 
capital) is linked to the public transfers in place. 
The third layer to the growth optimization problem is related to the existence of a PAYG pension system 
(and child-rearing subsidies). Expression (28) shows that the existence of this pension system affects 
economic growth15 in two ways:  
1) Through negative impacts to the amount of saving each individual does, as seen in the denominator 
of (28). The impact of the PAYG pension is weighed by the ratio of the pension replacement rate 
and the subjective discount factor, 𝜌𝑝 𝜌⁄  and the relative composition of labor vs. capital intensity, 
(1 − 𝛼) 𝛼⁄ . Here: 
a. The more impatient individuals are, or the smaller the pension replacement ratios are, the 
less impact PAYG pensions have on saving behavior and, consequently, growth.  
b. High labor intensity economies are more sensitive to the existence of a PAYG system in 
terms of economic growth. The higher the labor intensity, the lower economic growth will 
be for a given pension replacement, 𝜌𝑝. 
2) Through the taxation system, seen as (1 − 𝜃𝑡) in expression (28). The negative effects of the 
PAYG system are then measured by the funding requirements specified in expression (22). The 
analysis of that expression showed that the effects of demographic ageing on the tax rate 𝜃𝑡 is 
 
15 Note that PAYG pension systems can have socially useful objectives not considered in this paper. As such, I refrain from making normative statements on the 
existence of PAYG pensions. They are considered in the model as a reflection of reality, only being present due to the hypothesized link between age-related 
expenditures and the provision of public capital described in the introduction of this paper. 
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ambiguous, such that the net effect of PAYG pension on economic growth can only be verified in 
the numerical section. 
The optimal public-private capital ratio that maximizes economic growth, as seen in expression (28), is: 
 
 
𝑋∗
=
1
2𝛼𝑛𝜌(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝑧𝑛)
{
 
 
 
 
𝑛2[𝜔(1 − 𝐶𝑝) + 𝛼[2 − (2 − 𝐶𝑝)𝜔]𝜌𝑧]
− [𝜔(1 − 𝐶𝑝) + 𝛼[2 − (2 − 𝐶𝑝)𝜔]] 𝜌𝑛 − (1 − 𝛼)?̃?(2 − 𝜔)𝜌𝑝
+ √
4(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝐶𝑝)𝑛(1 − 𝜔)2𝜌(1 − 𝑧𝑛)[?̃?𝜌𝑝(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼𝑛𝜌(1 − 𝑧𝑛)] +
[
−2?̃?𝜌𝑝(2 − 𝜔) − (1 − 𝐶𝑝)𝑛𝜔𝜌(1 − 𝑧𝑛) +
𝛼[−𝑛(2 − (2 − 𝐶𝑝)𝜔)𝜌 + ?̃?(2 − 𝜔)𝜌𝑝 + 𝑛2(2 − (2 − 𝐶𝑝)𝜔)𝜌𝑧]
]
2
}
 
 
 
 
 
(29) 
 
Beyond the usual production parameters 𝛼 and 𝜔 found in the formulas above, 𝑋∗ now becomes a 
function of both the child-rearing subsidy as well as the PAYG pension replacement rate (along with many 
other parameters, such as impatience, child-rearing time). The formula is too complex to make simpler 
analysis on it. The results on the impact of demographic ageing to the optimal public-private capital ratio 
is then left to the numerical section. It should be noted that Appendix C shows that this capital ratio is 
indeed a maximizing solution, and not a minimizing one. We thus have that 𝛾𝑦(𝑋∗) is the unique maximum 
growth point in the steady state curve. 
3.3. Transitional dynamics and policy tool 
So far, the transition equation, the steady state curve, and the public-private capital ratio that maximizes 
economic growth were defined. A remaining piece of the puzzle is the transitional dynamics along the 
steady state curve, and especially, the dynamics around the maximum growth steady state. 
For the steady state curve (28), there always exists a range of public-private capital ratios which are 
locally stable, including a non-hyperbolic steady state (see Appendix B for the proof). The non-hyperbolic 
steady state is in fact the maximum growth steady state with special stability properties (see Appendix C 
for proof). The transition curve found in expression (25) has the shape found in Figure 1 below: 
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Figure 1 – Plot of motion equation for 𝑋𝑡+1. 
Looking at the blue line in Figure 1, graphing the motion equation for the maximal growth public 
investment policy, it has one steady state associated with it at 𝑋∗, the maximal growth steady state. It is 
stable from the left, meaning that if an economy is currently at an 𝑋 level lower than 𝑋∗ and the government 
sets the growth rate of public capital to the maximal growth rate of the economy, the economy will 
converge towards the maximal growth steady state and it will stay there. The maximal growth steady state 
is unstable from the right, yielding the exact opposite result: an economy currently at an 𝑋 level higher 
than 𝑋∗ must restrict its borrowing for public investment, relative to the maximal growth policy, to prevent 
the economy from collapsing.  
Most importantly, there will always be two steady states when the growth rate of the public capital stock 
is set to any value between 0 and the maximal growth rate. The orange line in Figure 1 is an example of 
an austerity motion equation. One of the two steady states will have a low public-private capital ratio, 
termed 𝑋𝑙, and the other a high ratio, termed 𝑋ℎ, where the maximal growth steady state will necessarily 
be between them (see Figure 1). Both 𝑋𝑙 and 𝑋ℎ steady states will have the same economic growth rate 
(by definition), though the 𝑋𝑙 steady state is locally stable, whereas its 𝑋ℎ counterpart is unstable (see 
Appendix C for proof). This implies that 𝑋ℎ is a critical value, beyond which an economy’s public debt 
stock explodes. (under a golden rule of public finance). 
The main take-away here is that there exists an instrument with which the government can stabilize an 
economy’s fiscal situation by temporarily setting low enough public investment (lowering the issue of 
public debt) to contain an otherwise exploding 𝑋. The containment region is determined by the position of 
the high ratio steady state 𝑋ℎ, and this ratio itself can be increased by further decreasing the growth of the 
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public capital stock, 𝛾𝑡+1
𝐺 . Denoting 𝑋𝑐 as the current public-private capital ratio, the minimum level of 
austerity to contain 𝑋𝑐 is the one that reduces public capital growth just enough to make 𝑋ℎ > 𝑋𝑐. If 
enough austerity is applied, the economy’s current public-private capital ratio 𝑋𝑐 will converge towards 
the low ratio steady state, 𝑋𝑙, over time. Recalling that 𝑋𝑙 will always be a lower value than the growth-
maximizing optimal ratio 𝑋∗, once the current ratio 𝑋𝑐 goes below this optimal ratio the government can 
go back to applying the growth maximizing public investment rate, and the economy will converge to and 
stabilize at 𝑋∗. 
4. Baseline Calibration 
Now the benchmark calibration that will be used for the numerical results is presented. The benchmark 
calibration is set to match the 45-year period 1969-2013 for the average OECD economy16 with respect to 
key data points of relevance to the study. This will be the starting point to analyze how demographic change 
and its interaction with the provision of public pensions and child-rearing subsidies impact the optimal 
debt-GDP ratio over the rest of the 21st century. 
4.1. Production parameters 
Starting with production-side parameters, the value of 𝛼 is set to 0.36. Having a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, this value was obtained from AMECO database’s “Adjusted wage share, total 
economy, as percentage of GDP at current factor cost” measurement. 
Next, measuring the influence of private capital (as opposed to public capital) in the efficiency of labor, 
is parameter 𝛽, which is not readily available in the literature. Checherita-Westphal et al. (2014) estimates 
𝜔 to be equal to 0.716.17 Having 𝛼 equal to 0.36, the definition of 𝜔 implies that 𝛽 equals 0.56. 
Finally, the TFP parameter 𝐴 is calibrated through the production function in expression (5), by making 
use of the calibrated value for 𝜔 and data for the public and private capital stock from IMF’s Investment 
and Capital Stock Dataset, 2017. This operation yields 𝐴 = 34. 
4.2. Preference and demographic parameters 
Parameter 𝜌 represents the subjective discount factor individuals apply to consumption in their retired 
period of life. Given that this discount factor represents a 45-year leap, it is arguably appropriate to 
acknowledge declining discount rates for longer periods of inter-temporal planning (see for example the 
 
16 Certain data only exists up to 2013, hence the choice of 2013 as the end year. Given the time period at hand and the focus group (the OECD countries), some of 
the data required for the calibration exercise is missing. Whenever there are data points consistently throughout the entire 45-year period, I use averages over the period 
at hand. Whenever data is not available for a portion of the period, linear inter-/ extrapolation is used. For demographic projections, the only data points available are 
1970-2015-2060-2100. This is slightly mismatching the rest of the data, but this detail should not significantly bias the numerical results presented here. 
17 First, the referred paper uses data for 22 of the biggest OECD countries for the period 1960-2010, which closely matches the current setting. Second, it uses a 
slightly more general production function than I do, the difference being that they do not include per-employee productivity gains to labor inputs to production. I have 
the following production function 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝐾𝑡
𝜔𝐺𝑡
1−𝜔
 whereas they have  𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴(𝐾 𝐿)𝑡
𝜑⁄ 𝐾𝑡
𝜔𝐿𝑡
1−𝜔
 (in my notation, where 𝜑 is the elasticity of the labor-capital to 
GDP). For my specification to match theirs, 𝜑 must be estimated to be zero. In fact, their estimate of the OECD average for 𝜑 is very close to zero at 0.037 (see Table 
2, for Model 2, Checherita-Westphal et al., 2014). 
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treatise on discounting by Frederick et al. 2002, and a substantiation of hyperbolic discounting for saving 
behavior by Cao and Werning, 2018). In this light, the discount rate is calibrated hyperbolically at an 
annual rate of 1%. We thus have 𝜌 = 1 (1 + 45 × 0,01)⁄ = 0.6918. 
Parameter 𝑧 measures the loss of work time to child-rearing activities. Given the difficulty in obtaining 
such a parameter, a proxy measurement is utilized of “Persons who did not work or look for work by age, 
gender, and reason for not working in 2014” for “people not working in order to undertake home 
responsibilities”, taken from the US Census Bureau’s “Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the 
Current Population Survey”. Interpreting “home responsibilities” as a proxy for not working due to child-
rearing, averaging across the entire US population in 2014 yields 𝑧 = 0.28. 
The child-rearing subsidy rate is calibrated it by making use of government spending data from OECD’s 
“Family Database” under “Total public social expenditure on families as a percentage of GDP”, and 
OECD’s “Education at a glance” reports. For the period 1969-2013, social spending, including primary to 
tertiary schooling, amounted to 7% of GDP. I then match the calibration’s child-rearing costs as a 
percentage of GDP to the value found in data. Knowing that the population growth factor in the OECD 
from 1970-2015 implies 𝑛 = 1.361 (see Table 1), 𝛼 = 0.36 and 𝑧 = 0.28, one can solve for 𝜌𝑤: 
(𝑁𝑤𝑧𝑛𝜌𝑤) 𝑌⁄ = 0,07 ⟺ [(1 − 𝛼)𝑧𝑛𝜌𝑤] (1 − 𝑧𝑛)⁄ = 0.07 ⟺ 𝜌𝑤 ≈ 0.1819. 
 1970-2015 2015-2060 2060-2100 
45-year population growth rate 36.1% 6.3% -5.2% 
Old-age dependency ratio 21.9% 44.0% 60.1% 
Life expectancy at birth 75.2 83.9 89.2 
Table 1: Demographic structure, historical values and projections. Source: United Nations 
Next, fertility and mortality parameters are calibrated. Overall, three demographic structures will be 
calibrated for the periods 1970-2015, 2015-2060 and 2060-2100. I start by focusing on the first one. The 
parametrization of the latter two demographic structures can be found in Table 4. The mortality rate, 𝜆, is 
found by matching the model’s old-age dependency ratio to that observed in the data. The model’s old-age 
dependency ratio is equal to (1 − 𝜆) 𝑛⁄ . The old-age dependency ratio in the data (see Table 1), is 21.9% 
for the period 1970-2015. With 𝑛 = 1.361 for the same period, 𝜆 becomes 0.7. Following a similar 
procedure for the preference for having children parameter 𝜀, I match the model’s fertility rate, 𝑛, to the 
one observed in the data. I then use expression (15), which does not include any endogenous variables, and 
solve it for 𝜀. This procedure yields 𝜀 = 0.55. 
Finally, the pension replacement rate is calibrated. Public pension expenditures as a proportion of GDP 
can be written as: 
 
18 Note that Frederick et al. 2002 reports a survey of longer-term discounting results (average measurement > 1 year), where the average discount factor found is 
consistently around 0,8 for all time horizons considered. The parametrization here of 0,69 is then perhaps overly discounting the future, and not otherwise. 
19 Note that this procedure does not make use of endogenous variables. The calibration procedure overall is strictly based on other (non-optimized) parameters. 
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[𝑤𝑡−1(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡−1) + 𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑡−1𝑧𝑛𝑡−1]𝑖𝑡𝜌𝑝,𝑡(1 − 𝜆𝑡)𝑁𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡
= 
=
[(1 − 𝑧𝑛) + 𝜌𝑤𝑧𝑛]𝑤𝑡(1 − 𝜆)𝜌𝑝𝑁𝑡−1
𝐴𝑋𝑡
−𝜔𝑔𝑡𝐿𝑡
= 
= [(1 − 𝑧𝑛) + 𝜌𝑤𝑧𝑛]
(1−𝜆)
(1−𝑧𝑛)𝑛
(1 − 𝛼)𝜌𝑝                                  (30) 
The pension replacement rate is found by matching public pension expenditures as a proportion of GDP 
to real world values, utilizing the calibrated parameters for 𝑧, 𝜀, 𝜌𝑤, 𝜆, and 𝛼. Using OECD’s Pensions at 
a Glance database, I estimate pension expenditures as a proportion of GDP to be 6% for the period 1969-
2013. By equating this proportion to the last part of expression (30) and solving for 𝜌𝑝, we obtain 𝜌𝑝 =
0.21. 
Table 2 summarizes the parameter values for the baseline calibration: 
𝛼 Private capital share in national income 0.36 
𝛽 Private capital share in labor productivity 0.56 
𝜔 Private capital share in aggregate production 0.72 
𝐴 TFP scale factor 34 
𝜌 Discounting 0.69 
𝑧 Rearing time per child 0.28 
𝜌𝑤 Child-rearing subsidy rate 0.18 
𝜆 Hazard rate 0.70 
𝜀 Importance of children in utility 0.55 
𝜌𝑝 Public pension replacement rate 0.21 
Table 2: Summary of baseline parametrization 
4.3. Initial Steady state 
Table 3 summarizes the modeling results for the baseline steady state in 1970-2015. The baseline 
calibration results in an optimal debt-GDP ratio of 40.6%, tied together with an optimal public-private 
capital ratio of approximately 0.19. The optimal debt-GDP ratio is quite smaller than what OECD countries 
like Japan, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and the US (among others) have nowadays. The average OECD country 
has a 65% debt-GDP ratio for the period 1995-2013, though some countries keep lower-than-optimal debt-
GDP ratios, such as Estonia, Chile, and Luxembourg.  
 
𝑑∗ Optimal debt-GDP ratio at steady state (annualized) 40.6% 
𝑋∗ Optimal public-private capital ratio 0.193 
𝛾𝑌 Economic growth rate (annualized) 0.99% 
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𝛾𝑦 Economic growth rate per capita (annualized) 0.3% 
𝜃 Tax rate 24.4% 
𝑟 − 1 Interest rate (annualized) 4.64% 
𝑛 Number of children per person 1.361 
 Saving rate out of disposable income 13.2% 
 Old-age dependency ratio 22% 
 Life expectancy at birth 78.5 
 Taxation revenue as a proportion of GDP 10.7% 
 Public pension expenditure as a proportion of GDP 6.1% 
 Return on private savings (annualized) 7.5% 
 Implied return to public pensions (annualized) 3.7% 
Table 3: Summary of benchmark calibration results 
Note that these countries can have more public debt than public capital, since they do not follow the 
golden rule of public finance. Considering these cases, where the golden rule of public finance is not in 
place, it is important to compare the public-private capital ratio, instead of public debt, to the optimal value 
indicated by the model. For this, IMF’s Investment and Capital Stock Dataset, 2017, indicates an average 
public-private capital ratio 𝑋 of 0.383 for the OECD group for the period 1969-2013. This value is in fact 
higher than what the model indicates, a public-private capital ratio of 0.193. The baseline thus suggests 
that, on average, OECD economies are either not employing enough private capital or are employing to 
much public capital.  
Countries with public-private capital ratios higher than the optimal value suggested by this model are not 
necessarily performing excessive public investment. The ratio 𝑋 can be too high if public capital is too 
high or if private capital is too low. The stock of private capital can in fact be “artificially” low if there 
exists excessive discretionary20 public debt crowding it out. This means that policies to reduce the public-
private capital ratio, 𝑋, do not have to include reductions in public capital investment; in a closed-economy 
perspective, such an objective can be fulfilled simply by reducing “discretionary” public debt. In this case, 
private capital crowd-out is reduced, and a lower public-private capital ratio follows while maintaining the 
same level of public capital. 
The optimized yearly economic growth rate for the economy stands at roughly 1.0%, with per capita 
growth at 0.3%. These values are lower than what the OECD economies experienced in the 1969-2013 
period (an average of 2.8%, 1.91% per capita21). The detail to consider here is that exogenous TFP growth 
is not included in the modelling; only labor-related endogenous productivity growth is included. The saving 
 
20 “Discretionary” in the sense that it is debt that is not raised for the purpose of public investment. 
21 The OECD Economic Outlook dataset for growth rates; World Bank WDI report for per capita growth rates. 
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rate stands at 13.2%22 and it is very close to the average gross saving rate out of disposable income reported 
in the AMECO database (13.9% for the period 1969-2013), but larger than the average net saving rate of 
8.3% reported in OECD’s Economic Outlook database23.  
As for the interest rate, the annualized value stands at 4.6%, a reasonable value, close to the observed 
average OECD real interest rate of 4.4% in the period 1969-201324. The balanced-budget tax rate is 24.4%. 
To gain a better perspective into what this number means, the tax revenue as a proportion of GDP is also 
reported, which stands at 10.7%. Data from OECD’s Revenue Statistics indicates that the OECD average 
is 9.4% for income and profits earned by individuals. The resulting balanced-budget tax rate represents a 
reasonable value, though a bit on the high-side given that many other public expenditure items exist. The 
excess can also stem from the fact that only labor income and the child-rearing subsidy are taxed. In reality, 
many other incomes/profits are taxed. 
Values are reported for the resulting fertility rate, old-age dependency ratio, and public pension 
expenditures as a proportion of GDP. By parametrization design, these values should be as close as possible 
to the observable data. The fertility rate (per individual) stands at 1.361 (or an annual population growth 
rate of 0.7%), the old-age dependency ratio is 22%, and public expenditures amount to 6.1% of GDP, all 
virtually identical to their observed data counterparts. As an additional check, I report life expectancy at 
birth, as calculated by 20 + 45 + 45(1 − 𝜆). It stands at 78.5 years, a value higher than the one observed 
in the data for the OECD, 75.3 years25, which is expected since a 45-year working career starting at the 
age of 20 is assumed. The model value for life expectancy is still quite close to the real counterpart, such 
that this should not represent an issue for the analysis. Finally, I report the return to retirement savings and 
implied return to public pensions measured as the ratio of pension payouts to pension pay-ins. This is 
calculated as [(1 + 𝐶𝑐) 𝐶𝑝⁄ ]𝜌𝑝𝛾
𝑦|𝑋=𝑋∗. An annualized return of 7.5% for private savings is obtained, 
versus 3.7% for public pensions. Private savings represent a better deal for households, though subjective 
discounting of future consumption makes households less willing to save. This discounting effect does not 
impact consumption at retirement provided by public pension income, since the benefit accrual rate is not 
chosen by households. 
5. Results 
So far, steady state equilibria, transitional behavior, and the existence of a policy tool with which to 
preserve public debt sustainability have been shown. This theoretical setting is now applied numerically 
 
22 This saving rate is derived by dividing savings, as it stands in expression (14), and dividing it by disposable income, (1 − 𝜃)𝑤(1 − 𝑧𝑛(1 − 𝜌𝑤)). 
23 It is unlikely that the difference between gross and net saving rates explains the wedge between the AMECO and OECD databases. This is revealing a more 
symptomatic reason, where methodologies for the derivation of saving rates likely yield markedly different results. 
24 Data from the World Development Indicators database. Only countries with more than 15 data points were considered 18 out of the 35 OECD countries were 
included. These are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Spain, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, the United States of America. 
25 Source: United Nations Population Division. 
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to analyze demographic shocks and their impact on the economy. Relevant dimensions, such as the fiscal 
stance of the government and the optimal public debt level, are discussed, as well as the impact of 
demographic ageing on the stability of the initial benchmark steady state. The new maximal growth steady 
states are shown for each future expected demographic structure, along with their convergence properties 
relative to the previous steady state. An analysis into how key parameters in the model affect the baseline 
results then follows. 
5.1. Benchmark scenario 
Demographic parameters will now be modified to match the projections in Table 1 in terms of the old-
age dependency ratio and the fertility rate by re-calibrating 𝜆 and 𝜀. Table 4 summarizes all three steady 
states for each of the demographic structures in Table 1, as well as the reductions in public investment 
necessary to ensure that the public debt stock does not spiral out of control: 
Period: 1970-2015 2015-2060 2060-2100 
λ 0.7 0.53 0.43 
ε 0.55 0.427 0.388 
Life expectancy at birth 78.5 86.15 90.65 
𝑋∗ 0.193 0.192 0.191 
d∗ (a) 40.6% 40.5% 40.3% 
𝛾𝑌 (a) 0.99% 1.55% 1.7% 
𝛾𝑦 (a) 0.3% 1.42% 1.82% 
𝜃 24.4% 26.4% 28.8% 
Saving rate out of disp. income 13.2% 15.3% 15.4% 
Interest rate (a) 4.64% 4.64% 4.63% 
Tax revenue / GDP 10.7% 12.8% 14.4% 
Public pension expenditure / GDP 6.1% 7.2% 7.74% 
Return on private savings (a) 7.5% 6.4% 5.9% 
Implied return to public pensions (a) 3.7% 3.3% 3.0% 
Public investment - Sustainability (a) --- 6x10-6 pp. 2x10-5 pp. 
Public investment – Max. growth (a) --- 0.007 pp. 0.013 pp. 
Table 4: Projected demographic shifts and future steady state results; (a) indicates annualized values. 
Starting with the most important result, we see that with decreasing fertility and mortality comes a lower 
optimal public-private capital ratio, 𝑋∗26. This reduction in 𝑋∗ can have serious implications in terms of 
stability, since, upon a demographic shock, the steady state for the period 1970-2015 lies to the right of the 
2015-2060 steady state. As the stability analysis in sub-section 3.3 concluded, this implies that the 
government must apply austerity to public investment relative to the maximal growth policy. Even though 
there is the need for a reduction in public investment, and by extension, a need for reducing public debt 
issuing, table 4 shows that the impact of the demographic ageing on 𝑋∗ is very small. 
Two different public investment policies are described in table 4 to face demographic ageing in what the 
 
26 Though not included in the text, fertility and mortality decreases have each a negative impact on 𝑋∗. 
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sustainability of public debt is concerned. The first is termed “Public investment – Sustainability” and the 
other “Public investment – Max. growth”. The former policy just ensures the sustainability of the public 
debt stock at its level in the previous steady state after the demographic shift takes place. This will be a 
permanent state of lower economic growth compared to its current potential. Since an effort is not made 
to transition into the new maximal growth steady state, the economy will be stabilized at a lower growth 
state, which by steady state definition also requires a permanently reduced public investment policy. 
Turning to the “maximum growth” policy, it ensures convergence towards the new maximal growth steady 
state in one 45-year period, which requires a more aggressive reduction in public investment, though 
temporary. After the transition period, the economy stabilizes at maximal growth forever if no further 
shocks take place. 
Table 4 shows that, for both demographic shocks at 2015-2060 and 2060-2100, public capital growth 
must be reduced by a negligible amount to just ensure its sustainability. For example, transitioning from a 
1975-2015 to 2015-2060 demographic structure requires a sustainability-inducing austerity policy of 
reducing public capital growth by an annual 6x10-6 percentage points for eternity (with no further 
demographic change). Transitioning to the 2060-2100 period, a minimum sustainability-inducing policy 
of 2x10-5 is observed, which remains negligible. As for the 1-period convergence public investment policy, 
though it requires stronger adjustments now, it still implies negligible reductions to public investment of 
an annual 0.007 percentage points per year for 45 years when transitioning from the 1970-2015 period to 
the 2015-2060 one. This number becomes 0.013pp. to transition to the 2060-2100 maximal growth steady 
state in one period. We thus have that austerity policies over the optimal public capital policy are virtually 
unnecessary in what demographic change is concerned. Even if a government attempts to induce 
convergence in only one-period, the amount of austerity remains negligible27.  
The public debt-GDP ratio tracks 𝑋∗ proportionally by definition (see expression 17), and it also sees 
very small changes to it. Interest rates also barely change negatively, meaning that interest servicing costs 
per unit of public debt will virtually remain the same. Effectively, the predicted demographic shifts, as 
large as they are (especially the old-age dependency ratio), virtually do not require accommodation in 
terms of the optimal public debt policy. We expectedly see a rather large change to the balanced-budget 
tax rate, and reforms to accommodate demographic change should instead focus on balancing taxation 
revenue and public expenditure on demography related items.28 
 
27 It is always worthwhile forcing the fastest convergence possible towards the maximal growth steady state in what concerns total inter-generational welfare. This 
will never be a Pareto improvement, since inducing (even marginally) an economy to converge to a new higher growth steady state after a demographic shock always 
implies at least one period of lower wage growth. This means that those living today will have lower life-time consumption and all future generations will be as well 
off as the economy allows them to. Applying the minimum austerity policy does not penalize the first generation of workers relative to all future workers, but all these 
future workers will not be able to be as well off as the economy actually allows them too because the government is forced to permanently restrict public investment 
to allow for a higher than optimal debt-GDP ratio (or equivalently, the optimal public-private capital ratio). 
28 All these results come with one caveat: this analysis is performed on the average OECD country. The weak effect results might be much stronger for certain 
OECD economies. We provide a robustness check to gain insight into this possibility. 
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As for economic growth (per capita), it is seen that it increases with the demographic shift. The driver of 
stronger economic growth stems mainly from an increase in the saving rate. There are two other items that 
are dragging economic growth down: the increased tax rate, and the decreased fertility rate. The tax rate 
suffers an increase, from 24.4% in 1970-2015 to 26.4% in 2015-2060, and then to 28.8% in 2060-2100. 
In a different perspective, tax revenues as a proportion of GDP goes from 10.7% to 12.8% to 14.4%. We 
are thus in a situation where demographic ageing implies increased financing requirements. Adding to this 
is the projected decrease in fertility, from 1.361 children per person on average in 1970-2015 to less than 
1 child per person for 2060-2100. This hinders economic growth in two ways: first, by having less workers 
come into the economy; second, by increasing the negative effect public pensions have on growth, since 
there are now fewer working age individuals to pay into the public pension system.  
We observe that the increase in saving behavior, due to a higher life expectancy, dominates all these 
negative effects, thus increasing the economic growth rate. This reveals a potential problem that economies 
may face: if the saving rate of households does not increase as expected, in line with increases in longevity, 
or if the retirement age is not adjusted accordingly to roughly maintain the same relative length of 
retirement, we will not see the positive growth effects from increased saving, but we will have all the 
negative effects from higher taxation and lower fertility. 
Finally, the demographic shift implies an increase with public pension costs, from an initial 6.1% to 7.2% 
in the following 45-year period, to 7.7% in the 2 period after the initial one. More people surviving into 
retirement and less people contributing into the pension system justifies this result. The implied public 
pension return, defined as how much one individual receives in public pension compared to how much that 
individual contributes into it, drops after the demographic shift takes place. Public pension payouts become 
more attractive as economic growth per capita increases due to wage indexing, but pension contributions 
into the public system also become higher when longevity increases. The latter effect dominates the former 
effect, thus worsening the implied return to the public pension system. 
5.2. Weakening/Strengthening PAYG pensions 
The analysis so far focused on a benchmark case of the average OECD country. Further investigation is 
thus warranted to understand how the model’s results change with key parameters. This is important to 
understand in which dimensions the model’s results are generalizable, and which should be given further 
thought at a country-specific level. To begin, different economies are considered, differing only in the 
public pension replacement rate, 𝜌𝑝, offered by the government. The experiment is done for the range 0 to 
100%. 
Figure 2 plots the key results from the model over the pension replacement rate on the x-axis. Starting 
with non-demographic observations: The optimal public-private capital and debt-GDP ratios are 
remarkably stable across all replacement rates within period. This comes in contrast with what is observed 
from tax rates in the first period, 1970-2015, which increase from 20%, when no public pensions are 
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offered, to 40% when full replacement of lifetime income is offered by the government at retirement.  
 
Figure 2 - Results for various 𝜌𝑝 values. Vertical dashing line represents benchmark value. 
Now considering the results across periods, the lower end of replacement rates sees negligible impacts 
on all three variables, optimal public debt/capital and the tax rate, stemming from demographic shifts. The 
existence of public pensions is the main driver of the results seen in the benchmark calibration. The child-
rearing subsidy alone has little impact to the optimal public debt policy, a result already confirmed in the 
work of Hughes Hallett et al. (2019). Only when public pension replacement rates rise do optimal public-
private capital and debt-GDP ratios begin to curve downwards after demographic change takes place. 
Two effects take place to the optimal public debt-GDP ratio when the replacement rate increases: 
• One, the PAYG pension benefits disincentivize more and more private saving, which is damaging 
to economic growth. Increasing the public-private capital ratio 𝑋 softens the impact the PAYG 
system does to the saving mechanism (see denominator of expression 28). 
• Two, tax collection to preserve the fiscal balance of the PAYG pension system progressively 
increases as the replacement rate is higher. For a given old-age dependency ratio, higher benefits 
become relatively harder to finance, which in turn make a given stock of public debt harder to 
finance out of the common pool of resources (see the numerator of tax rate expression 19). This 
implies a lower optimal public debt-GDP ratio for higher pension replacement rates. 
The two effects described above impact the optimal public debt-GDP ratio in different directions. The 
numerical simulation above shows that the second mechanism dominates the first, such that with higher 
PAYG pension replacement rates comes a lower optimal public debt-GDP ratio. 
Table 5 summarizes the results for no PAYG pensions vs. 100% PAYG pension replacement rate. First, 
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for the key result on transitional impacts, an economy that does not offer PAYG pension benefits sees 
virtually no impact to its optimal public debt policy. With no PAYG pension system, the reductions in 
fertility translate into a lower tax rate when the demographic structure evolves from the 1970-2015 period 
onward, as expenditures with the child-rearing subsidy drop. As public pensions are introduced, its tax-
increasing effects quickly overshadow the tax decreasing effects from child-related transfers. 
For full pension benefits, at a 100% replacement rate, we now observe that the effects of demographic 
change become very pronounced for the optimal public-private capital and debt-GDP ratios. Initially, 
between 1970-2015, it is optimal to keep a debt-GDP ratio of 39.6%. Two periods ahead, between 2060-
2100, that number decreases to 28.2%, which is a significant drop. Figure 2 also shows that the drop in the 
optimal debt-GDP ratio starts to get significant in size from a replacement rate of ~60% and above. 
Demographic shifts are a double-edged sword for countries offering very high replacement rates: not only 
the optimal debt-GDP ratio becomes markedly lower (by roughly 5 pp. every 45 years), setting a more 
demanding target for public debt reduction, it also raises tax rates significantly (by roughly 15 pp. every 
45 years), making it harder to create the budget surpluses required to reduce the public debt stock. 
Pension 
replacement rate: 
𝝆𝐩 = 𝟎 𝝆𝐩 = 𝟏 
Period: 
1970-
2015 
2015-
2060 
2060-
2100 
1970-
2015 
2015-
2060 
2060-
2100 
X∗ 0.1916 0.1916 0.1916 0.1864 0.1528 0.1161 
d∗ (a) 40.4% 40.4% 40.4% 39.6% 34.3% 28.2% 
𝜃 19.7% 17.1% 16.2% 41.4% 59.3% 72.3% 
Tax revenue / GDP 8.7% 8.3% 8.1% 18.2% 28.7% 36.2% 
Public investment 
- Sustainability (a) 
- ≈0pp. ≈0pp. - 0.015pp. 0.03pp. 
Public investment 
– Max. growth (a) 
- ≈0pp. ≈0pp. - 0.31pp. 0.44pp. 
Table 5: Model’s results when 𝜌𝑝, the public pension replacement rate, is 100%; (a) indicates annualized values 
Table 5 reports the sustainability-preserving and maximal growth-inducing adjustment to the 
government’s policy function of public investment. First, the steady state adjustment to public investment 
required to stabilize the economy around the previous period’s public-private capital ratio is 0.015 pp. for 
the transition from 1970-2015 to 2015-2060. The next jump to 2060-2100 requires a minimum adjustment 
of 0.03 pp. Though these values are much higher than in the benchmark scenario, they are still relatively 
negligible. If we turn our attention to the austerity policy of enforcing a 45-year convergence towards the 
new maximal growth steady state, we now see that this type of austerity policy requires lowering the growth 
of the public capital stock by around 0.31-0.44 percentage points every year, for 45 years. The results are 
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not as negligible as they were, though a value just below half a percentage point is arguably no cause for 
serious concern. 
It is thus concluded that paths to ensure stability or convergence towards a new steady state under a new 
demographic structure exist for the entire range of possible public pension replacement rates. Even for 
governments that offer very high public pension replacement rates, ensuring stability or convergence 
towards the new steady states requires only negligible reductions in public investment. Even if transition 
to the new steady state is to be made in one period (45 years), a reasonable path still exists, only requiring 
a drop in public investment in the order of 0.31-0.44 percentage points a year. The point to note in terms 
of fiscal sustainability is then the implied balanced-budget tax rates seen for countries with very strong 
PAYG pension schemes. Keeping these systems as they currently are imply massive increases to tax 
collection in order to keep these PAYG schemes balanced. Action is required on reforming these systems, 
and not so much on reforming the way public investment is taking place today vs. the long-term future. 
5.3. Production function parameters – 𝜶 and 𝜷 
Now, production function parameters, key elements in defining the optimal public-private capital ratio 
𝑋∗, are considered in terms of 𝛼 and 𝛽. Figure 3 plots the model’s results for the entire range of possible 
values for 𝛼. Starting with tax rate effects of increasing 𝛼, we see that tax rates display a certain concavity 
over 𝛼 values for each period. As 𝛼 increases, the costs with servicing public debt increase, but the optimal 
public debt level decreases at the same time. These two elements counteractively remain balanced, which 
explains the low variance of the tax rate across different values of 𝛼. Looking at how demographic change 
impacts the equilibrium tax rate over periods, it uniformly impacts the tax rate across the range by 
increasing it. 
 
Figure 3 – Results for various 𝛼 values. Vertical dashing line represents benchmark value. 
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Focusing now on the optimal debt-GDP ratio (or equivalently the optimal public-private capital ratio), 
we see that increasing 𝛼 provokes a monotonic decrease in the optimal debt-GDP ratio for a given period. 
This is not surprising, given that increasing the proportion of production that stems from private capital, 
as opposed to labor activities, decreases the importance of public capital for a given level of production. 
The interesting detail to underline is that demographic change impacts the optimal debt-GDP ratio in 
different directions depending on the value of 𝛼. The reasoning follows:  
• When 𝛼 is low, two effects take place: 
o One, the costs with financing a given stock of public debt are lower (see tax rate 
expression 20).  
o Two, the negative impact of PAYG pensions on the saving mechanism becomes stronger. 
Thus, stimulating wage rates further up by increasing 𝑋 becomes optimal as a 
government policy (see denominator of economic growth expression 28). 
These two effects together yield a higher 𝑋∗ when demographic ageing takes place. When 𝛼 is high, these 
two effects reverse, and demographic ageing implies new steady states with a lower maximal growth 
public-private capital ratio 𝑋∗. The benchmark case is performed at 𝛼 = 0.36. In the data, countries with 
low 𝛼 values, as of 2013, are: Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Slovenia, the UK, Iceland, Switzerland 
and South Korea. All other OECD countries face a negative impact on optimal public investment due to 
demographic change, however small that impact may be. This result also reveals future concerns over 
technological change: if private capital is increasing in importance over time, relative to labor, 
demographic change may have an increasing negative impact on economies as time moves forward. 
Turning to the parameter 𝛽 (see Figure 4), it determines the contribution of aggregate private capital, as 
opposed to public capital, in the effectiveness of labor in the production process. Within period, the optimal 
public-private capital and public debt ratios change considerably over 𝛽, and the curves are virtually 
independent of demographic change. For a reasonable value interval of [0.3 − 0.8], 𝑋∗ (𝑑∗) ranges from 
0.33 (71%) to 0.09 (16%). Like with parameter 𝛼, the debt-GDP ratio is much more sensitive than the 
public-private capital ratio because the expression for the debt-GDP ratio is scaled by 𝜔 ≡ 𝛼 + 𝛽(1 − 𝛼) 
(see expression 17).  
The tax rate is downwards sloping, since a lower 𝛽 is associated with a higher need for public capital, 
which requires more taxation to fund the public debt servicing costs. Demographic change increases tax 
rates across all 𝛽 values equally, but it virtually has no impact to the optimal debt-GDP ratio. A changing 
𝛽 does not affect the taxation structure of the economy, as it does not enter the balanced-budget tax rate 
expression. It only affects the production side of the economy. Since public capital is costly to run due to 
the taxation requirements (as opposed to private capital), a lower 𝛽 makes the economy more dependent 
on public capital, which in turn makes it more sensitive to demographic change. Nonetheless, the impact 
is negligible, even for small values of 𝛽. 
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Figure 4 - Results for various 𝛽 values. Vertical dashing line represents benchmark value. 
Like in the 𝛼 situation, it is confirmed that it is the taxation system that suffers a heavy impact with the 
expected demography shift, and not the optimal public debt schedule, for a reasonable range of production 
parameters. 
6. Conclusion 
Under a regime of old-age and child-related public transfers, I show how future expected demographic 
shifts, represented by a lowering of both fertility and mortality rates, represent a potential for future 
disruption of current balanced-budget fiscal policies. For the average OECD economy, there are both 
reasonable steady states and transition paths available under a golden rule of public finance for the expected 
demographic ageing processes throughout the 21st century. Under this golden rule, the optimal public debt-
GDP ratio suffers very small impacts stemming from demographic ageing. The model indicates an initial 
optimal public debt-GDP ratio of 40.6%, suffering negligible changes throughout the expected 
demographic structure for the rest of the 21st century. As the old-age dependency ratio increases, public 
debt sustainability does not require significant reductions in public investment. 
Countries with more generous unfunded pension systems are at a higher risk of seeing their public debt 
stocks turning unsustainable upon a reduction in fertility and mortality rates. When higher benefits are 
distributed under PAYG pension schemes, demographic ageing implies stronger funding requirements, 
making it harder to finance a given stock of public debt, as well as stronger interference in the saving 
decisions of households. The combined effect of these two transmission channels is a strong reduction to 
the future optimal public debt-GDP ratio, though ensuring its sustainability requires relatively small 
reductions to public investment. Hence, the outlook for public debt seems benign. The problem with strong 
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unfunded pension benefits is the dramatic increase in funding requirements in order to finance increased 
unfunded pension outlays upon demographic ageing. Focus should be posited on reforming the pension 
system and its benefits level, and not in managing the public debt stock that finances public investment for 
a country that follows the golden rule of public finance. 
The transition mechanics depend on the labor intensity of the economy. Labor intensive economies have 
stronger wage rates, which makes it easier to finance a given stock of public debt. Stronger wage rates also 
augment the negative impact that PAYG pensions have in disincentivizing private saving. These two 
mechanisms make it so that demographic ageing increases the optimal public debt-GDP ratio. The 
conclusion here is that demographic ageing processes do not de-stabilize the public stock of debt for labor 
intensive countries. Convergence is automatically ensured upon demographic ageing. The situation is 
reversed for capital intensive countries, where demographic ageing turns a sustainable public debt stock 
into an unsustainable one. Though the numerical results show that sustainability inducing policies require 
negligible interventions to the public investment schedule, this result reveals a potential for trouble: With 
the advent of robotics, IT technologies, artificial intelligence and automation, economies that are becoming 
more capital intensive may need to re-evaluate their unfunded pension systems, or risk having to cut on 
public investment in the future, yielding lower economic growth prospects for future generations. 
For future work, allowing for budget surpluses/deficits would enrich the analysis by providing a more 
comprehensive approach to fiscal policy reform in terms of achieving fiscal sustainability by either 
reductions (increases) to public investment or by creating budget surpluses (deficits). Furthermore, 
different taxation structures, including variations to the tax treatment of subsidies and savings, exploring 
lump-sum transfers, or the introduction of taxation on other income items could be explicitly explored for 
the enrichment of the results shown in this paper. Considering public debt not associated with public capital 
would also be interesting follow-up work, as most advanced economies do not follow the golden rule of 
public finance. 
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Appendix A – Short- and long-run conditions for equilibria 
A short-run equilibrium can be described as a point in time where: consumption of working and retired 
individuals and next period’s capital stock is positive, while public capital does not completely crowd-out 
private capital and the government budget is respected: 
• Positive consumption of workers: starting from expression (10), and substituting optimal savings 
described in expression (14): 
𝑐𝑡 > 0 ⇔ (1 − 𝜃𝑡)[𝑤𝑡(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡) + 𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑧𝑛𝑡] − 𝑠𝑡 > 0 ⇔ (1 − 𝜃𝑡)𝑤𝑡 + (1 − 𝜆𝑡+1)𝜌𝑝,
𝑤𝑡+1
𝑟𝑡+1
> 0
⇔ (1 − 𝜃𝑡) > −(1 − 𝜆𝑡+1)
𝜌𝑝,
𝑟𝑡+1
𝑤𝑡+1
𝑤𝑡
 
This in turn implies: {
𝑋𝑡 > 0
𝑋𝑡+1 > 0
𝜃𝑡 < 1 + (1 − 𝜆𝑡+1)
𝜌𝑝,
𝑟𝑡+1
𝑤𝑡+1
𝑤𝑡
⇔ 𝜃𝑡 < 1
 
• Positive consumption of retirees: starting from expression (12), and substituting in expression 
(11) and (14) measured at times 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1, respectively: 
𝑑𝑡 > 0 ⇔
𝑟𝑡
(1 − 𝜆𝑡)
𝑠𝑡−1 + [(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡−1) + 𝜌𝑤𝑧𝑛𝑡−1]𝜌𝑝,𝑤𝑡 > 0 ⇔ 𝑟𝑡(1 − 𝜃𝑡−1)𝑤𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜆𝑡)𝜌𝑝,𝑤𝑡
> 0 ⇔ (1 − 𝜃𝑡−1) > −(1 − 𝜆𝑡)
𝜌𝑝,
𝑟𝑡
𝑤𝑡
𝑤𝑡−1
 
This in turn implies: {
𝑋𝑡−1 > 0
𝑋𝑡 > 0
𝜃𝑡−1 < 1 + (1 − 𝜆𝑡)
𝜌𝑝,
𝑟𝑡
𝑤𝑡
𝑤𝑡−1
 
• Positive capital stock/no private capital full crowd-out: starting from expression (23) and 
substituting in expression (14), and using the definition of the debt-GDP ratio (18): 
𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡+1 > 0 ⇔ [?̃?𝑡(1 − 𝜃𝑡)𝑤𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡
𝜌𝑝,
𝜌
𝑤𝑡+1
𝑟𝑡+1
] 𝑁𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡+1 > 0
⇔ ?̃?𝑡(1 − 𝜃𝑡)𝐴(1 − 𝛼)𝑋𝑡
−𝜔
1
𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
1
(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡)
− ?̃?𝑡
𝜌𝑝,
𝜌
(1 − 𝛼)
𝛼
1
𝑋𝑡+1
1
(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡+1)𝑛𝑡
− 1
> 0 
This in turn implies: 𝜃𝑡 < 1 − [
(1−𝑧𝑛𝑡)
(1−𝛼)?̃?𝑡
+
𝜌𝑝,
𝜌
1
𝛼𝑋𝑡+1
(1−𝑧𝑛𝑡)
(1−𝑧𝑛𝑡+1)𝑛𝑡
] 𝑑𝑡𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
 
Summing up the short-run conditions for equilibrium, positive consumption of both workers and retirees 
yield the same conditions but measured at different time periods. The first conditions simply require a 
positive public-private capital ratio, which is trivial. The non-trivial condition requires the tax-rate to be 
lower than a number bigger than 1. Since it is not possible to tax more than gross income in this model, 
this restriction collapses to the tax-rate not being higher than 100%. The positive capital stock/no private 
capital crowd-out restriction presents itself as an expression that is dependent on the public pension 
replacement rate, the debt-GDP ratio, and the growth factor of the public capital stock. If any of these 
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elements become higher, the more restrictive the condition becomes for how high the tax-rate can be if a 
short-run equilibrium is to exist. 
A long-run equilibrium is, under initial conditions 𝑋0 and 𝐺0 and the path (𝜌𝑤 , 𝜌𝑝)𝑡≥, characterized by 
the sequences (𝑋𝑡 , 𝐺𝑡)𝑡>0 and (𝜃𝑡)𝑡≥0 such that these two conditions are verified: 
{
𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡+1 + 𝐺𝑡+1
𝐵𝑡+1 = 𝐵𝑡 + (𝑟𝑡 − 1)𝐵𝑡 + (𝐺𝑡+1 − 𝐺𝑡) + 𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑧𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑡 +
+[(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡−1) + 𝜌𝑤𝑧𝑛𝑡−1]𝑤𝑡−1𝑖𝑡𝜌𝑝(1 − 𝜆𝑡)𝑁𝑡−1 −  𝜃𝑡(𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑡 + 𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑧𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑡)
 
I assume a golden rule of public finance, so that: 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝐺𝑡 
Simplifying further, this makes it so that the long-run equilibrium conditions can be re-stated as: 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑋𝑡+1 =
1 +
(1 − 𝛼)
𝛼
𝜌𝑝
𝜌
?̃?𝑡
(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡+1)𝑛𝑡
?̃?𝑡
(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡+1)𝑛𝑡
𝐴(1 − 𝛼)
(1 − 𝜃𝑡)
𝑋𝑡
𝜔𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔 − 1
𝐵𝑡 = 𝐺𝑡
𝜃𝑡 = 1 −
1 −
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)
𝑋𝑡 − 𝐶𝑝,𝑡
1 + 𝐶𝑐,𝑡
 
These conditions are expressions (25), (17) and (20), respectively. 
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Appendix B – The Jacobian and Hessian of transition equation 
The Jacobian of the transition equation in expression (25) is now derived. Taking the derivative of this 
expression and evaluating it at steady state with 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
= 𝛾𝑦 yields: 
𝜕
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝑋𝑡+1(𝑋𝑡 , 𝛾𝑡+1
𝐺 )|
𝛾𝑡+1
𝐺 =𝛾𝑦(𝑋)
=
[(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝐶𝑝)𝜔 + 𝛼(1 − 𝜔)𝑋][(1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝜌𝑝 + (1 − 𝑧𝑛)(1 + 𝑋)𝛼𝑛𝜌]
[(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝐶𝑝) − 𝛼𝑋][(1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝜌𝑝 + (1 − 𝑧𝑛)𝛼𝑛𝜌]
 
The sign of the Jacobian is completely determined by the element [(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝐶𝑝) − 𝛼𝑋] in the 
denominator. Thus, the sign of the Jacobian is: 
{
 
 
 
 > 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑋 <
(1 − 𝛼)
𝛼
(1 − 𝐶𝑝)
< 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑋 >
(1 − 𝛼)
𝛼
(1 − 𝐶𝑝)
𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑓 𝑋 =
(1 − 𝛼)
𝛼
(1 − 𝐶𝑝)
 
This implies that the Jacobian starts at a positive value and converges to +∞ as 𝑋 approaches 
(1−𝛼)
𝛼
(1 − 𝐶𝑝). When 𝑋 → 0, the Jacobian value converges to 𝜔, which is below 1 by definition. This 
proves that there exists a section of the steady state curve that is locally stable, where the Jacobian value 
is between 𝜔 and 1. 
I now derive the Hessian of the transition curve in expression (25), twice differentiating it with respect to 
𝑋𝑡, and again calculate it evaluated at steady state with 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
= 𝛾𝑦: 
𝜕2
𝜕𝑋𝑡
2 𝑋𝑡+1(𝑋𝑡 , 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
)|
𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
=𝛾𝑦(𝑋)
= [𝛼3𝜌3 (𝑛(1 − 𝑧𝑛)
+
(1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝜌𝑝
𝛼𝜌
) [−𝑛(1 + 𝑋)(1 − 𝑧𝑛) −
(1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝜌𝑝
𝛼𝜌
]
2
{2[(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝐶𝑝)𝜔 + 𝛼(1 − 𝜔)𝑋]
2
+
𝜔[𝛼𝑋 − (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝐶𝑝)][(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝐶𝑝)(1 + 𝜔) + 𝛼(1 − 𝜔)𝑋][(1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝜌𝑝 + (1 − 𝑧𝑛)𝛼𝑛𝜌]
(1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝜌𝑝 + (1 − 𝑧𝑛)(1 + 𝑋)𝛼𝑛𝜌
}]
×
1
𝑋[𝛼(1 − 𝐶𝑝 + 𝑋) − (1 − 𝐶𝑝)]
2
[(1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝜌𝑝 + (1 − 𝑧𝑛)𝛼𝑛𝜌]
3 
The sign of the Hessian is dependent on the value of 𝑋. The sign of the Hessian depends on the expression 
[𝛼𝑋 − (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝐶𝑝)] in the numerator of the fraction inside the curly brackets. When 𝑋 → 0, the 
expression inside the curly brackets converges to −(𝛼 − 1)2(𝐶𝑝 − 1)
2
(1 − 𝜔)𝜔, and the denominator of 
the last fraction converges to infinity. As such, the Hessian converges to −∞ when 𝑋 → 0. In turn, 𝑋 can 
64 
 
become large enough such that [𝛼𝑋 − (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝐶𝑝)] becomes positive. Hence, the Hessian necessarily 
becomes positive for 𝑋 high enough. The conclusion is that the transition curve expressed in (25) starts out 
concave and necessarily becomes convex for 𝑋 high enough. 
Finally, I show the derivative of the transition equation with respect to growth of the public capital stock, 
𝛾𝑔, evaluated at steady state with 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
= 𝛾𝑦: 
𝜕
𝜕𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔 𝑋𝑡+1(𝑋𝑡 , 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
)|
𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
=𝛾𝑦(𝑋)
=
(1 + 𝐶𝑐)𝑋
𝜔[(1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝜌𝑝 + (1 − 𝑧𝑛)(1 + 𝑋)𝛼𝑛𝜌]
2
𝐴𝛼?̃?𝜌[(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝐶𝑝) − 𝛼𝑋][(1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝜌𝑝 + (1 − 𝑧𝑛)𝛼𝑛𝜌]
 
This function is proportional to the Jacobian of the transition curve. As such, it has the same sign as the 
Jacobian. Another very important consequence here is that changes to the policy function 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
 affect the 
transition curve monotonically, meaning that increasing or decreasing public investment respectively tilt 
the transition curve upwards or downwards from the origin (0,0).  
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Appendix C – Stability analysis of non-hyperbolic steady state 
This appendix provides details on the stability features over the steady state curve, which includes one 
non-hyperbolic point where the Jacobian of the transition curve (25) is equal to 1. Drawing from Croix 
and Michel (2002), this appendix starts by showing that the bifurcation point is in fact the maximal growth 
steady state. With a bifurcation point, a further look beyond the system’s Jacobian is warranted for the 
maximal growth steady state, in order to understand it. I then characterize its stability and show the stability 
of all other steady states relative to the maximal growth.  
Expression (25) defines the transition equation for the optimal public-private capital ratio, 𝑋, at time 𝑡 +
1. It is dependent, among other parameters, on the previous’ period capital ratio 𝑋𝑡 and the government’s 
policy function, 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
. Recall that, by definition, we have that the policy function is steady state compatible 
only when 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑔
= 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑦 (𝑋𝑡). I define 𝜑(𝑋, 𝛾
𝑔) = 𝑋(𝑋𝑡 , 𝛾
𝑔) − 𝑋. Differentiating 𝜑(𝑋, 𝛾𝑔) = 0 with 
respect to 𝑋 and evaluating it at steady state yields: 
𝜑𝑋
′ [𝑋, 𝛾𝑦(𝑋)] + 𝜑𝛾𝑔
′ [𝑋, 𝛾𝑦(𝑋)]𝛾𝑦′(𝑋) = 0                                   (C1) 
Appendix B shows that the Jacobian of the system at the steady state curve is initially positive and equal 
to 𝜔 and increasing towards +∞, meaning that it attains the value of 1 at some point. Denoting ?̅? as the 
public-private capital ratio that is associated with a Jacobian value of 1, we have that 𝜑𝑋
′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)] = 0, 
and expression (C1) then implies that when 𝜑𝛾𝑔
′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)] ≠ 0 we necessarily must have that 𝛾𝑦′(?̅?) =
0. In this case, there are three possibilities: one, the function 𝛾𝑦(𝑋) attains a maximum at point ?̅?; two, it 
attains a minimum at that same point; and three, there is an inflection point at ?̅?. A look at the Hessian of 
function 𝛾𝑦(𝑋) is thus useful. For this, I twice differentiate 𝜑[𝑋, 𝛾𝑔] = 0 with respect to 𝑋 and evaluate it 
at steady state: 
𝜑𝑋𝑋
′′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)] + 𝜑𝑋𝛾𝑔
′′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)]𝛾𝑦′(?̅?) + 𝜑𝛾𝑔𝑋
′′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)]𝛾𝑦′(?̅?) + 𝜑𝛾𝑔𝛾𝑔
′′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)] (𝛾𝑦′(?̅?))
2
+ 𝜑𝛾𝑔
′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)]𝛾𝑦′′(?̅?) = 0 
With 𝛾𝑦′(?̅?) = 0, this expression reduces to: 
𝜑𝑋𝑋
′′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)] + 𝜑𝛾𝑔
′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)]𝛾𝑦′′(?̅?) = 0 
Noting that 𝜑′′[?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)] = 𝑋′′(𝑋𝑡 , 𝛾
𝑔), solving the expression just above for 𝛾𝑦′′(?̅?) yields: 
𝛾𝑦′′(?̅?) = −
𝜑𝑋𝑋
′′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)]
𝜑𝛾𝑔
′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)]
= −
𝑋𝑋𝑋
′′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)]
𝑋𝛾𝑔
′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)]
 
I can now establish in which of the three scenarios the function 𝛾𝑦(𝑋) is on. We need to find the signals 
𝑋𝑋𝑋
′′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)] and 𝑋𝛾𝑔
′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)]. Starting with the former, given that Appendix B showed that there 
always exists a section of the steady state curve that is stable, the hessian of the system in that interval is 
necessarily negative. That appendix also showed that the Hessian starts with a concave shape, then turning 
into a convex shape. But since the maximal growth steady state is a bifurcation point, it must be that an 
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inversion point exists in the Hessian in the interval of 𝑋 [0, ?̅?). This implies that the Hessian is convex at 
the maximal growth steady state, ?̅?. Thus, 𝑋𝑋𝑋
′′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)] >0. Appendix B also shows that 𝑋𝛾𝑔
′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)] 
has the same sign as the system’s Jacobian. Given that the Jacobian at the maximal growth steady state is 
positive, we then necessarily have that 𝑋𝛾𝑔
′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)] is also positive there. Both these findings imply that 
𝛾𝑦′′(?̅?) above is negative. I thus conclude that 𝛾𝑦(𝑋) attains a maximum at ?̅?. Since this is the economic 
growth function, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?) is the maximal growth steady state, where ?̅? is labeled as 𝑋∗ in the main text. 
I now focus on the stability properties of the maximal growth steady state and characterize the stability 
of the rest of the steady state curve relative to it. Having a non-hyperbolic steady state with the 
characteristics displayed so far, where 𝑋𝑋
′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)] = 1, 𝑋𝛾𝑔
′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)] > 0, 𝑋𝑋𝑋
′′ [?̅?, 𝛾𝑦(?̅?)] > 0 and 
𝛾𝑦′′(?̅?) < 0, comes with a very specific property: When 𝛾𝑦(𝑋) attains a maximum at 𝑋 = ?̅?, picking any 
value for the policy function 𝛾𝑔 that is below 𝛾𝑦(?̅?) creates two hyperbolic steady states. The steady state 
with lower 𝑋, denoted 𝑋𝑙 in the main text, is stable. The other steady state with higher 𝑋, denoted 𝑋ℎ is 
unstable. On the other hand, picking any value for the policy function 𝛾𝑔 that is above 𝛾𝑦(?̅?) implies the 
non-existence of non-trivial steady states. The reason is simple: since the Jacobian of 𝑋(𝑋𝑡 , 𝛾
𝑔) is locally 
monotonic, and the Hessian evaluated at the maximal growth steady state is positive, it means that the 
Jacobian value for any steady state located at 𝑋 < ?̅? (𝑋 < ?̅?) is lower (higher) than 1. Stability conclusions 
immediately follow for these two hyperbolic steady states. Given this result, if we consider a neighborhood 
around the maximal growth steady state, and let that neighborhood get infinitesimally small, one can 
conclude that the stability of that infinitesimal neighborhood implies that, when 𝛾𝑔 = 𝛾𝑦(?̅?), 𝑋 will 
converge towards ?̅? when 𝑋 < ?̅? and 𝑋 will converge towards infinity when 𝑋 > ?̅?. Figure 1 in the main 
text summarizes these results. 
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1. Introduction 
The phenomenon of demographic ageing driven by increased longevity and lower fertility has led to a 
serious policy and academic debate about the sustainability of pension systems. Many industrialized 
countries rely on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension schemes, where payments to retirees are covered by 
current contributions by the working population. The demographic structure is a key determinant of the 
sustainability of such schemes and how generous they can be. In general, there are three ways of adjusting 
PAYG schemes faced by ageing populations: The contribution rate can be increased; the benefit rate can 
be decreased; or the retirement age can be increased.   
Preserving the living standards of both the retired and the working-age population in an era of 
demographic ageing presents a very complex challenge. For example, while lower pension benefits would 
improve the sustainability of the PAYG pension system, they would also redistribute income from retirees 
to workers. The opposite distributional effect holds for an increase in contributions to the pension system. 
The point is that any distinct shift in either the benefit or the contribution rate will necessarily imply some 
degree of redistribution of intergenerational welfare.1 
An alternative solution to keeping the pension system on a sustainable path in an era of ageing populations 
is to raise the retirement age. This would broaden the labour supply by having individuals work for a longer 
period in their lives (the extensive margin), while simultaneously decreasing the number of retirees by the 
same amount. Such a policy would counter the adverse effects of population ageing on PAYG pension 
systems, by exogenously decreasing the old-age dependency ratio and thus increasing the number of 
contributors relative to beneficiaries.2  
Retirement decisions of individuals are complex, and affected by financial and social factors. While 
financial incentives undoubtedly matter, the empirical evidence on retirement behaviour shows a large 
spike in actual retirement at the statutory (or official) retirement age. Furthermore, there is evidence that 
indicates large and sharp hikes in the actual retirement age in response to changes in the statutory retirement 
age.  
The statutory retirement age can serve as a reference point to which agents anchor their retirement plans. 
For example, Lumsdaine et al. (1996) finds that 48% of men working at age 64 retire at age 65 in Fortune 
500 companies. Rather than being explained by financial or demographic factors, the study suggests that 
the spike is simply caused by an “age-65, rule of thumb” based on customs or accepted practice. This 
observation is consistent with the findings by Cribb et al. (2016) who find that changes in actual retirement 
 
1 The issue of intergenerational equity/fairness is indeed complicated and contentious, depending, among other things, on dynamic efficiency concerns and the 
definition of fairness. See, for example, Howse (2007) for a discussion. 
2 A deeper discussion of fairness is warranted here. For example, Queisser and Whitehouse (2006) elaborates on pension design in the context of actuarial fairness 
and neutrality. We do not pursue this discussion in this paper. 
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age, when early retirement provisions are changed, are not driven by financial incentives but rather a signal 
about the appropriate time to retire.  
A number of studies related to retirement reform further demonstrate the role of the statutory retirement 
age as a reference point. Based on Austrian data on reforms of the public pension system between 2000 
and 2004, Staubli and Zweimuller (2013) analyse the effects of an increase in official early retirement age 
on labour market participation. They find that an increase in the early retirement age has significant effects 
on delaying pension claims.  
The labour market effects of the Austrian reforms are also evaluated by Manoli and Weber (2016). They 
find that the reforms both increased pension-claiming ages and job market exits. They further state that the 
official early retirement age is potentially an important reference point for retirement decisions. The effects 
of an increase in the Swiss official retirement age is found to have a strong effect on the actual retirement 
age by Lalive and Staubli (2015). This effect is also observed in the US, where Mastrobouni (2009) finds 
a strong reaction to increases in the actual retirement age as a response to a reform passed in 1983 to 
increase the default retirement age. 
This effect of official retirement age on actual retirement age holds even when accounting for the financial 
incentives agents are subject to when leaving the labour market. This is investigated by Manoli and Weber 
(2014), who find that financial incentives alone cannot explain retirement decisions; implying that non-
financial factors also play an instrumental role in retirement planning. Brown and Laschever (2012) 
observe a peer effect on retirement timing, implying that individuals tend to retire at the same time as their 
peers.  
The peer effect on retirement decisions is also identified by Chalmers et al. (2008) who found that 
individuals are more likely to retire when one or more of their co-workers retire: This further highlights 
that retirement decisions are not solely driven by financial incentives. These anchoring effects, coupled 
with specific schemes to incentivize older workers to retire, tie the official retirement age tightly to the 
actual retirement age. 
The focus of this paper is on how such exogenous changes in the statutory retirement age interact with 
the endogenous labour supply decisions of households. Changes in the intensive margin of labour supply 
have already attracted some attention, with a focus on the tax-like disincentives of pension contributions; 
see, for example, Fisher and Keuschnigg (2007) and Keuschnigg and Fisher (2011). Weil (2006) has also 
argued that the distortionary effect of PAYG systems is the most important channel through which ageing 
will affect output. 
Backlash effects, where labour supply decreases on the intensive margin as a response to increases on the 
extensive margin, have been found in previous theoretical studies: Jensen and Jorgensen (2010) find the 
numerical existence of these backlash effects under a public DB scheme when the retirement age increases 
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in response to decreased fertility rates. They find that a more-than-proportional increase to the retirement 
age is necessary when fertility rates decrease. Börsch-Supan and Ludwig (2010, 2013) numerically find 
similar backlash effects for public DB and private FF schemes. In line with our results, they also find that 
backlash effects are stronger in DB schemes as opposed to only private savings. We add to this line of 
research by, first, showing the analytical existence of these backlash effects regardless of calibration, and 
second, numerically show the size of these backlash effects under three different pension schemes.   
To our best knowledge, the empirical literature on backlash effect is very scarce. This could be (partly) 
due to the rigidity of the labour market on the intensive margin. Typically, workers face a choice between 
working full time or not at all. There is, however, significant literature on the effects of taxation on the 
labour supply, which relates indirectly to the themes addressed in this paper. For example, Meghir and 
Phillips (2008), review the empirical literature and perform their own empirical analysis to demonstrate 
the effects of taxation on labour supply on the intensive and extensive margin. Their main conclusion is 
that incentives matter and that different groups in society react to taxation differently. Women, and 
especially women with young children, respond substantially to tax and benefits incentives on the intensive 
margin. However, hours worked for males (intensive margin) is irresponsive to incentives, while 
participation (extensive margin) is highly responsive. 
When designing retirement reforms, our basic insight is that a higher statutory retirement age can 
discourage workers from working, leading to a drop in hours worked as an endogenous mechanism. Thus, 
retirement reform, implemented through increases in labour supply on the extensive margin, might come 
hand-in-hand with a backlash effect on the intensive margin. Identifying the existence of these backlash 
effects, and their potential magnitude, is the key objective of this paper.  
Our analytical framework for demonstrating these effects is a simple lifecycle model over consumption-
leisure choices at the steady state level.3 In addition, we check to what extent the sensitivity of these 
backlash effects depends on the design of the pension system. Specifically, we distinguish three alternative 
schemes: a public PAYG scheme, either of the defined-benefit (DB) or the defined-contributions (DC) 
version, and a private, fully funded (FF) scheme. It turns out that the backlash effect critically depends on 
the pension system in operation. The intended positive effect on the labour supply is most successfully 
obtained with a public DC scheme in place, followed by a private FF scheme, whereas the public DB 
scheme displays the strongest backlash effects.  
The roadmap of the paper is as follows: In section 2 we explain the basic assumptions and build the 
model; Section 3 elaborates on the implications of demographic change and shows the existence of the 
backlash effects following pension reform; Section 4 features a calibration exercise to quantify the 
 
3 Our focus on steady state impacts should be regarded as a starting point. In later work we plan to include transitional dynamics which, admittedly, may be even 
more important.  
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implications of longevity shocks and retirement reform under different pension regimes; Section 5 provides 
an additional robustness analysis, providing further perspective on the numerical results for different 
calibrations; Section 6 concludes. 
2. The model  
2.1.  Basic assumptions 
In order to analyse the effects of an increase in the retirement age on individual labour supply, we base 
the analysis on the overlapping generations model in line with Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985). We 
consider a small open economy and incorporate endogenous labour supply decisions. Since the analysis is 
performed only at steady state, the small open economy is assumed to start at some point in the past to the 
point where it is at steady state at time 𝑡 = 0. Hence, the analysis is carried out via the age of a generation 
which enters the labour market at 𝑡 = 0. 
 The economy is populated by agents who face a stochastic risk of death. This hazard rate, or the 
instantaneous probability of death, is age-independent. We assume a fixed population size, resulting in the 
number of agents “born” into the labour market being equal to how many die at each moment in time. The 
hazard rate can be manipulated to simulate longevity, since a lower hazard rate implies that agents live 
longer.4 Agents save through actuarial notes, which include a component of life insurance that pays a 
constant amount until the agent’s death, thus mitigating the loss of utility sustained from the uncertainty 
of death. 
Working agents can choose to spend a fraction of their time endowment working, earning a wage at rate 
𝑤. An individuals’ productivity is uniform and the wage is therefore assumed to be constant both between 
individuals and throughout the lifecycle. However, the labour supply decision of working agents varies 
with age. A mandatory retirement age is also implemented, labelled 𝑔, where agents are forced to leave 
the labour market. 
We abstract from welfare impacts that this mandatory retirement age may have, since our analysis is not 
dependent on social welfare considerations. We simply focus on the labour supply effects of shifting that 
retirement age under different pension regimes. The aim of the analysis is to shed light on the labour market 
response on the intensive margin from changes on the extensive margin. The analysis therefore considers 
policy reform in a narrower perspective, evaluating the actual performance of the reform in question versus 
its original intent, a key consideration. Introduction of a welfare analysis of different pension schemes and 
their effect on the intensive (and extensive) margin labour supply is interesting, but in order to demonstrate 
 
4 Having a fixed population size is compatible with our research objective, since what matters is that we simulate a worker/retiree composition shift. A change in the 
hazard rate with fixed population size provides us exactly that, a decrease in fertility and an equal decrease in mortality. We acknowledge that it would be interesting 
to see individual results for both reductions in fertility and mortality, but we leave that choice for future work and use the simpler setting here. 
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clearly the labour supply effects of changes to the statutory retirement age, these considerations are left to 
future work.   
2.2. Pension system 
The introduction of a pension system in the style of Nielsen (1994) allows us to extend the analysis to 
include judgements about the extent to which different types of pension systems mitigate or amplify the 
adverse effects on individual labour supply caused by pension reforms.  
Since the mortality rate, 𝛽, is age-independent, the fraction of the population that is retired can be 
expressed as:  
 ∫ 𝛽𝑒−𝛽𝜏𝑑𝜏 = 𝑒−𝛽𝑔
∞
𝑔
 (1) 
Hence, the fraction of working agents is (1 − 𝑒−𝛽𝑔). The pension system introduced consists of 
contributions denoted by 𝑘 and paid by workers. The collected contributions are transferred as pension 
benefits, denoted by 𝑏, to the retired population. These contributions act as lump-sum “taxes” on those 
who have not reached the retirement age. The pension system is a balanced budget period-by-period, 
meaning that it must always hold that: 
 (1 − 𝑒−𝛽𝑔)𝑘 = 𝑒−𝛽𝑔𝑏 (2) 
This allows us to analyse three different pension schemes: First, a DC scheme where 𝑏 is a function of 𝑘. 
Second, a DB scheme, where 𝑘 is a function of 𝑏. Third, an FF scheme, where 𝑏 = 𝑘 = 0. Most pension 
schemes are either DC or FF, here we also analyse DB. In this setting (DB and DC) the agents are forced 
to contribute the same amount to the pension scheme regardless of how much they work.   
For an agent born at t=0 with age 𝑎, the discounted stream of future transfers from the pension system is 
denoted by 𝑝(𝑎) and for a working agent is defined as:  
 
𝑝(𝑎) = ∫ −𝑘𝑒(𝑟+𝛽)(𝑎−𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑔
𝑎
+∫ 𝑏𝑒(𝑟+𝛽)(𝑎−𝜏)𝑑𝜏
∞
𝑔
= 
=
{
 
 
 
 
(−1 + 𝑒𝛽𝑔+(𝑟+𝛽)(𝑎−𝑔))
𝑟 + 𝛽
𝑘 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐶
(−1 + 𝑒𝛽𝑔+(𝑟+𝛽)(𝑎−𝑔))
(−1 + 𝑒𝛽𝑔)(𝑟 + 𝛽)
𝑏 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐵
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝐹
 
(3) 
The first integral represents the pension system transfer for working agents until retirement. The latter 
integral represents pension benefits that agents receive after retirement. In the case of a retired agent, the 
first integral equals zero and the pension system transfers are found using only the second integral.  
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For both the DC and DB cases, note that the value of the pension system at labour market entry (age 0 in 
the model) is always negative. This is due to the static productivity and population size, which makes the 
implicit return on unfunded pension systems zero. Combined with positive returns on investment for the 
private savings market, the pension contributions are worth less than an equal amount of savings.5  
With the existence of a retirement age, there is a moment in an individual’s life where the present value 
of pension transfers becomes positive, a moment determined when 𝑎 = 𝑟𝑔 (𝛽 + 𝑟)⁄ . This implies that, 
with a positive chance of death before retirement, the present value of pension transfers necessarily 
becomes positive during the working period. How early in the working period of life the present value of 
the pension system becomes positive is determined by the relative size of the hazard rate to the interest 
rate.  
With a lower chance of dying at any moment (lower 𝛽), the present value of pension benefits to an 
individual, increases relative to the contributions made to the pension system, since the agent’s expectation 
of survival until and throughout retirement is now higher. This puts pressure on the pension system as a 
whole, which now needs to either increase contributions or decrease benefits (for DB and DC schemes, 
respectively) to maintain balance. Therefore, at the individual level, a lower 𝛽 makes 𝑝(𝑎) become positive 
for an agent later on. 
We aggregate values for pension transfers at steady state, denoted by 𝑃. That is, the present value of all 
future pension transfers of all agents currently alive in the economy, if individual valuations of the pension 
system, 𝑝(𝑎), remain stable over time. This yields: 
 𝑃 = 𝛽∫ 𝑒−𝛽𝑎𝑝(𝑎)𝑑𝑎
∞
0
=
{
 
 
 
 𝛽(1 − 𝑒
−𝑟𝑔)
𝑟(𝑟 + 𝛽)
𝑘 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐶
𝛽(𝑒−𝑟𝑔 − 1)
𝑟(1 − 𝑒𝛽𝑔)(𝑟 + 𝛽)
𝑏 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐵
 (4) 
We see that the present value of the aggregated stream of future pension transfers of those agents currently 
alive is dependent on the pension system type, the size of the contributions (benefits) for a DC (DB) 
scheme, the demographic structure (through the hazard rate, 𝛽) and the interest rate, 𝑟. Note that this 
function is not negative, even though the pension stream for agents at labour-market entry is negative. This 
is a result of the fact that the present value of pension transfers is never negative during retirement, meaning 
that 𝑃 > 0 when 𝛽 > 0 and 𝑃 = 0 when 𝛽 → 0.  
 
 
 
5 Our results are thus within the context of a dynamically efficient economy, where long-run growth, as dictated by population growth, is smaller than the interest 
rate. Abel et al. (1989) and, more recently, Luo et al. (2018) find dynamic efficiency to be the case for the US and most other developed nations. 
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2.3. Production and wages 
The production side of the economy is now specified. The aggregate production function is given by 𝑌 =
𝜔𝐿 where 𝜔 is exogenous and potentially time varying and represents the economy's technological level. 
𝐿 represents aggregate labour supply. Perfect markets are assumed, which implies that wages are also 
exogenous and given by 𝑤 = 𝜔. This is due to the marginal productivity of labour being equal to the 
producer's cost of employing labour. The labour supply and technology level determine the economy's 
output. 
With wages set exogenously, we can determine the potential income over the life cycle of the agent. The 
present value of earnings potential, or the potential future wages of an individual aged 𝑎 working in all 
his/her available time, where the time allowance is normalized to one, is defined as: 
 ℎ(𝑎) = ∫ 𝑤𝑒(𝑟+𝛽)(𝑎−𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑔
𝑎
=
(1 − 𝑒(𝑟+𝛽)(𝑎−𝑔))
(𝑟 + 𝛽)
𝑤 (5) 
If the agent has already retired, the earnings potential is equal to zero. The actual income of the agent is 
dependent on the labour-leisure choice of the agent, while the potential income is not. Therefore, the 
potential earnings separate the exogenous part of the agent’s income from the endogenous part. Aggregate 
earnings potential at steady state is then: 
 𝐻 = 𝛽∫ 𝑒−𝛽𝑎ℎ(𝑎)𝑑𝑎 = 𝑤
𝛽
𝑟 + 𝛽
(
1 − 𝑒−𝛽𝑔
𝛽
−
𝑒−𝛽𝑔(1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑔)
𝑟
)
𝑔
0
 (6) 
Aggregate earning potential depends positively on the retirement age. In terms of longevity, its effect on 
aggregate earnings potential is ambiguous. There are two forces in effect: on one hand, higher longevity 
increases the chances that workers live for longer, thus increasing total labour supply on the extensive 
margin; on the other hand, higher longevity decreases the proportion of workers in the population, which 
has a negative effect on total labour supply. There is no closed-form solution to the total effect, and the 
result is reverted to the numerical exercise section. 
2.4. Consumption and labour choices 
The agent derives utility from instantaneous consumption, denoted by 𝑐, and instantaneous leisure, 
denoted by 1 − 𝑙. The instantaneous utility function and discounted stream of lifetime utility at age 𝑎 are 
respectively denoted as:  
 u = ln (𝑐𝜀[1 − 𝑙]1−𝜀) (7) 
 𝑢(𝑎) = ∫ 𝜀 ln 𝑐(𝜏) 𝑒(𝜌+𝛽)(𝑎−𝜏)
∞
𝑎
+ (1 − 𝜀) ln(1 − 𝑙(𝜏)) 𝑒(𝜌+𝛽)(𝑎−𝜏)𝑑𝜏 (8) 
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Here, 𝜌 > 0 is the discount rate and 0 ≤ 𝜀 ≤ 1 dictates the relative weight the agent puts on consumption 
and leisure respectively. Agents can work until they reach the age 𝑔, after which they are forced to retire. 
Note that as the agent reaches retirement age, 𝑙(𝜏) is set to zero and the second term reduces to zero. 
When faced with a positive risk of death, an agent would be less inclined to save for the future. We thus 
introduce actuarial notes issued at a fair rate (Yaari, 1965) that include a component of life insurance. The 
purchaser of an actuarial note gets a constant stream of payments until his/her death, and the assets of those 
who die are redistributed to those currently living. These assets therefore act as savings for individuals 
with an extra component of life insurance to the purchaser, indicated by 𝑖(𝑎). The rate of return on the 
actuarial note is then 𝑟𝐴 = 𝑟 + 𝛽. We have adopted the small open economy case, so the rate 𝑟 is 
exogenous and equals the world interest rate.  
Agents in the economy can freely lend and borrow at the international interest rate. Parameter values 
distinguish whether a nation is a debtor nation, with relatively impatient inhabitants, a creditor nation, with 
relatively patient inhabitants, or the razor edge case of a perfectly balanced economy. In our setting, there 
is no intrinsic characteristic that distinguishes foreign and domestic assets, so that, in the context of a small 
open economy, it can be assumed that all an agent's wealth is held in an unspecified mix of national and 
foreign assets. Note that the only traded assets for saving purposes are the actuarial notes described above. 
The working agent is faced with the budget constraint:  
 ∫ 𝑐(𝜏)𝑒(𝑟+𝛽)(𝑎−𝜏)
∞
𝑎
𝑑𝜏 = 𝑖(𝑎) + ∫ 𝑤𝑙(𝜏)𝑒(𝑟+𝛽)(𝑎−𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑔
𝑎
+ 𝑝(𝑎) (9) 
𝑖(𝑎) denotes total assets, or stock of actuarial notes, the agent holds at age 𝑎. For a retired agent, the 
integral on the right-hand side reduces to zero. Solving the utility maximization yields a relationship 
between labour supply and consumption for a working agent:  
 𝑤𝑙(𝑎) = 𝑤 −
1 − 𝜀
𝜀
𝑐(𝑎) (10) 
Differentiating the first-order conditions, and acknowledging that an agent is forced to retire at age 𝑔, 
yields the Euler equations: 
 
?̇?(𝑎)
𝑐(𝑎)
= 𝑟 − 𝜌 (11) 
 {
−𝑙(̇𝑎)
[1 − 𝑙(𝑎)]
= 𝑟 − 𝜌 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 < 𝑔
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 ≥ 𝑔
 (12) 
This implies that consumption throughout the lifecycle follows the path 𝑐(𝑎 + 𝜏) = 𝑐(𝑎)𝑒(𝑟−𝜌)𝜏. A 
similar relationship can be found for the time path of leisure (valid only for when the agent is a worker). 
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Applying the first-order condition for consumption with the consumption/labour supply relationship, 
equation (10), and the Euler equation, equation (11), on the budget constraint and integrating, we arrive at 
a relation for the consumption at each age for the agent:  
 𝑐(𝑎) = 𝜇[𝑖(𝑎) + 𝑝(𝑎) + ℎ(𝑎)] (13) 
Here, we define 𝜇 ≡ (𝜌 + 𝛽) {
𝜀
1−(1−𝜀)𝑒(𝜌+𝛽)(𝑎−𝑔)
} for the working agent, which is a corrective term for 
consumption and leisure choices that account for the forced retirement age. For a retired agent, the term 
reduces to 𝜇 ≡ (𝜌 + 𝛽) {
𝜀
1+𝜀
}. For the working agent, between the ages 0 < 𝑎 < 𝑔, we arrive at the 
following relation for leisure: 
 1 − 𝑙(𝑎) =
(1 − 𝜀)
𝜀𝑤
𝜇[𝑖(𝑎) + 𝑝(𝑎) + ℎ(𝑎)] (14) 
Consumption is thus directly related to the time until retirement (also captured in 𝜇), the risk of death and 
the discount rate. For a working agent, the 𝜇 expression always starts at a value lower than 1. Up towards 
retirement, this expression converges to (𝜌 + 𝛽) and stays there throughout retirement, leading to the 
standard Blanchard-Yaari style relation for consumption. 
Instantaneous consumption, 𝑐(𝑎), is related to the anticipated stream from the pension system, 𝑝(𝑎), and 
the discounted maximum potential for future wage income, ℎ(𝑎), and the level of current assets, 𝑖(𝑎). 
Since the pension system is actuarially unfair at labour market entry, it exerts negative pressure on 
consumption until age 𝑎 = 𝑟𝑔 (𝛽 + 𝑟)⁄ . If an agent survives until then, the expectation of future pension 
benefits exerts a positive effect on consumption even before the agent retires, when 𝛽 > 0. The same 
conclusion is drawn for leisure choices. 
We can aggregate consumption over all households by applying the consumption path based on the Euler 
equation. At steady state, aggregate consumption, 𝐶, and aggregate labour supply, 𝐿, become:  
 
𝐶 = 𝛽∫ 𝑐(𝑎)𝑒−𝛽𝑎𝑑𝑎 = 𝛽𝑐(0)∫ 𝑒(𝑟−𝜌−𝛽)𝑎𝑑𝑎 =
𝛽𝑐(0)
𝜌 + 𝛽 − 𝑟
∞
0
∞
0
 
 
(15) 
 𝐿 = 𝛽∫ 𝑙(𝑎)𝑒−𝛽𝑎𝑑𝑎 =
𝛽(1 − 𝑙(0))(1 − 𝑒(𝑟−𝛽−𝜌)𝑔)
𝑟 − 𝛽 − 𝜌
+ (1 − 𝑒−𝛽𝑔)
𝑔
0
 
 
(16) 
 
2.5.  Assets 
From the budget constraint and realization about the aggregate pension transfers and earning potential we 
establish the steady state aggregate stock of actuarial notes, 𝐼:  
79 
 
𝐼 = 𝛽∫ 𝑒−𝛽𝑎
∞
0
∫ 𝑐(𝜏)𝑒(𝑟+𝛽)(𝑎−𝜏)𝑑𝜏
∞
𝑎
𝑑𝑎 − 𝛽∫ 𝑒−𝛽𝑎
∞
0
𝑝(𝑎)𝑑𝑎 − 𝛽∫ 𝑒−𝛽𝑎
𝑔
0
∫ 𝑤𝑙(𝜏)𝑒(𝑟+𝛽)(𝑎−𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑔
𝑎
𝑑𝑎 
By applying the relationship between labour supply and consumption and by plugging in aggregate 
earnings potential and aggregate future stream of pension income we arrive at:  
𝐼 = 𝛽∫ 𝑒−𝛽𝑎
∞
0
𝑐(𝑎)
𝜌 + 𝛽
𝑑𝑎 − 𝑃 − 𝐻 +
1 − 𝜀
𝜀
𝛽∫ 𝑒−𝛽𝑎
𝑔
0
𝑐(𝑎)
𝜌 + 𝛽
(𝑒(𝑟+𝛽)(𝑎−𝑔) − 1)𝑑𝑎 
⟺ 𝐼 =
𝐶
𝜌 + 𝛽
− 𝑃 − 𝐻 +
1 − 𝜀
𝜀
𝛽∫ 𝑒−𝛽𝑎
𝑔
0
𝑐(𝑎)
𝜌 + 𝛽
(𝑒(𝑟+𝛽)(𝑎−𝑔) − 1)𝑑𝑎 
Solving the integral, the steady state aggregate stock of assets can be expressed as:  
 𝐼 =
𝛾
𝜌 + 𝛽
𝐶 − 𝑃 − 𝐻 (17) 
Here, for convenience, we define 𝛾 = 1 +
1−𝜀
𝜀
(1 −
𝜌+𝛽
𝑟
𝑒−𝑔(𝜌+𝛽−𝑟) +
𝜌+𝛽−𝑟
𝑟
𝑒−𝑔(𝜌+𝛽)) > 1 
Note, that when we abolish the retirement age by making 𝑔 approach infinity, the 𝛾 expression reduces 
to 1/𝜀. Adding to this, by abolishing the pension scheme, we arrive at the same expression as in the 
standard Blanchard-Yaari model, i.e., 𝐶 = 𝜀(𝜌 + 𝛽)(𝐼 + 𝐻).  
3. Impact of population ageing and pension reform 
3.1. Effects of demographic ageing 
The effects of ageing in the form of a decrease in mortality and fertility rates are now analysed for an 
agent just entering the labour market at the beginning of their economic life (𝑎 = 0)6. This analysis is 
performed, first, in a steady state perspective only, and second, for the razor-edge case, when 𝑟 = 𝜌, though 
this assumption is relaxed in the numerical analysis (below). Under this assumption, agents have perfectly 
flat consumption (and labour supply) smoothing over their life cycle. If we relax this assumption and allow 
𝑟 > 𝜌, agents plan their life cycle consumption and labour supply paths with constant exponential growth 
when they enter the labour market; The existence of backlash effects is not dependent on this assumption. 
Overall, a longevity shock can be broken down into three parts: First, an extensive margin effect on labour 
supply, where an increase in longevity increases the demographic old-age dependency ratio, if the official 
retirement age remains the same. This implies that the extension of life spent working is now relatively 
smaller when compared to the new expected lifetime; Second, an intensive margin effect on labour supply 
due to an income effect where agents now feel wealthier due to a higher potential to attain work income; 
Third, another intensive margin effect on labour supply, but now due to changes in the perceived value of 
 
6 Given homogenous agents and zero population growth, the case in point in this section can be generalized to any other generation or point in time (if at steady 
state). 
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an unfunded pension system (if in place). When longevity increases, the expected lifetime wealth of the 
agent will vary according to changes in the value of such an unfunded pension scheme. 
An agent entering the labour market chooses his consumption and leisure according to:  
 𝑐(0) = 𝜇[𝑝(0) + ℎ(0)] (18) 
 1 − 𝑙(0) =
(1 − 𝜀)
𝜀𝑤
𝜇[𝑝(0) + ℎ(0)] (19) 
We see that any effects on the mandatory retirement age adjustment factor, 𝜇, the pension value, 𝑝(0), 
and earnings potential, ℎ(0), stemming from longevity shifts in 𝛽 will yield a level impact to consumption 
and leisure choices. Hence, these types of shocks work only through income channels, and not through 
substitution channels between consumption and leisure (see Euler equations 11 and 12 and the absence of 
longevity factors there).  
Starting with the first component of the longevity shock related to labour supply on the extensive margin 
for new incoming generations with higher longevity, the effect of a drop in the hazard rate on the mandatory 
retirement age adjustment factor 𝜇 is negative. The reason is that a decreased hazard rate makes it more 
likely that an individual survives into a (now longer) retirement period. With longer life expectancy and a 
fixed official retirement age, an agent now works for a smaller portion of their lifetime. The downwards 
adjustment to consumption-leisure during the working period must therefore be larger, compared to a 
generation of individuals with lower longevity.  
Turning to the second component of the longevity shock, in terms of labour supply effects on the intensive 
margin, the effect of a change in the hazard rate on the present value of earnings potential, ℎ(𝑎), is 
independent of the pension system type, and it reacts positively to decreases to the hazard rate, 𝛽. This 
makes intuitive sense, since a lower 𝛽 implies that an agent is more likely to survive throughout their 
working life. This makes the agent feel wealthier, resulting in a desire for higher consumption and leisure. 
The third component of the longevity shock is related to labour supply intensity and the existence of 
unfunded pension schemes: The individual values of these pension schemes are described by 𝑝(𝑎), and 
they react negatively to a decreasing 𝛽 for both DC and DB pension systems. This is easily seen by 
recalling that the value of an unfunded pension system always starts negatively for an agent just entering 
the labour market, turning positive when the agent reaches the age 𝑎 = 𝑟𝑔 (𝛽 + 𝑟)⁄ . When longevity 
increases, the hazard rate, 𝛽, decreases. That implies that the age at which the value of the unfunded 
pension scheme turns positive for the agent is now higher, which makes the value of the pension system 
even more negative at labour market entry. This has a negative impact on consumption and leisure choices. 
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Given the different directions of the effect on 𝜇, ℎ and 𝑝 from a decrease in 𝛽, the effect of a 
mortality/fertility reduction on leisure choices (or conversely, labour supply choices) can only be asserted 
with a numerical exercise for all pension types (performed below). 
3.2. Increase in the retirement age 
Since a decrease in the hazard rate exerts negative pressure on the pension system, a natural pension 
reform would be to simply increase the retirement age so that the portion of working life gets rebalanced. 
This is the reform type in focus, since it is this type of reform in which backlash effects happen. As before, 
such a retirement reform is analysed in a steady state context and considers the same three components as 
described above.  
First, increasing the official retirement age is analogous to increasing labour supply at the extensive 
margin. The impact of such a reform is reflected in the mandatory (or official) retirement age adjustment 
factor 𝜇, and the impact is negative; Second, at the intensive margin, the present value of earnings potential 
increases in the retirement age 𝑔, as that will increase the amount of time an agent can work; Third, at the 
intensive margin. But where unfunded pension systems are concerned, the impact of retirement age 
increase now depends on the type of unfunded pension system in place. In short, pensions of the DC type 
will see their value decreased and pensions of the DB type will see the opposite. 
Basically, when the pension system is of the DC type, an exogenous increase to the retirement age will 
decrease the present value at birth of the pension system, 𝑝(0), since the contributions to the pension 
system are fixed. Additionally, a longer working life implies a longer schedule of contributions relative to 
the expected benefits upon retirement. In the DB case, an increase in 𝑔 has a positive effect on 𝑝(0), since 
the amount of contributions necessary to finance the pension system is now lower.  
The overall effect on the intensity of labour supply is determined by the joint effects on both ℎ(𝑎) and 
𝑝(𝑎). In the DC case, the overall effect is ambiguous since the effect on the value of the pension system is 
opposite to the effect on earnings potential. In the DB case, the increased value of the pension system, 
when the retirement age is increased, goes in tandem with the effects on earnings potential, and always 
dominates the negative extensive margin effects measured in 𝜇. In the FF scheme, we have 𝑝(0) = 0 and 
the sole effect of the retirement reform is captured by ℎ(0) and 𝜇. Again, the positive effects on ℎ(0) 
always dominate 𝜇.  
The conclusion is that, in the DB and the FF case, consumption and leisure (labour supply) choices will 
increase (reduce) when the retirement age is raised for new incoming generations. Therefore, in economies 
operating under DB and FF pension systems, we get: 
 
𝜕𝑐(𝑎)
𝜕𝑔
> 0 (20) 
82 
 
 
𝜕 𝑙(𝑎)
𝜕𝑔
< 0 (21) 
A retirement reform aimed at increasing the labour supply on the extensive margin will have the 
unintended effect of lowering the labour supply on the intensive margin at steady state. Thus, with DB and 
FF pension systems, there will always be backlash effect to reform, where retirement age increases need 
to be more-than-proportionally relative to increases in longevity, in order for aggregate labour supply to 
return to its previous level. In these cases, agents who are faced with working for more years, choose to 
work less each year. In the DC case, the effect is ambiguous, and the result is reverted to the numerical 
exercise.  
Finally, note that the retirement age does not enter the aggregation of consumption at steady state, 𝐶, in 
any other way than through 𝑐(0). We can therefore conclude, that under a DB or an FF pension system, 
aggregate consumption will necessarily increase as the retirement age increases. But the retirement age 
makes an extra appearance on aggregate labour supply outside of 𝑙(0), as seen in the two exponentials in 
the equation (16). These extra factors react positively to retirement age increases and ensure that aggregate 
labour supply will always increase with the raising of the retirement age. The effects of ageing, or a pension 
reform of increasing the retirement age under DC has ambiguous effects on both aggregate consumption 
and leisure. Again, we come back to this in the numerical exercise. 
4. A numerical exercise 
4.1. Calibration baseline 
So far, we have laid out the theoretical building blocks of our model. We now turn to a numerical exercise 
that will allow us to explore the differences and dimensions of ageing and reform of the pension system at 
steady state in the form of a retirement age increase. The razor-edge assumption of 𝑟 = 𝜌 will now be 
relaxed. This numerical exercise will be performed for different pension schemes, whether it is FF, 
unfunded with DC or unfunded with DB plans. This analysis quantifies the backlash effects of increasing 
the extensive margin of labour supply. It will also tell us, first, the direction of impact from a change in the 
hazard rate on leisure choices for all pension types, and second, the direction of the impact on leisure of 
changing the retirement age in the DC case. 
We begin by establishing a baseline calibration: Since 47% of 15-24 year-olds participated in the labour 
market in 2015 (OECD, 2019), we assume agents will enter the labour market at the age of 20. The average 
effective retirement age in the OECD was 64 years in 2015 (OECD, 2017), making 𝑔 = 64 − 20 = 44. In 
terms of the hazard rate, 𝛽, we calibrate it to obtain a realistic old-age dependency ratio. The observed 
dependency ratios in OECD countries in 2015 is 29% (United Nations, 2017), which implies 𝛽 = 0.034.7 
 
7 Since life expectancy is at every time 1/β for all members of society (aged 20+), an alternative approach would be to calibrate β to match average years left of life 
of all currently living. This turns out to be roughly 33 years for the European members of the OECD in 2015 (Eurostat, 2018a, 2018b). The baseline calibration is based 
83 
 
The interest rate, 𝑟, is assumed to be 1.8%. This is in line with recent calibration of the Blanchard-Yaari 
model in Benhabib, Bisin and Zhu (2014). The subjective discount rate, 𝜌, is set at 1.5% which implies 
that the condition, 𝑟 > 𝜌 holds. It is thus a case where the inhabitants of the economy are relatively patient 
compared to the outside world, implying growing consumption and leisure choices over time. Following 
Heijdra (2003), the relative weight of consumption in leisure is set to 𝜀 = 0.25. Furthermore, we normalize 
the wage rate to one. The average net replacement rate of unfunded PAYG pension schemes in the OECD 
in 20138 was 53.3% of life-time labour income (DICE Database, 2015). This results in the steady state 
lump-sum benefit rate of 0.15 and a lump-sum contribution rate of 0.044. 
The baseline calibration is summarized in the table below: 
𝛽 hazard rate 0.034 
𝜌 discount rate 0.015 
𝑟 interest rate 0.018 
𝑔 retirement age 44 
𝑤 wage rate 1 
𝑏 pension benefit rate 0.15 
𝑘 pension contribution rate 0.044 
𝜀 weight of consumption in utility 0.25 
 
Given these parameter values we can calculate the relevant aggregate values for the baseline case. We 
can compare the two cases: with a mandatory DB PAYG pension scheme, and without a mandatory PAYG 
pension scheme. We do not include the DC case in the table, since the results are identical to the DB ones. 
These results are summarized in the table below for each pension system: 
  
FF pension 
scheme 
PAYG pension 
scheme 
𝐶 Aggregate consumption 0.254 0.247 
𝐿 Aggregate labour supply 0.208 0.223 
𝑃 Aggregate pension transfers 0 0.869 
𝐻 Aggregate earnings potential 10.47 10.47 
𝐼 Aggregate assets 2.564 1.347 
The introduction of the pension system implies that aggregate consumption and the aggregate stock of 
actuarial notes, or assets, drop significantly. This is due to the foregone interest income the agents would 
have earned if their pension transfers were invested instead. Consumption in the FF case is also higher, 
 
on a realistic dependency ratio, and it implies an average life expectancy of 29.5 years, which resonates with the observed data. 
8 We use year 2013 here since data for year 2015 is missing. 
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since the existence of the unfunded pension system makes agents poorer. The same reasoning justifies a 
higher labour supply in the DB and DC cases. 
4.2. Fully-funded (FF) pension scheme 
We now look at the effect of increased longevity on the lifecycle path of leisure. We simulate the 
demographic shock by decreasing the value of 𝛽 to 0.025, which represents an increase in the average 
lifespan of 10 years.9 The effects of the longevity shock over the lifecycle of an agent is shown in Figure 
1 below.  
The baseline labour supply is the dashed blue line and the path of labour supply after the shock is the 
yellow line. Agents who are faced with higher longevity substitute current consumption and leisure for 
future consumption. This is a combined result of a higher chance of surviving and an expectation of being 
able to work for longer, and individuals discounting the future less heavily because they are more likely to 
be alive to enjoy their savings.  
From Figure 1 we can see that the effect of increased longevity on leisure. Leisure is subject to a negative 
shock from increased longevity, such that the negative effects in the retirement age adjustment, factor 𝜇 
outweigh the increased expectation of earnings potential ℎ(0). But as the expected agent lifespan has 
increased dramatically for all age groups, aggregate consumption has risen (see table below). We see an 
increase in aggregate consumption of 1.3%. In this case, there is a hike in the labour supply each time of 
around 4.7% while the agent is working and aggregate labour supply drops by 9.3%. This drop is caused 
by the higher proportion of individuals in retirement, where labour supply is 0. 
We now analyse the effects of countering the life expectancy increase with an increase in the retirement 
age.10 We assume that the government attempts to preserve the initial demographic structure as it was 
before the longevity shock took place, in that the old-age dependency ratio goes back to its original value. 
In this case, we choose a retirement age increase of 15 years, making 𝑔 equal to 59. The implication with 
this experiment is that, because the new retirement age makes the new old-age dependency ratio equal to 
the original one before the longevity increase, the proportion of life spent as part of the labour force relative 
to time spent in retirement remains the same. In this case, changes in aggregates stem solely from individual 
consumption and labour supply choices, and not aggregate demographic composition effects. 
When faced with a hike in the retirement age, the new higher longevity agents anticipate being able to 
work longer during their lives, making them less likely to survive into retirement. This has the effect of 
 
9 Since we are performing an analysis for fully matured retirement age increase reforms (at steady state), we consider an increase in life expectancy that corresponds 
to the life expectancy after everybody born in 2015 is, on average, dead. As such, we choose a 10-year increase in life expectancy, since life expectancy will be 90 
years from 2015 (United Nations, 2017). The implicit assumption here is that the economy will have converged to the new steady state after longevity shock and reform 
in one lifetime. 
10 Again, the results displayed here are for when the retirement age increase has fully matured, meaning that the economy is at steady state under the new longevity 
level and under the new retirement age, where everybody in the economy is also under the new retirement age for the entirety of their lives. 
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lowering labour supply on the intensive margin and increasing consumption at each time, as there is less 
of a need to save for retirement. The effects are summarized in figure 2.  
Figure 1 Life Cycle Path of Labour Supply in a 
Fully-Funded System: Baseline and Longevity 
Shock 
 
Figure 2 Life Cycle Path of Labour Supply in a 
Fully-Funded system: Longevity Shock and 
Retirement Reform 
Even though aggregate labour supply increases by 6.5%, it does not return to the original value before 
the longevity shock. This is a result of decreased labour supply at the intensive margin due to the 
existence of the backlash effect, which is reflected in a reduction on individual labour supply at each 
point in time of around 3.4%, a result seen in Figure 2 where the yellow line shifts to the dashed green 
line when the reform is implemented. The following table summarizes the aggregates: 
Variable Initial scenario Longevity shock Retirement age increase 
𝐶 0.254 0.257 0.2262 
𝐿 0.208 0.189 0.201 
𝑃 0 0 0 
𝐻 10.47 9.678 13.12 
𝐼 2.564 3.822 3.376 
Backlash - 𝟒. 𝟕% −𝟑. 𝟒% 
 
Again, we see that the effect of a 15-year hike in the retirement rate on aggregate labour supply has a 
smaller effect than the longevity shock. Showing this result on a smaller scale, in order to arrive at the 
same labour supply level on the intensive margin, an increase in longevity of 1 year should be followed 
by an approximately 1.6-year increase in the retirement age, under the FF pension regime. 
4.3. Defined-benefits (DB) pension scheme  
We now perform the same experiments for an economy with a DB pension scheme: This case has an 
important consideration: When the size of the retired population changes relative to the working 
population, the lump-sum contributions of the currently working automatically change. An agent just 
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entering the labour market will certainly experience this change in contributions, but will not necessarily 
experience the pension benefits, since they are not guaranteed to survive until retirement. 
As before, we start by looking at the case of a longevity increase of 15 years. This has the effect of 
increasing the survival probability of all agents. Those entering the labour market are now more likely 
to reach retirement, and those retired are more likely to survive longer after retirement. These two factors 
weigh in the same direction causing the lump-sum pension contributions to increase.  
As seen in the FF case, agents are expecting to enjoy a longer retirement, incentivising them to increase 
their labour supply and decrease their current consumption in order to finance consumption during 
retirement. The existence of the DB pension scheme introduces a new channel of effects, where the 
increase in the mandatory lump-sum pension contribution due to demographic ageing has the effect of 
making the agents poorer, which further drives them to decrease consumption and leisure.  
Combining both channels, we see that the negative pension effect dominates the positive earnings 
potential effect when the hazard rate goes down. Hence, if a longevity shock is allowed to fully mature 
in the economy, the intensive margin of labour supply would see an increase of 8.7% with consumption 
dropping by 4.1% at each point in time. Aggregate consumption would drop by 0.9%, which is a change 
in the opposite direction relative to the effects seen with the FF pension scheme. This is due to the 
reduced present value of the unfunded public pension system at birth, which is not present in the FF 
case. The lifecycle paths of consumption and leisure for the baseline case and after the longevity shock 
are displayed in figure 3.  
We now perform the same pension reform of increasing the retirement age by 15 years, such that the 
old-age dependency ratio remains the same as before the longevity shock took place. The effects of an 
increase in labour supply on the extensive margin has the effect of increasing the relative size of the 
working population and decreasing the retired population by the same amount. In addition to the effects 
associated with a shorter retirement, as traced above in the context of figure 2, the retirement reform has 
the effect of decreasing pension contributions, since the number of retirees receiving pension benefits 
has shrunk and the number of workers has increased. This causes pension contributions per person to 
decrease. These two effects work in the same direction of lowering lump-sum contributions.  
As a result, the working agents have more disposable income, leading to an increase in both 
consumption and leisure. The backlash effect here, measured again as a lowering in labour supply at 
each point in time, is 6.2%. These effects can be seen in figure 4, below. This effect works in the same 
direction as the effect of a longer working life, but as seen when comparing figures 2 and 4, the observed 
backlash effects under an unfunded pension scheme are much more pronounced compared to the case 
without them.  
The implication is that the setup of the DB pension system affects the size of the backlash effect. When 
the retirement age is increased, it rebalances the pension scheme such that its value for individuals is 
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improved. This in turn further stimulates the backlash effect, reducing labour supply on the intensive 
margin. The following table summarizes the aggregates: 
Variable Initial scenario Longevity shock Retirement age increase 
𝐶 0.247 0.245 0.254 
𝐿 0.223 0.212 0.219 
𝑃 0.869 1.310 0.930 
𝐻 10.47 9.678 13.12 
𝐼 1.347 1.873 1.935 
Backlash − 𝟖. 𝟕% −𝟔. 𝟐% 
  
Figure 3 Life Cycle Path of Labour Supply in a 
Defined-Benefits Scheme: Baseline and 
Longevity Shock 
 
Figure 4 Life Cycle Path of Labour Supply in a 
Defined-Benefits Scheme: Longevity shock and 
Retirement Reform 
 
4.4. Defined-contributions (DC) pension scheme  
Finally, we perform our experiment in the setting of a DC pension scheme. The effects on the labour 
supply and consumption decisions of agents when faced with demographic ageing or pension reform 
have a different scale than in the DB scheme. As longevity increases the proportional size of the retired 
population, pension benefits drop as a result. This has the impact of decreasing the present value of 
future pension transfers at labour market entry. The agent is more likely to reach retirement, but when 
they do, pension benefits are drastically reduced. Once again, the negative effect of the reduced value 
of life-time pension transfers and the negative 𝜇 effect both dominate the positive effect of increased 
earnings potential when the hazard rate drops. This causes agents to increase their labour supply by 
approximately the same amount as in the FF case, as well as saving more through private saving 
schemes. This results in the ability to have a higher lifetime consumption. This is demonstrated in the 
table and figure 5 below. 
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Figure 5 Life Cycle Path of Labour Supply in a 
Defined-Contributions Scheme: Baseline and 
Longevity Shock 
 
Figure 6 Life Cycle Path of Labour Supply in 
a Defined-Contributions Scheme: Longevity 
Shock and Retirement Reform 
 
When faced with an increase in the retirement age of 15 years, we see a backlash effect of reduced 
labour supply at each point in time of 2.6%. This effect is far smaller than in the DB case, and even 
smaller than in the FF case. The reason is that the increase to the retirement age now reduces the value 
of the pension system to the individual, which softens the backlash effect.40 Once again, this 
demonstrates how important the existence and type of unfunded pension schemes are for the behaviour 
of the intensive margin of labour supply. Whether retirement age increases have negative or positive 
effects on the value of the pension system to an individual just entering the labour market matters in 
explaining the sizes of backlash effects. This explains why the aggregates of longevity shock and 
retirement age reform are the same in the DB and DC cases, but the observed backlash effects are 
nonetheless different. The following table summarizes the aggregates for the DC case: 
Variable Initial scenario Longevity shock Retirement age increase 
𝐶 0.247 0.250 0.254 
𝐿 0.223 0.202 0.219 
𝑃 0.869 0.778 0.930 
𝐻 10.47 9.678 13.12 
𝐼 1.347 2.665 1.935 
Backlash − 𝟒. 𝟔% −𝟐. 𝟔% 
5. Robustness analysis and further discussion 
We now perform a robustness check on the sensitivity of the observed baseline backlash effects to 
certain key parameters. We continue with a discussion on how the lack of certain modelling devices 
can influence our results. These modelling devices are endogenous retirement decisions, realistic 
mortality and productivity profiles, and generalising the CRRA utility function to assume an 
 
40 This effect is dependent on the size of the contributions, but here we begin with the same baseline for the DC as in the DB case.   
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intertemporal elasticity of substitution different than 1. The numerical experiments we perform in the 
following robustness analysis, and the associated parameter changes, are summarized in the following 
table: 
Experiment Old parameter(s) New parameter(s) 
Increased importance of consumption in utility 𝜀 = 0.25 𝜀 = 0.5 
Debtor nation 
scenario 
Stronger discounting 𝜌 = 0.015 𝜌 = 0.02 
Lower interest rates 𝑟 = 0.018 𝑟 = 0.012 
Higher interest rate 𝑟 = 0.018 𝑟 = 0.024 
Higher pension replacement ratio 53.3% 100% 
 
5.1.  Decreased importance of leisure in utility 
We simulate an economy with a much lower preference towards leisure as opposed to consumption. 
This makes individuals less sensitive to leisure choices, serving as a check into how important this 
sensitivity is to the size of the baseline backlash results. We do so by doubling the baseline consumption 
preference parameter 𝜀 to 0.5. The backlash effects, measured by the decrease in labour supply at the 
intensive margin as a response to an increased retirement age, are now summarized for each pension 
system type and put in context of the baseline results: 
Backlash effect:  
Baseline and lower preference for leisure 
Pension system Baseline case Robustness case 
FF −3.4% −3.0% 
DB −6.2% −4.8% 
DC −2.6% −2.4% 
 
The robustness checks confirm that the baseline results are not heavily dependent on the consumption 
preference parameter 𝜀 for any of the pension types, especially considering the extreme experiment 
performed here of doubling the parameter. When the preference towards consumption is increased, the 
backlash effects are diminished, since the individual now values consumption more compared to the 
baseline case, making the individual want to work relatively more when the retirement age is increased 
to finance a higher desire for consumption. The differences between pension systems are still preserved 
as in the baseline case for the same reasons. The case with the strongest reduction is still the DB case, 
where the backlash weakened by 1.4 pp. Both the FF and DC pension types saw decreases of less than 
half a percentage point, with the DC system seeing the smallest backlash effect of them all. 
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5.2. Debtor nation scenario 
We now consider a debtor nation scenario under two different experiments. For the first debtor nation 
scenario, we perform an increase to the subjective discount rate of one third, making 𝜌 = 0.02. This 
makes the discount rate relatively bigger than the interest rate, making individuals choose decreasing 
paths for consumption and leisure (see equations 11 and 12). The economy, in turn, becomes one 
composed of impatient individuals, making it a debtor nation. The results are now summarized: 
Backlash effect:  
Baseline and higher time preference 
Pension system Baseline case Robustness case 
FF −3.4% −7.5% 
DB −6.2% −10.6% 
DC −2.6% −5.9% 
 
The backlash effects get quite exacerbated by the increase in 𝜌, making the backlash effects higher in 
the order of 3-4 pp. By increasing how much individuals discount the future, consumption-leisure 
choices become stronger during the working period since 𝜇 increases with 𝜌. Note that the present value 
of earnings potential and pensions are unaffected by changes in 𝜌. The result is an increase in the 
sensitivity of labour-leisure choices to changes in the retirement age. 
The second debtor nation scenario is performed by reducing the interest rate, 𝑟 by one third, making 
it equal to 0.012. Again, the nation becomes an external debtor, with relatively fewer patient 
individuals. The backlash results are summarized in the following table: 
Backlash effect:  
Baseline and lower interest rate 
Pension system Baseline case Robustness case 
FF −3.4% −10.2% 
DB −6.2% −12.4% 
DC −2.6% −8.5% 
 
We see that backlash effects are more sensitive to interest rate decreases than to increased subjective 
discount rates. Decreasing the interest rate by one third, doubles or even triples the observed backlash 
effects. The mechanism of action is different compared to changes to the subjective discount rate. In 
this case, when the interest rate is reduced, the value of 𝜇 remains the same, but the present value of 
earnings potential and pensions increase. Now, when the retirement age is raised, it produces stronger 
value changes for earnings potential and pension wealth compared to when the interest rate was higher. 
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Individuals feel even more wealthy when the retirement age is increased, exacerbating the backlash 
effect when compared to the baseline case. 
5.3. Higher interest rate 
We next simulate an economy that has an interest rate one third higher than in the baseline case, 
making the economy a stronger creditor nation, with individuals saving more aggressively in the 
beginning of their lives, choosing steeper consumption-leisure paths when compared to the baseline 
case. The backlash results are: 
 
Backlash effect:  
Baseline and higher interest rate 
Pension system Baseline case Robustness case 
FF −3.4% −0.2% 
DB −6.2% −2.8% 
DC −2.6% 0.2% 
 
Overall, the more relatively patient individuals are, the weaker backlash effects become. The reason 
is opposite to the case studied just above, where the value of earnings potential and pension wealth 
drops with a higher interest rate, which attenuate the backlash effects associated with a higher retirement 
age.  
Interestingly, the backlash effect vanishes in the DC case, where the retirement age increase raises 
individual labour supply on the intensive margin by 0.2%. Backlash effects are nonetheless still present 
in the FF and DB cases. The takeaway is that, if the differential between interest rates and subjective 
discount rates are large enough, backlash effects tend to be mitigated or disappear altogether. Though 
it is important to underline that large positive differentials between interest rates and subjective discount 
rates are unlikely to be observed in reality, so that our results remain robust for the average OECD 
economy. 
5.4. Stronger unfunded pensions 
We also consider a case where the economy has a 100% unfunded pension replacement ratio, as 
opposed to the baseline scenario of 53.3%. Since the FF situation represents the case of 0% replacement 
rate, it is interesting to reveal the backlash effects in the opposite situation as well: 
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Backlash effect:  
Baseline and stronger unfunded pensions 
Pension system Baseline case Robustness case 
DB −6.2% −8.5% 
DC −2.6% −1.8% 
 
Here, the increased volume of inter-generational transfers introduces stronger impacts of the individual 
value of unfunded pensions 𝑝(𝑎) in how wealthy an individual feels. As asserted in section 2, when a 
DB system is in place, a later retirement age increases the value of the pension system to the individual. 
When the replacement ratio is 100%, this effect is amplified, so the backlash effects are now stronger 
compared to the baseline case. 
If a DC pension system is in place, a later retirement age reduces the value the pension transfers at 
birth to the agent. That means that, with a higher pension replacement ratio, the agent feels even poorer 
when compared to the baseline scenario when the retirement age is increased. This results in diminished 
backlash effects, as seen in the table above. Note that changes to the pension replacement ratio result in 
opposite impacts to the backlash effects. Countries with full public pension replacement of the DB type 
are more vulnerable to backlash effects than countries with DC systems. 
5.5. Generalized CRRA utility function 
When considering changing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution from 1 (the log case) to a more 
inelastic setting, it is important to consider that the model as it is, has no substitution effect where 
longevity and the retirement age are concerned, meaning that the relative “price” of consumption and 
leisure remains static when an individual now lives for longer or has a longer period to work in. As 
such, changing the intertemporal elasticity should have no relevant impact on the income effects we 
measure. 
We take the position that the lack of substitution effects, with respect to longevity and the retirement 
age is not a completely unrealistic setting. After all, when thinking about one’s lifetime, longevity and 
retirement issues are more closely related to financially planning the support of a longer retirement than 
to one’s wish to enjoy more or less leisure due to a different length of lifecycle. The implication then, 
is that it is on the level of consumption-leisure that the main focus should be placed - and not its 
intertemporal allocation rate - when considering shifts in longevity and retirement age. 
5.6. Realistic mortality profile 
The mortality profile featured in the model is a classic Blanchard-Yaari style perpetual youth model 
where agents face the same mortality risk at all ages. We apply a mandatory retirement age, making 
agents’ proximity to retirement age an important aspect when making consumption-savings decisions. 
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In order to portray a fair picture of the size of the backlash effect, we calibrated the baseline to fit a 
dependency ratio that is close to those observed in reality, see more details in section 4.  
This does however imply that the age structure of society, both before and after the retirement age 
is not realistic. Agents face a higher probability of dying before retirement, and once retired they live 
longer than observed. The existence of actuarial notes mitigates the mortality risk for savings, but 
pension transfers are not subject to any such mitigation. These factors affect the absolute size of the 
backlash effect, but should not change our main results: Namely, the existence of the backlash effect 
and the fact that the set-up of the pension scheme matters.  
5.7. Age-dependent wage profiles 
The model features a flat wage-profile, implying that agents’ productivity is constant over their life 
cycle. The fact is that young and old workers are not perfect substitutes in reality. Younger workers 
might adapt better to new production technologies while older workers have more experience.  By 
applying age dependent wages, the labour supply over the lifecycle would feature a hump shape where 
agents work more during the ages where they are relatively more productive, see equation (10). This in 
turn would have an interesting impact on the backlash effect. As labour supply is increased on the 
extensive margin, those extra years available to the agent are now less productive compared to the case 
with constant wages. 
This implies two things; first, that the size of the backlash effect would be smaller, since their 
lifetime earnings potential is increased to a lesser extent; Second, the backlash effect would, in absolute 
terms, be more pronounced at specific ages due to the hump shape of the labour supply. This extension 
would then invite analysis on how different age groups respond to retirement reform.  
5.8.  Endogenous retirement decisions 
Agents in this model are forced out of the labour force at a specific age, at which they might want 
to work for more years. As noted in the introduction, the connection between the official and actual 
retirement age is complex and explained by both social and financial factors. An interesting extension 
to this model would be to allow for endogenous retirement. Analysing both the intensive and extensive 
margin of retirement decisions requires a utility function featuring a distinctive mechanism for intensive 
and extensive labour supply decisions. This could, for example, be done by applying disutility of work 
similar to the one currently featured in the model, coupled with extra utility from being retired (see for 
example: Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil (2010)). The lifetime utility function could be re-written as: 
𝑢(𝑎) = ∫ 𝜀 ln(𝑐(𝑎)) 𝑒−𝑎(𝜌+𝛽)𝑑𝑎
∞
0
+∫ (ln(1 − 𝑙(𝑎)) (1 − 𝜀) − 𝛾)
𝑔
0
𝑒−𝑎(𝜌+𝛽)𝑑𝑎 
Where 𝛾 is disutility from being a part of the labour force. The agent would then maximize his 
lifetime utility based on his consumption profile 𝑐(𝑎), intensive labour supply 𝑙(𝑎) and time of 
retirement 𝑔. This would surely allow for endogenous retirement on both intensive and extensive 
margins, but also invite a host of questions about the set-up of the pension scheme - and how the pension 
age would be tied to the retirement age. In order to provide a realistic response to the actual retirement 
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age when the official retirement age increases, as traced in the introduction, some explicit link between 
the two has to be established. We leave this to future work.  
5.9. Proportional pension contributions 
Applying pension contributions proportional to the labour income of the agents is another 
interesting extension. This would establish a link between intensive margin labour supply decisions of 
the agents and the pension scheme. These effects would fundamentally change the dynamics of the 
model: First, equation (10) would change to include proportional contributions which would act like 
taxation; Second, the pension system balance would include aggregate labour supply in addition to the 
demographic parameters.  
The representative agent would therefore make labour supply decisions, which would in turn affect 
the balance of the pension scheme, implying either a change in the contribution or benefits rates, which 
would then impact the agent’s labour supply choice. This dynamic would lead to changes in the Euler 
equation of labour supply, affecting the shape of the intensive margin of labour supply.  
Having an impact on the intensive margin of labour supply, proportional pension contributions 
would deepen the sophistication of the analysis of the backlash effect. The ability to separate the 
backlash effect into income and substitution effects is one possible avenue this extension could provide 
the analysis with.  We leave this to future work.  
5.10. Decreasing returns to labour 
In the analysis, constant returns to scale of labour supply was assumed. Production, 𝑌, is assumed 
to be a function of labour supply, 𝐿, and the economy’s technology level, 𝜔, which was assumed to be 
exogenous and potentially time varying. Perfect markets imply that wages are set equal to the 
technology level, 𝑤 = 𝜔. This set-up of the labour market implies that wages do not impact an agent’s 
decisions on labour market participation.  
By introducing decreasing (or increasing) returns to scale, the agent’s wages would react to changes 
in the aggregate labour supply, both on the intensive and extensive margins. This implies that in a DRS 
setting, the backlash effect would become greater, since as labour supply drops on the intensive margin, 
the wages per hour worked would increase, causing agents less financial loss from reducing their 
working hours. The opposite would hold true in the increasing returns to scale case. 
6. Concluding remarks 
We specify a model of leisure-consumption choices that confirms our insights about retirement reform. 
This is a reform that aims at increasing the labour supply on the extensive margin, and how this will 
have the unintended effect of decreasing labour supply on the intensive margin. This was done in a 
steady state setting of dynamic efficiency with an unfunded pension system, where backlash effects 
were shown to exist in an analytical setting for DB and FF pension schemes. 
We have shown that the type of mandatory pension scheme matters a great deal in the context of either 
increased longevity or an increase in the retirement age. The calibration exercises demonstrated how 
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important the design of the pension system is when implementing retirement age increases. A feature 
as simple as DC and DB can make a difference to the decision-making process of agents when choosing 
the intensity of labour supply throughout their lives. Basically, whoever pays the “longevity bill” 
matters for how agents react to retirement age increases. In this case, the existence and type of pension 
scheme can either reduce or increase the unintended effects of increased extensive labour supply on 
intensive labour supply - or as we call it, the backlash effect. 
Through our calibration exercise, we found that the effects under a FF pension regime were in line 
with our insights about labour intensity. In the FF case, changes in labour intensity were driven by 
anticipated length of the working life and retirement.  By adding a pension system, where pension 
benefits were contemporaneously covered by contributions by the working population, another layer of 
complexity arose. The effects of retirement reform on labour supply increased substantially in the DB 
case compared to the FF case, leading to a relatively large drop in labour supply on the intensive margin 
as a result of an increase on the extensive margin. But in the case of DC, the opposite situation occurred, 
where the backlash effects of pension reform were smaller than in the FF case. These differences indeed 
stem from the existence of an unfunded pension scheme, its value to individuals, and how that value 
changes when the retirement age is raised. 
We confirmed the existence of backlash effects under different calibration exercises. Our results are 
generally robust to changes in leisure preferences. In terms of the interplay between interest rates and 
subjective discount rates, a key relationship for our results, we conclude that debtor nations, where 
individuals have stronger subjective discount rates compared to the world interest rate, have more 
pronounced backlash effects. A one third increase (decrease) to the subjective discount rate (interest 
rate) yields two to three times stronger backlash effects. In the case of an even more relative patient 
economy, making it more of a creditor nation compared to the baseline, the backlash effects tend to be 
mitigated. 
The lesson to take from this study is that pension rebalancing reforms aimed at either indexing 
retirement age increases in a one-for-one manner with respect to increases in life expectancy or 
increasing the retirement age to preserve the same old-age dependency ratio, may fall short from 
accomplishing their goals at steady state. Increases to the retirement age must be more-than-
proportional with respect to increases in longevity and need to account for the type of pension system 
in place.  
For countries running DB unfunded schemes, increases to the retirement age should most likely be 
much stronger relative to expected longevity increases, when compared to other pension system types. 
Complimentary pension reforms should therefore be explored. The situation looks much more benign 
for DC pension systems, where retirement age increases seem to create relatively weak backlash effects. 
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This pension system type is much more robust to retirement age increases where labour supply 
responses are concerned, having a lesser need of complementary pension reform. 
Given the results presented here, a further look into these backlash results is warranted, where other 
features should be considered. Future work should consider features such as endogenous retirement 
decisions, realistic mortality and wage profiles and proportional taxation. We acknowledge that the 
addition of these features would provide a more accurate measurement of the backlash effects. The 
question of economic transition to the new steady state is also a relevant one, which this paper does not 
answer. Given the nature of inter-generational transfers that an unfunded pension system implies, the 
potential for divergence upon a demographic shock, plus retirement age reform should be investigated. 
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Abstract 
For the past decades, Denmark has fostered the funded component of its pension system via quasi-
mandatory labor-market pension schemes alongside the strengthening of old-age public insurance in the 
form of means-tested unfunded supplementary benefits. Within this institutional setting, which requires 
higher individual responsibility to save for retirement, the group of individuals that are eligible to the full 
public pension supplement (folkepensionstillæg) is analyzed, a group termed the “residual group” in 
Denmark. This pension supplement is means-tested, making this group the collection of individuals with 
the lowest pension savings in Denmark and that can become a fiscal pressure to the public pillar of the 
Danish pension system. We investigate the factors associated with higher or lower risk of belonging to this 
group. We then quantify that risk for cohorts that will reach retirement in the next decade and provide a 
framework that can be used to measure what level of means-tested pension expenditures the government 
could expect to pay out in the future. 
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1. Introduction 
In a world where human longevity is increasing, the issue of properly saving for retirement is one of 
great importance. In this context, pension systems across the globe work towards helping people reach 
retirement with enough resources to enjoy their golden years. The Danish pension system has been 
successful along these lines as evidenced by cross-country evaluations and comparisons, such as the 
Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index (Mercer, 2018). The Danish pension system has consistently 
been placed 1st since it became part of the index, only to lose the top score to the Dutch pension system in 
2018.  
Part of the Danish success has to do with the implementation of the 2nd pillar of quasi-mandatory, 
employer-made pension contributions since the early 1990’s. This reform has been successful in providing 
significant income at retirement for individuals. In particular, this success can be explained by the 
automatic nature of employer-made contributions. Estimates in Chetty et al. (2014) point to a proportion 
of “passive” savers in Denmark in the order of 85% of the population, meaning that being automatically 
enrolled to contribute does not necessarily imply a crowd-out in otherwise voluntarily-made contributions 
to most of the Danish population. Overall, the Danish pension system has been able to achieve low poverty 
among the retired (see OECD 2017a, 2017b, 2019), as well as comparatively good replacement rates across 
the income distribution.  
Nonetheless, there exists a group of individuals that are characterized by low retirement savings, to the 
point that they become eligible for full pension supplements and therefore fully dependent on the public 
pillar of the Danish pension system. This group of individuals has been labeled “the residual group” (the 
literal translation of restgruppen in Danish). In an ideal insurance scheme, these individuals would be the 
ones affected by exogenous adverse shocks, like rare diseases, which translate into an inability to save for 
retirement. However, such poverty insurance can also induce free-riding behavior or moral hazard issues, 
where people with the capacity to save don’t do it due to the saliency of pension supplements in the public 
pillar. 
In this study we propose a framework to analyze how large the residual group is in Denmark and what 
are the personal characteristics that affect the probability of being part of that group. This approach is based 
on assessing the probability of individuals becoming dependent on pension supplements at retirement, 
where individual characteristics help us understand what types of individuals are at higher risk. We focus 
only on absolute measurements of low savings, as opposed to relative measurements that make use of 
distributional moments. Our definition of low saving in this study is related to saving behavior throughout 
the life cycle that translates into being entitled to full public pension supplement (folkepensionstillaeg in 
Danish) at retirement.  
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This definition has a governmental perspective, since the benchmark for low savings is becoming fully 
dependent on the state pension system. An advantage of this definition is that the assignment of this pension 
supplement to an individual is determined objectively by law according specific income-limit rules. This 
enables a precise definition of absolute thresholds of what pension contributions/wealth to aim for such 
that an individual does not become fully dependent from the government at retirement.1 This concrete 
threshold for being characterized as a “low-saver” (or person with low savings) allows for techniques that 
can be employed to clearly estimate the size of this group and its characteristics in a perspective of interest 
to policymakers. 
Previous studies have focused on measurements of the residual group that are non-stochastic and more 
descriptive, like SFI (2014) and ATP (2015). Previous approaches have based their analysis on classifying 
currently working individuals according to some criteria that is conceptualized to be an indicator of 
whether these individuals will become entitled to the full pension supplement (i.e. the group of low savers) 
upon retirement. Even though this method can reveal distributional characteristics of individuals in the 
residual group and estimates on its size, it does so independently across each characteristic. For example, 
it may be that immigrants are overrepresented in the residual group among the currently working; however, 
this could be driven by income or market attachment, and therefore being an immigrant may not be a 
significant determinant of belonging to the residual group after controlling for other characteristics. 
Moreover, these studies generally rely on classifying low-saving behavior with classifiers that can be 
sensitive to certain dimensions. For example, defining low-saving individuals as not contributing enough 
into one’s pension accounts will likely yield different measurements depending on the age range. During 
an individual’s peak earnings’ age, it is arguably easier to contribute higher amounts when compared to 
very young or old ages, especially in the presence of (quasi-) mandatory occupational pensions. 
Our approach takes into account important individual characteristics, instead of just looking at 
distributional descriptions of each characteristic based on a univariate classifier estimate. First, we estimate 
a Probit model to explain the probability of belonging to the residual group at retirement, conditional on a 
set of relevant individuals’ demographic and financial characteristics. We find that females, immigrants, 
individuals with less than a university degree, and single individuals are the most at risk. In terms of work 
sector, the sectors most at risk are manufacturing, mining and quarrying, accommodation and food 
services, construction, wholesale, retail and vehicle repair. In terms of labor status, people most at risk are 
those receiving cash benefits and the self-employed. In terms of risk group composition, most of those in 
the high-risk group are individuals with low labor market attachment. A rather high portion of employees 
 
1 A drawback of this definition is that it may include individuals that could save enough to avoid becoming fully dependent from the government. Nonetheless, they 
fail to save the minimum and become totally dependent of the public pension scheme. The identification of such individuals is a relevant question for governments that 
requires the modelling of moral hazard as well as a subjective benchmark of what people should consume and save. This is an issue that is beyond the scope of this 
study and is part of our future research agenda.  
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are also part of this high-risk group. Setting up a truly mandatory occupational pension system would 
capture these employees and reduce the size of the residual group, if automatic contribution rates are set 
high enough. 
Second, we predict the probability of belonging to the residual group in cohorts that will retire in the 
next decade or so. The estimation of a probability distribution of belonging to the residual group allows 
the identification of characteristics that are associated with higher or lower risk of arriving at retirement 
with low savings. In our framework, we separate the probability distribution of belonging to the residual 
group into 3 sections, two extremes representing very low and very high risk, and a middle group whose 
residual group membership can go either way. We then identify individual characteristics of those most at 
risk and those that are on the fence. This categorization allows us to identify the type of individuals that 
will most likely never (always) enter the residual group and understand the structural factors associated 
with the high likelihood of belonging to this group. Immigrants are overrepresented in the higher risk 
group. Low education is a relevant determinant of residual group membership as well. Very little 
individuals with a university degree (short- or long-cycle) are a part of the high-risk group. A very 
prominent educational group in Denmark, those with vocational education (as well as normal secondary 
education), compose almost half of the low risk group and roughly 60-65% of the middle risk group. 
Furthermore, singles are overrepresented in the high-risk group. Among those single, the proportion of 
divorcees and widowers does not significantly change across risk. Employees are overrepresented at low 
and middle risk, though there is still a relatively large proportion of employees in the high-risk group. This 
likely stems from the quasi-mandatory occupational pensions, where these are not completely widespread, 
even among the group of employees. 
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2, a historical perspective is given on the Danish pension 
system and how it developed over time, as well as key details of how it works nowadays. Section 3 
describes the data used in this paper. Section 4 details our methodology, the outcome of interest, how it is 
identified, and the econometric methods utilized. Section 5 reveals our main results, starting with residual 
group size estimations using stock-flow threshold approaches. We then explain our risk-based framework, 
revealing the size of the residual group among different age-cohorts and characteristics associated with a 
higher risk of membership. Section 6 discusses our results further, contextualizing the predictive power of 
our framework against the preexisting threshold techniques, and exploring different dimensions of our 
results. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Historical context and institutional setting 
2.1. Brief development history of the Danish pension system 
We start by providing context to the Danish pension system in terms of how it developed from its 
inception up to 2016. The following history brief is heavily based in Goul Andersen (2011), which contains 
an excellent and detailed overview of the Danish pension system.  
The current Danish pension system is quite mixed in terms of its multi-pillar system. Making use of the 
World Bank’s 1994 pension classification, the current average Danish individual is/will be dependent on 
both 1st pillar and 2nd pillar for retirement income. Both pillars have relevance in the old-age income 
structure, thus making the Danish pension system quite mixed in terms of funded or unfunded financing 
of pension income. The current institutional setting of the Danish pension system is still relatively young, 
a system that is still consolidating over time, especially in terms of its 2nd pillar. 
The first legal appearance of a pension system in Denmark came with the policy package 
“alderomsunderstøttelsen” in 1891, which focused on supporting those in need at the age of 60 or older, 
requiring citizenship and residence in Denmark. The pension amount was established via discretionary 
evaluation and was financed by taxation. Roughly 30% of people were covered around the inception of 
this pension system (Jørgensen, 2007). This system was then further reformed in 1922 with the policy 
package “aldersrenten”. In it, entitlement requirements and benefits were further standardized across the 
country, moving away from discretionary evaluation, as well as setting the pension age at 65 years of age. 
In 1957 a new pension system was implemented with the bill “folkepension”, the name in use nowadays. 
A major shift in this new pension system was the universality of entitlement, though the benefits were 
means-tested, and a pension age of 67 years. Between the years 1956 and 1970, several other changes were 
introduced, but the last large reform to the pension system came in 1964 where a flat-rate unfunded pension 
benefit was introduced alongside a smaller means-tested benefit. The layout of the public pension system 
has not suffered major changes since, though the trajectory of means-testing regulation and benefit sizes 
has with the spreading of occupational pension schemes in Denmark. 
A major change of direction within the Danish pension system came with the proliferation of 
occupational pension schemes. Such schemes have existed since the beginning of the 20th century 
(Jørgensen, 2007), but their size at the macro level was relatively small. In 1984, the government declared 
support, or a wish for widespread occupational pensions. Starting with the Danish Confederation of Trade 
Unions working towards implementing occupational schemes for its members in the second half of the 
80’s, the adoption of such schemes expanded rapidly during the 90’s. Though older pre-existing schemes 
could have contribution rates in the range of 12-18%, initial contribution rates in these new 90’s schemes 
were small, being for example 0.9% within many unions (Jørgensen, 2007). Over time, the contribution 
rates on newer schemes have converged to the rates seen in older schemes. 
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Given the development of occupational schemes, becoming the de facto 2nd pillar in the Danish pension 
system topology, the role of the 1st pillar morphed as a result. The 1st pillar became much more targeted at 
alleviating old-age poverty situations, distributing more means-tested benefits relative to the universal flat-
rate benefit (Goul Andersen, 2011). Under the “old” pension system, means-tested benefits were small, 
and most were eligible to it. After a tax reform in 1994, these means-tested benefits became roughly in line 
with the flat-rate benefit the state gives to every eligible individual. As Goul Andersen (2011) frames it, 
even though the 1st pillar has become largely means-tested, it “does not mean that the system has become 
residual”. The pension complex must be seen as a whole, where all pension pillars are both complements 
and substitutes of each other. 
It is important to note that these occupational schemes were not born out of legislation, but instead 
created out of labor market negotiations, with contributions being managed, not by a central institution, 
but by a privately organized market. This means that employees are usually contractually “forced” into 
these schemes, leaving self-employed, unemployed or low labor-market attachment-type individuals at 
risk of not setting up/contributing into pension saving schemes voluntarily. Nonetheless, the proportion of 
non-zero contributions to funded pension schemes in 2016 (employer-made or voluntarily made) is quite 
high. Among all individuals aged between 25 and 64 in 2016, 25% had zero pension contributions. But 
among those in an employer-employee relationship, only 7.6% had zero pension contributions. In terms of 
accumulated pension assets, these have grown from 81% of GDP in 1993 to 199% of GDP in 2015 (Danish 
Ministry of Taxation, 2017). This exhibits tremendous growth in the 2nd and 3rd pension pillars. Since the 
schemes are quasi-mandatory, the question remains if individuals are actively ensuring appropriate saving 
behavior adjusted for income level, or if generalized passive behavior occurs with, for example, individuals 
assuming that the state is ensuring an appropriate level of income at retirement with no further individual 
action.  
2.2. Danish Pension System in 2016 
We now describe the main and relevant features of the Danish pension system as it was in 2016, the 
year our main results are based on. We start by exhibiting a schematic summarizing the main components 
of the Danish pension system over a 3-pillar layout (see Goul Andersen, 2011, for a more detailed 
description): 
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Table 1 – Danish Pension System Structure 
Pillar 1 Pillar 2 Pillar 3 
Universal Flat-rate* Quasi-mandatory 
occupational pensions 
Personal Pensions 
 
Public Pension Supplement** 
(folkepensionstillæg) 
{
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑝 − 𝑠𝑢𝑚)
 
Other Individual Supplements 
*** 
(housing, heating, personal, 
health related transfers) 
ATP   
Note: based on Goul Andersen (2011); * Means-tested against labor income only (relatively high ceiling); ** Means-tested 
over most taxable income that does not stem from 1st pillar transfers; *** More targeted/idiosyncratic means-testing. 
In a 3-pillar scheme, the 1st pillar of the Danish pension system represents unfunded benefits whose 
accessibility is based on a residence criterion, and not citizenship. For those with less than 40 years of 
residence, a reduction is applied to benefits. Certain benefits have different rules applying to singles than 
to couples. Couples are classified as people that effectively share an economy. This means that even if two 
people are married, they may be considered single by the state if those two people are not effectively 
sharing an economy (for example, if they are separated, living separately, yet not divorced). The rules can 
also depend on whether a person is in a couple where the partner is a pensioner or not. The 2nd pillar is 
comprised of occupational pensions that are quasi-mandatory in nature, with the exception of the ATP 
scheme, which is mandatory for most working-age individuals in Denmark. The 3rd pillar is comprised of 
voluntarily accumulated pension assets. 
There are four major components in the 1st pillar:  
• First, a universal flat-rate benefit (folkepension): 
o Pays out a maximum yearly amount of 72.756kr. 
o This income is attributed to each individual, irrespective of marital/couple status. 
o It is only means-tested against labor income. 
o Any labor income (and labor income alone) above 310.000kr. starts to reduce the flat-
rate benefit, and when that income reaches 546.500kr. the flat-rate benefit is not paid 
out anymore. 
• Second, the public pension supplement (folkepensionstillæg): 
o Pays out a maximum yearly amount of 76.788kr. if single and 37.632kr. if in couple 
(each). 
o It is means-tested against all taxable income, not counting the public pension amount 
(though including ATP income). Notably, some items do not count for the means-
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testing, such as other general wealth and housing wealth. Certain types of pension 
accounts do not count as well, such as kapitalpension and aldersopsparing2. 
o Means-testing is dependent on couple status. 
o For singles: Full pension supplement is paid out if privately earned income is below 
68.400kr., and the supplement is no longer paid if the same income is above 316.900kr. 
o For couples: 
▪ Partner is not retired: a deduction up to a maximum of 107.050kr. is allowed 
from the working partner’s labor income and a deduction of 60.000kr. is 
allowed on labor income from the retiree partner. After the deduction, the 
couple’s total income cannot exceed 137.300kr. for the full pension supplement 
to be paid out. Entitlement to any supplement stops with combined income 
above 254.900kr. 
▪ Partner is also retired: a deduction of 60.000kr. is allowed on own labor income. 
After the deduction, the couple’s total privately earned income cannot exceed 
137.300kr. for the full pension supplement to be paid out. Entitlement to any 
supplement stops with combined income above 372.600kr. 
• Third: Other Individual Supplements 
o Generally, these supplements are targeted at the poorest individuals. 
o Usually means-tested against both income and wealth. 
o Supplements attributed according to specific life expense needs (health, house heating, 
housing). 
o Certain supplements can be given over idiosyncratic evaluation. 
• Fourth: ATP 
o Fully-funded defined-contribution scheme. 
o Contribution amount is flat across income rates, only adjusted for work-hours. 
o Contribution amount for full-time work is 3.408kr. 
o Mandatory for employees (with more than 9 hours of weekly labor). Also mandatory 
for unemployed under unemployment insurance (a-kasse). 
o Possible for self-employed to participate in scheme voluntarily. 
o Benefits setup as a guaranteed deferred annuity. 
o Usually described as 1st pillar benefit, though technically can be considered a part of 2nd 
pillar. 
For the 2nd and 3rd pillars, the pension taxation regime is ETT for most pension products (see below). 
Capital gains are taxed at 15,3%, whereas out-payments are either taxed at 40% for lump-sum payouts, or 
 
2 Contributions into these two types of pension accounts were generally not tax deductible (up to certain law-defined limits under which deductions were allowed). 
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they pay normal personal income tax otherwise (Goul Andersen, 2016). There are three main types of 
pension products:  
• Life annuities (livrente): 
o Contributions are tax deductible. 
o Payouts are taxed. 
o Pays amount until death. 
o Count towards means-testing of public pension supplement. 
• Non-life annuities (ratepension): 
o Contributions are tax deductible up to a limit (52.400kr.). 
o Payouts are taxed. 
o Can be paid out over a period of 10 to 30 years. 
o Count towards means-testing of public pension supplement. 
• Age pension (aldersopsparing): 
o Substituted kapitalpension in 2013, which was a similar, more generous scheme. 
o Contributions are not tax deductible. 
o Payouts are tax-free. 
o Typically pays out in lump-sum. 
o Does not count towards means-testing of public pension supplement. 
There is also the possibility to become an early retiree under two different systems. First, the state can 
award early retirement benefits to people at any age, if these individuals have reduced or no capacity to 
work. These benefits are in line with unemployment benefits, and not public pension benefits. Concurrent 
work is allowed up to a certain income threshold. Second, there exists a voluntary early retirement scheme, 
efterløn, where individuals can choose to contribute into the scheme for 30 years through their 
unemployment insurance company (a-kasse) during their work years. This allows them to receive benefits 
(in line with unemployment benefits) just before the official pension age in a situation of unemployment. 
In order to receive these benefits, individuals must have had a sufficient degree of employment in the years 
leading to early efterløn retirement. Moreover, the benefit rates are downwards adjusted against pension 
wealth. This makes efterløn disadvantageous for people with occupational/private pension accounts. 
Recall that our definition of under-saving behavior in this paper are those individuals that are/will 
become entitled to the full public pension supplement (folkepensionstillæg) among those at or over the 
official state pension age. We ignore all other means-tested benefits as they are generally given to the very 
bottom of individuals over the income distribution, at the same time that they are heavily targeted towards 
specific types of necessities/expenditures retirees face at an individual level. The folkepensionstillæg 
(public pension supplement henceforth) is instead chosen due to its broader eligibility base and simplified 
rules, as the only means-testing criteria is defined over income. Overall, focusing on individuals with a 
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low amount of pension savings allows for a simple, tractable definition of this group, though it does not 
allow for detecting under-saving behavior in a consumption-smoothing perspective. 
2.3. The residual group in pensions – previous measurements 
The residual group problem in Denmark has been measured in previous reports. ATP (2015) summarizes 
the key findings of some of these past reports. As established before, we focus only on absolute 
measurements of the residual group using threshold techniques. Our starting point is based on two studies 
that perform such measurements: ATP (2015) and SFI (2014). Their residual group size estimations are 
summarized in the following table: 
Table 2 - key results from previous studies 
Study Measuring Criteria Population 
Result 
Proportion 
Number of 
individuals 
SFI 
(2014) 
Pension wealth 
Pension wealth lower than 
1.088.500kr. (2011 DKK) 
64 year-olds in 2012 46% 34557 
Pension 
contributions 
Pension contributions lower 
than 100000kr over 5 years 
(2011 DKK, excluding ATP 
fund) 
30-59 year-olds in 
2011 from 2007 to 
2011 
32% 720746 
ATP 
(2015) 
Pension 
contributions 
Average yearly pension 
contributions lower than 
23240kr over 10 years (2014 
DKK) 
30-59 year-olds in 
2012 from 2003 to 
2012 
35% 788316 
The numbers reported above show a sizeable residual group. Recall that these individuals are estimated 
to receive the full public pension supplement, something that is, in its principle, to be given to the most 
disadvantaged within the Danish society. Coupled with the past decades’ push to implement stronger 2nd 
pillar occupational pensions, making the individual more reliant on own pension savings, the issue of 
under-saving has become a highlight in the Danish social discussion. Given that these reports measure the 
residual group’s size in the range of 32 to 46% of working age individuals at the same time that aggregate 
pension assets as a proportion of GDP have reached record high levels of around 200% in 2016, questions 
of moral hazard, free-riding behavior and institutional shortcomings have been raised. 
One should note that these results only focus on those currently working or people about to retire3. This 
brings uncertainty into the estimation of the residual group size, since proxy measurements are being used 
to estimate who will become entitled to the full pension supplement at retirement. It should be noted that 
the pension wealth technique in SFI (2014) should be the most reliable one, since it is measuring pension 
wealth just before the official pension age, after all the saving decisions have been made. In this paper, we 
 
3 Note that some of the reports referenced above include analysis of the currently retired, but not with absolute measurements based on thresholds for receiving the 
full pension supplement, the measure we focus on in this paper. 
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also perform residual group size estimation with the same proxy methods of the two reports referred to in 
the table above. However, we go beyond and also look at the currently retired and evaluate if they are 
eligible to the full pension supplement through direct income assessment against the legal conditions they 
face for receiving the supplement. Since this is a virtually certain (apart measurement error) classification 
of residual group membership, we use it in our risk-based framework, removing residual group 
membership uncertainty from our risk classification. We then evaluate how individual characteristics affect 
the probability of being part of the residual group and use these predictions to forecast the probability of 
ending up in the residual group in the future among those current working. 
Furthermore, these reports only consider saving performed into savings accounts that are earmarked for 
retirement. This means that every working age individual that is saving into stocks, bonds and/or other 
liquid/illiquid assets, instead of pension accounts, is more likely to be falsely identified as part of the 
residual group, even though they might be relatively wealthy overall. We explore how the inclusion of 
such wealth items alters the residual group size. Related to the previous point is saving through housing 
wealth, which can also be used to supplement retirement savings via partial alienation of housing equity. 
More than half of the Danish population has housing assets and they can have a relatively large size in the 
balance sheets of many Danish households (Leth-Petersen and Andersen, 2019), such that it is an important 
dimension to consider. 
3. Data 
The present analysis is performed using administrative data from the Danish statistics agency Danmarks 
Statistik (DST henceforth). We use several registers linked by personal identification numbers for every 
Danish resident between the ages of 20 and 100 present in these registers, though more restricted age 
cohorts are used in specific contexts throughout the paper. We use registers with information on personal 
characteristics, such as sex, age, household size, relationship status, immigration, education level, labor 
status, work sector, official retirement status, income, assets, liabilities and pension contributions.  
Descriptive statistics will span the period 2002-2016, whereas our econometric methods will focus on 
the year 2016 in the dependent variable and span the period 2000-2016 in the regressors4. In terms of 
wealth data, there exists two different sources. There are long running assets and liabilities measurements 
that exist since 19955 based on official sources of information from the state’s property register, reports 
from financial institutions and the tax authority. Remarkably, these long-running wealth measurements do 
not include pension wealth. Recently, DST introduced new wealth data of higher quality, but it only exists 
 
4 We do not use panel data methods for the regressions. We use cross-sectional methods based on the year 2016, but regressors may be measurements made on the 
relevant population of individuals in 2016 when they were younger. 
5 There is a significant break in this series between the years of 1996 and 1997, since 1996 was the last year Denmark had a wealth tax. The break is characterized 
by a change in how the value of certain stocks is observed by the state, which brings a change to the observed holdings of stock wealth. 
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from 2014. This new data does include pension wealth. We do not use both sources interchangeably. 
Overall, as Leth-Petersen and Andersen (2019) argue, this tax return data is regarded as highly reliable. 
Immigrant status is defined by country of origin not being Denmark. Education level is divided by 3 
categories: first, primary school or lower; second, secondary or any vocational schooling; third, any 
university or equivalent institution’s degree (short or longer cycle). Those categorized as “married” are all 
individuals legally married, “unmarried” are individuals never having been legally married, “widow” and 
“divorced” are self-explanatory where the individual has not legally re-married, and “couple” is a dummy 
that does not follow the legal marital status but instead categorize a couple as two individuals actually 
sharing an economy. This means that two people that are legally married may not be considered a couple 
if they are officially or unofficially separated6, meaning, they are not sharing an economy. In the eyes of 
the pension institution, it is the actual situation that matters on whether an individual is under couple’s or 
single’s rules, and not the legal marital status. More generally, two individuals are marked as a couple 
considering the following dimensions: if they live at the same address, if they could potentially get married 
or are legally married, if their age gap is not bigger than 15 years, if they are not close family to each other, 
and if they have children together (not a necessary condition). 
As for work sector, it is categorized loosely around the highest level of aggregation of NACE codes. An 
individual is designated into a work sector if it is the biggest source of employment in a given year, so 
some smaller variance may exist with employment at other sectors. We also aggregate people into a 
placeholder sector dummy, people to which work sector is not relevant (for example early retirees and 
retirees) or if a main work sector could not be defined (low sector attachment). In terms of labor status, it 
again represents the status most prominent in a given year. We categorize individuals into employed, self-
employed, unemployed (but ready to work), receivers of cash benefits (kontanthjælp), receivers of 
sickness/parental leave and labor market-related student benefits, students, early retiree in public scheme 
(social insurance on inability to work), early retiree in efterløn scheme (voluntary early retirement scheme, 
available only at age 60), retiree, and finally, a dummy for individuals that could not be categorized (ie. 
non-students with generally low income from all sources). 
In terms of the components of income, wealth and pension contributions we use, income measurements 
include income from labor activities, plus financial income, public transfers and other residual income 
(observed income that cannot be characterized into the former categories, such as child support payments). 
Two measures of aggregated income are used. One is gross income, which is total income before tax, the 
other is disposable income as total income after tax plus the rental value of owned property minus 
deductions of interest expenses.  
 
6 Officially separated is a status that is legally defined, a status between marriage and divorce. 
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For wealth data, we use total assets and total liabilities for the long series starting in 2002 but use 
disaggregated wealth components for the high-quality wealth data starting in 2014. This disaggregated data 
is comprised of financial assets, real assets (buildings and cars), pension assets, mortgage debt, and all 
other debt items (ie. bank debt, student loans, debt to the state and the like). In terms of pension 
contributions, we have data since the year 2000. We have disaggregated data for contributions made by an 
employer7 and voluntarily made. We also observe pension wealth and pension contributions made into 
pension accounts of a type that does not count towards the means-testing of the public pension supplement, 
pension accounts of the type kapitalpension and aldersopsparing. These contributions/pension accounts 
are not used in estimating the residual group size and in the regression models. 
Moreover, when plotting distributions of income and wealth and income quantiles, we utilize 
equivalized measures across households (as opposed to individual measures) to account for economies of 
scale in sharing an economic life between household members. We use the square root rule (otherwise 
known as the LIS equivalence scale), in line with recent OECD tradition (OECD 2015, 2019). This rule 
distributes household income to each adult member in the following way: 
Equivalized flow/stock =
Total household income/stock
√number of individuals in household
                                          (1) 
Full summary statistics can be found in Appendix A, Table A1 for our population of individuals aged 
25-101 in the year 2016. Below, we show selected key statistics: 
Table 3 – Summary Statistics 
 Mean SD 
Male (%) 49.1 50.0 
Immigrant (%) 12.0 32.5 
Age 53.1 17.0 
Couple (%) 64.7 47.8 
Education level obtained 
     Primary or less (%) 24.1 42.8 
     Secondary and equivalent (%) 41.0 49.2 
     Tertiary (%) 32.7 46.9 
Disposable Income 248.3 819.1 
Disposable Income (equivalized) 283.4 679.0 
Total Net Wealth (equivalized) 2082.4 10800.0 
Under poverty line (ages 25-101) (%) 8.1  
Number of individuals aged 25-100 4074652  
Note: Financial items are displayed in 1000’s, 2016 DKK; income poverty line defined as 50% of equivalized median income  
The proportion of immigrants stands at 12%, which is a significant percentage. The majority of 
individuals are in a couple, at roughly 65% of the population. Most people hold at most secondary 
 
7 We do not have data on pension contributions made into the ATP scheme. The full-time employment contribution amounts to roughly 3400kr. a year. Not including 
these pension contributions will bias our threshold-based residual group size estimate. It will not affect our results under the risk-based framework, with the exception 
of our estimate for pension contributions made by employer. 
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education or equivalent (such as vocational training). The proportion of individuals with primary schooling 
or less is still rather high at 24%. Across each individual, average disposable income stands at 
248.000DKK. Accounting for economies-of-scale in the household, the equivalized measure raises that 
number to 283.000DKK. In terms of poverty, 8.1% of individuals are technically income-poor, as defined 
by 50% of the equivalized median income.  
4. Empirical strategy 
4.1. Empirical framework 
In order to develop an accurate risk approach, we start by only focusing on the currently retired, since 
we know with certainty (apart measurement error) who is entitled to the full pension supplement. This 
removes an extra layer of uncertainty of residual group classifiers based on the currently working, as these 
estimates are exactly only estimating the group size. Next, we fit a probability model with selected 
regressors (see Appendix C for a list). Any relevant information we have on all individuals is then used to 
draw out risk factors related to belonging to the residual group.  
Technically, the Probit model being fitted is of the form: 
𝑝𝑖 = prob[𝑅𝐺𝑖 = 1|𝑋] = Φ(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) 
Here, 𝑝𝑖 denotes the probability of belonging to the residual group for individual 𝑖, 𝑅𝐺𝑖 is the dummy 
equal to 1 if individual 𝑖 belongs to the residual group, and Φ represents the Normal cumulative 
distribution. Probability has a relationship with individual characteristics through a Normal cumulative 
distribution transform applied over a linear combination of individual characteristics in 𝑋. Given the 
model’s structure, in order to present how changes in explanatory variables are reflected in changes to 
probability, one must derive marginal effects. These are derived differently on whether the explanatory 
variable is continuous or dichotomous. For continuous variables, the marginal effect is computed as: 
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑘
= 𝜙(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽)𝛽𝑘 
For dummy variables it is determined as: 
∆𝑝𝑖 = Φ(?̅?𝑖
′|𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦=1𝛽) − Φ(?̅?𝑖
′|𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦=0𝛽) 
We specify different Probit models with mutable regressors measured at different past age-points for 
the new retirees that become 65/66 years old in 20168. Note that including higher ages in the analysis 
reduces how long back the analysis can be performed. Hence, to keep each Probit model consistent over 
ages, we refrain from mixing different age-cohorts. As such, we only look at the two earliest ages 65 and 
 
8 In first year under pension age, where no deferment of official retirement took place. More than 90% of individuals retire at these ages. By retirement, we mean 
becoming an old-age pensioner, even if the individual was previously under the public or the voluntary early retirement schemes. 
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66, that can be observed in the data in 2016. We go as far back as the data allows us. This means that we 
formulate 13 Probit models performed with mutable regressors at ages 52-64 onto new retirees that became 
65 or 66 in 2016. It also means that we can no longer use high-quality wealth data, since we need to look 
back in time beyond 2014 (the year at which high quality wealth data becomes available). This measure is 
substituted with the lower quality measure of total net wealth9.  
We then project the resulting Probit equations onto individuals that become 52, 53, …, 64 in 2016, thus 
obtaining forecasts for residual group size within this age-range. This offers us a distribution of forecasted 
probabilities for individuals 15 years away from reaching the public pension age of becoming entitled to 
the full pension supplement at retirement. If data is available over time, this method also allows to keep 
track of how the risk distribution evolves over time. This is useful information, since it allows us to identify 
main characteristics at different risk levels of becoming dependent on pension supplements at retirement.  
Table 4 below summarizes the types of regressors used in the Probit models (see Appendix C for a 
complete list): 
Table 4 - Regressors used in the Probit models 
Variables Definition 
Basic Characteristics Sex, number of children, immigrant, education, marital status in a given 
year 
Work Sector Predominant work sector in a given year 
Labor Status Predominant labor status in a given year 
Wealth measures Measured holdings of assets and liabilities in a given year 
Income measures Measured income flows in a given year 
Pension contribution measures Amount of contributions into means-tested pension accounts in a given 
year 
First, we consider relevant personal characteristics that can impact saving behavior, such as gender, 
immigration status, education level, number of children, being in a couple or widower or divorced. Both 
SFI (2014) and ATP (2015) show that labor status and work sector matter in how individuals save for 
retirement. As such, we include regressors for different work sectors, including one dummy for when work 
sector does not apply or could not be determined (it does not apply when an individual is mostly not, or 
not at all, working). In the same way, we include dummies for labor status, whether a person is 
unemployed, self-employed, receiving poverty alleviating cash benefits, in early retirement discerned for 
the public and voluntary10 schemes, and a category for those that couldn’t be categorized (basically, those 
with virtually no attachment to the labor force). 
 
9 This situation is less than ideal, since the lower quality wealth measurement does not include pension assets. Other asset items are included in the model, nonetheless. 
Later on, we do show how the Probit model behaves if we use the high-quality wealth data for the model at age of 64 (in 2014 or 2015, when the new retirees in 2016 
respectively become 65 or 66 years old). 
10 Note that the voluntary scheme is only available when an individual turns 60. As such, all the Probit equations for ages 52-59 do not include this dummy variable. 
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We then include as regressors a series of relevant financial measurements, such as total assets (excluding 
pension assets, including housing assets) and total liabilities, primary income, public transfers, financial 
income, residual income (including income items that cannot be classified in the former categories), as 
well as pension contributions made automatically by an employer in the behalf of the employee and ones 
voluntarily made. Assets and liabilities tell us how much money has been put aside, the disaggregated 
income regressors help control for the income level from labor activities versus how much comes from 
public transfers, financial returns and other types of income. And finally, pension contributions are an 
obvious addition to the model to measure the level of contributions versus how it contributes to not be in 
the residual group, separated for employer-made contributions where the employee has little short-term 
say (the employee might have negotiation power upon labor contract negotiation, but little after that 
contract is signed) and voluntarily made contributions, measuring active decisions towards savings. 
Against the dummies included in the Probit models, we have a baseline individual that is female, non-
immigrant, university educated, not in a couple, not a widower, not a divorcee, working in the public 
administration, and not self-employed. Furthermore, we winsorize all non-categorical variables at the 1th 
and 99th percentiles (only at the 99th percentile for variables bounded below at 0) to deal with the impact 
of outliers on our results and improve the stability of the Probit estimation procedure11. 
Moreover, we also analyze individuals aged 25-44 using a similar Probit model, with the exception that 
projections and forecasts will not be made. Since the Probit models will be made over working-age 
individuals, the dependent variable will be a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual is part of the 
residual group of those that are not accumulating enough pension wealth. We then obtain average marginal 
effects and observe how individual characteristics impact the probability of belonging to the residual group. 
4.2. Identification of residual group members 
In order to assess the risk of becoming dependent on pension supplements, we first need to identify those 
currently retired that are eligible to it. In the Probit models, the outcome variable of analysis is binary in 
terms of residual group membership. The residual group is the group of individuals that are, or will be, 
entitled to the full public pension supplement. A member of this group is coded as 1 in the binary outcome 
variable and 0 otherwise. When determining group membership, it is important to account for two 
dimensions: one is co-habiting couples sharing economy vs. being single; the other is considering only 
pension contributions or pension wealth that counts towards the means-test of the public pension 
supplement. We account for these dimensions. When determining residual group membership for the 
currently retired, we do not consider early retirees as “retired”. Our definition of “retiree” is officially being 
retired under the public pension age (or folkepensionsalder in Danish). It is the case that one may still work 
 
11 The Probit model performed for those aged 64 using high quality pension wealth data required winsorization at percentiles 2 and 98, and 0 and 98 for those 
variables bound at zero, due to computational issues with outliers. 
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while being under official retirement at public pension age. In 2016, the income limit over which one stops 
receiving the full public pension supplement was 68.400kr for singles and 137.300kr for couples12.  
The identification for the currently retired is quite accurate since the data is granular enough to identify 
items of income that count towards the means-test of the pension supplement. There are specific rules for 
different items of income, and we account for these in terms of labor income, income from private pensions 
that count towards the means-testing (private pension income from aldersopsparing or kapitalpension not 
included), financial income and other residual income13. We also have information on whether individuals 
are tagged as a couple or not (as measured by DST matching criteria). It is important to consider that, in 
the perspective of the public pension institution, a couple is not necessarily the same as two legally married 
individuals. Being a couple, in determining which set of rules to apply, is dependent on whether two 
individuals share an economy. So, if there is a married couple that are even informally separated, having 
separated economies, each of the married individuals will be considered as “actual single” if each are not 
subsequently in another relationship with a shared economy.  
We also replicate the results in SFI (2014) and ATP (2015) and expand their residual group 
methodology. Given the different sources of data in those reports and the present paper, we start by 
contextualizing those reports to our data and verifying how their methodology behaves under different 
dimensions such as over cohorts, over time and over income quantiles. The identification of the residual 
group over those individuals currently working is done according to pension contribution or pension wealth 
thresholds, determined in a way such that an individual will likely be entitled to the full pension supplement 
at retirement. This is possible to define under certain assumptions since the legal rules around the pension 
supplement have themselves well-specified income limits in its means-testing.  
For defining pension contribution and pension wealth thresholds, we simulate all pension wealth as if it 
will all be converted to a guaranteed deferred annuity type of instrument (in similar fashion to SFI 2014). 
For pension contributions, we assume that pension contributions start at the age of 25 until the age 65 (40 
years of contributions), that these are flat along the contributory career (in real terms), with a real return of 
1%. For pension wealth thresholds, we also assume a 1% real return on the annuity assets and a remaining 
average lifetime in retirement of 20 years (matching the Danish population, see SFI 2015). Assuming a 
1% real return might be on the lower end of possibilities, but given that this return refers to pension assets 
 
12 These income limits only apply to certain types of income, and different types of income can have allowances associated with them. Certain income types from 
spouses (as in, the other individual in a couple) also count towards the means testing of the pension supplement, and the rules differ on whether the spouse is also 
retired or still officially not retired. See section 2 for more details. 
13 There is of course a certain degree of uncertainty in measuring items of income that count towards the means-testing of pension supplements, stemming from 
items of income in the “residual income” variable that aggregates certain types of income that do not fall under the other categories of gross income disaggregation. 
We include “residual income” in the means-testing, and certain items there may not actually count for the means-testing of supplements. We do not expect this effect 
to be relevant, as the residual income average observed in Table A1 in appendix is really low. 
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and its return after pension administration costs, we find it reasonable as a baseline assumption. The 
formulas for the wealth threshold and average pension contribution are: 
Pension wealth = Yearly withdrawal × 
1−(1+𝑟)−𝑛
𝑟
                                      (2) 
Yearly contribution = Pension wealth × 
𝑟
(1+𝑟)𝑛+1−(1+𝑟)
                                      (3) 
The pension wealth threshold that an individual must have at retirement is derived in equation (2). It is 
found by substituting in the real return on remaining assets in the annuity, number of years in retirement 
and the yearly income withdrawal at which point the public pension supplement starts to be reduced. We 
also use wealth thresholds for each age, with these thresholds being defined by the natural accumulation 
progression implied by equation (3). The natural accumulation progression is dependent on the yearly 
contribution into the pension account, which, again, is flat across time. By inserting the amount of pension 
wealth required at retirement, the return on the pension account and the number of contributory years, one 
finds the average pension contribution required. Then, one can derive pension wealth thresholds at each 
age point as implied by the average pension contribution found before. The exact age-dependent wealth 
thresholds are shown in Appendix B. This amount is different for singles than it is for couples, and we 
account for that difference. 
Finally, for estimation of residual group size and probabilities, we utilize household-level flows/stocks 
but not equivalized. This is because the determination of residual group hinges on specific monetary values, 
and not a measure of well-being (as equivalized measures correct for). We implicitly assume that current 
couples will remain a couple for the rest of their lives, planning their lives as such, and that total household 
income and wealth is pooled among all household heads equally (always one minimum or two individuals 
maximum). 
Overall the residual group definitions we employ are summarized in the table below: 
Table 5 - Residual group definitions 
Residual 
group 
Definition Perspective Population 
Definition 1 Privately earned income below 68.400kr for 
singles and 137.300kr for couples 
Actual 
Entitlement 
Retirees 
Years: 2002-2016 
Definition 2 Pension wealth below threshold according to 
formulas (2) and (3) adjusted for couples and 
singles 
Stock Working-age 
Years: 2014-2016 
Definition 3 Pension contributions below 25000kr for 
singles and 50000kr for couples as determined 
by formula (3) 
Flow Working-age 
Years: 2002-2016 
Briefly summarizing the choices above, definition 1 allows us to obtain an accurate measurement of the 
residual group, since it is only applied to the already retired; definition 2 checks that individuals have 
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enough pension wealth accumulated; and definition 3 checks that individuals are saving at an enough rate 
into pension accounts.  
For each definition, we apply a broad age range and a restricted age range to perform an extra check of 
how much the age range drives results. Table 6 below reveals the age ranges applied: 
Table 6 – Age ranges considered in measuring residual group 
Measure Range type Age range 
Definition 1 
Broad (All retirees) 65-100 
Restricted (New retirees only) 65/66  
Definition 2 
Broad 25-64 
Restricted (SFI 2014) 64 
Definition 3 
Broad 25-64 
Restricted (ATP 2015) 30-59 
Note that definition 2 is inspired by the report SFI (2014), but whereas they only focus on 64 years old 
(see Table 2), we generalize the pension wealth threshold technique they employ to all ages. Similarly, 
Definition 3 is inspired by both SFI (2014) and ATP (2015), who consider only those aged 30-59, and we 
also expand and explore the age dimension in how it impacts residual group size measurements. 
Conceptually, restricting the age range is expected to change the estimated residual group size. At younger 
ages, lower labor market attachment might correlate with a lower intensity of pension contributions/wealth 
accumulation. The same goes for cohorts just about to hit the public pension age. As for retirees, those 
surviving well into retirement are also more likely to run down their wealth to a point where they end up 
becoming eligible to the full pension supplement. 
Specifically, Definition 3 will be the most vulnerable one, since the flow intensity of saving is likely to 
be, on average, weaker at the beginning and end of the working period of life. This is why ATP (2015) 
focuses on measuring pension contributions in the middle of the working period of life. A potential problem 
here is that, taking pension contributions in this middle period as representative of saving behavior across 
the entire working life can lead to under-estimation of residual group size. We expect this definition to not 
be stable over different age-cohorts.  
Definition 2 should be more robust than Definition 3 since this definition is based on stock 
measurements, and stocks are “sticky” by nature as opposed to flows. It checks if someone is on track to 
save appropriately, even if pension contributions have been unstable across years but have a high enough 
average contribution. Since a certain threshold of pension wealth will ensure that a person is not eligible 
to the full pension supplement, Definition 2 will likely produce an accurate estimate if measured among 
those about to retire. There is one vulnerability in it, in that it says nothing about future saving behavior, if 
it is measured earlier in one’s life. SFI (2014) dealt with this problem by only looking at 64 year-olds, 
120 
 
though we expand their analysis to the full age range (25-64) and verify the stability of estimates over age 
cohorts (among other dimensions). 
5. Results 
5.1. Direct measurements of residual group size – threshold methods 
We now turn to evaluate the residual group size according to the threshold techniques described in 
Section 4. We focus on Definitions 2 and 3 as defined in Table 5 and apply each to two different age 
ranges, specified in Table 6. The estimated residual group sizes from Definitions 2 and 3 are then 
contextualized with the residual group size measurement in Definition 1. The estimates for residual group 
size for both the broad and restricted age range are revealed in Figure 1 below: 
Figure 1 – Residual group size, broad and restricted age ranges 
 
First, the current residual group size, as measured by Definition 1, is markedly bigger when considering 
all retirees (broad age) as opposed to newly retirees (restricted age), going from 54.8% down to 43.4%. 
This is, at least to a certain extent, expected, as people consume their pension wealth over time when 
retired. At some point, individuals may consume their pension wealth to the point where they become 
entitled to pension supplements. One way this can take place is due to the existence of non-life annuity-
type retirement income, such as ratepension type of products with a payout period of 10 to 30 years. If 
individuals survive longer than the outpayment period of their annuities, they will suffer an income drop 
if their consumption during that period was in line with the higher income stemming from these non-life 
annuities. 
Second, Definitions 2 and 3 also suffer a marked change when considering the different age ranges, 
revealing their dependence on the age considered. For the restricted age range, Definition 2 measures the 
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residual group size at 49.7% and Definition 3 at 38.5%. Thus, our results do not exactly replicate the reports 
SFI (2014) and ATP (2015), with our estimates being slightly increased. When expanding the 
measurements to all those aged 25-64, Definition 2 lowers to 40.9% and Definition 3 increases to 45.3%. 
Definitions 2 and 3 seem to better explain the residual group among those newly retired, compared to the 
average eligibility rate observed within the entire pool of retirees. This dependence on the ages considered 
is a cause for concern over the stability of the estimates given by definitions 2 and 3. 
A few reasons for the differences between broad and restricted age measurements can be hypothesized. 
For one, people do not save smoothly over their working period of life, and the definitions 2 and 3 assume 
so. As such, if the average individual displays strong saving behavior during peak earning years (say, 
around the age of 40-55), they can then show lower saving behavior at other ages and still save enough so 
that they do not become entitled to pension supplements. In short, timing can matter, as Figure 2 below 
shows. Another reason is average behavior changing over time, in the sense that different cohorts might 
be saving more or less on average, which can impact the measured residual group size at different age-
points. For these reasons, we analyze all the definitions below in two different perspectives: over age 
cohorts and over time. Overall, definitions 2 and 3 seem to underestimate the residual group size over the 
broad age range. 
Figure 2 - Residual group over cohorts, broad age 
 
Starting with how the definitions perform over different cohorts, Definition 2 is rather stable over 
cohorts. It seems that younger people do not start saving that early, and older individuals about to retire 
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also seem to be more vulnerable on average when compared to middle aged cohorts. Older cohorts seem 
to be more entitled to the full pension supplement compared to middle aged cohorts. It may be that 
individuals are saving strongly during their top earning years, thus accumulating pension wealth above the 
threshold in that period, but then reducing pension contributions in the following years to the point where 
pension assets fall below the threshold.  
The same pattern is observed for pension contributions measured in definition 3. Including age periods 
where lower pension contributions are likely to take place, before labor market status largely stabilizes, 
(ages 25-29) and just before retirement, where labor market participation is also more unstable (ages 60-
64), increases the estimate of residual group size. Interestingly, definition 2 is somewhat resilient to the 
different age-cohorts when compared to the performance of definition 3. Note that the very high proportion 
of individuals flagged by definition 2 in the cohort aged 25-34 remains high (around 60%) even if students 
are excluded from it. 
Now turning to the time dimension, it is possible to plot residual group size under definition 2 over the 
period 2014-2016 and definition 3 over time for the period 2002-201614. We perform these measurements 
assuming that all individuals will retire under 2016 rules. 
Figure 3 – Residual Group Size Over Time 
 
Starting with the estimates in Figure 3 under definition 2, the wealth-based measurement, a downwards 
trend is observed over the years 2014-2016 for residual group membership over all cohorts with the 
 
14 We cannot show it for the years 2000 and 2001 due to data limits on pension contributions and retirement age. 
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exception of the youngest cohort aged 25-34. This downwards trend is rather strong, seeing drops in the 
order of almost 5 percentage points. Remarkably, the youngest cohort does not share this downwards trend, 
revealing that younger individuals are lagging behind in the overall trend of higher pension assets in 
Denmark. Either the occupational pension system is already matured within the youngest cohort, meaning 
that a very broad base of these young individuals is already contributing to a high degree, or a worrying 
new under-saving trend is dominating behavior within the youngest cohort.  
As for definition 3, the pension contribution-based measurement, its progression over time also displays 
a decreasing trend for the residual group size. In terms of cohort behavior, it is in line with definition 2, 
since the youngest cohort displays the largest proportion of low contributing individuals. As expected, 
people around their peak earnings age (say, 35-54) are the ones contributing the most. In line with the 
situation in Definition 2, a downwards under-contributing trend observed in older cohorts is not seen 
among the youngest cohort. Whereas older cohorts’ under-contributing patterns are still exhibiting a 
downwards trend, the proportion of under-contributors within the youngest cohort has nearly flattened 
since 2009, a year of economic crisis where the unemployment rate nearly doubled in Denmark (OECD, 
2017c). Since the under-contributing rate among the youngest cohort is far above that of all older cohorts, 
it shows that the flattening of the residual group size under Definition 2 for the youngest cohort is likely 
to stem from a worrying new trend of under-saving, and not a full-maturation of pension contributions 
among the youngest cohort. 
Another important dimension in terms of under-saving behavior relates to those individuals that simply 
cannot save enough due to low disposable income, otherwise known as hand-to-mouth type of individuals. 
These individuals can be thought of as “legitimate” residual group members, since means-tested public 
pension supplements are exactly meant to curb poverty situations at retirement among the most income-
disadvantaged ones. In order to observe how the residual group behaves across the distribution of income, 
we show the estimated residual group size for each equivalized disposable income quintile of 2016 for the 
broad age range: 
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Figure 4 – Residual Group Size Over Income Quintiles 
 
Figure 4 reveals a decreasing residual group size over income quintiles, as expected. What is perhaps 
less expected is that, even at median income, we observe residual group sizes of around 45-50%, a value 
in line with the average estimated residual group size for the entire population of individuals aged 25-64. 
This means that the distribution of individuals estimated to be in the residual group under Definitions 2 
and 3 is rather centered. To contextualize the meaning of this residual group size at median income, note 
that a 12% pension contribution rate out of the median income will roughly suffice to comply with the 
residual group definition 3. So, on average, 45-50% of individuals at the median Danish income 
distribution are saving less than 12% of their disposable income. Even less expected is the positive estimate 
for the residual group size in definitions 2 and 3 at the top quintile. The estimated residual group size 
among the highest earners in Denmark is around 14% of those individuals. This is a surprisingly high 
degree of under-saving among those earning the most.  
The reason for these high residual group sizes at the top quintile likely stems from the fact that, first, 
definitions 2 and 3 only look at savings earmarked as pension saving, though it may be that it is showing 
actual under-saving behavior. A possibility is that many households (and especially at higher incomes) are 
saving for retirement thorough other asset types. As such, just looking at pension assets might distort the 
estimate of residual group size at higher income quantiles. Second, not all types of income count towards 
the means-testing of the pension supplement. Especially so, non-pension assets are not considered in the 
means-testing for the public pension supplement, only the financial income generated by it. It may be that 
wealthy people may manage to structure their wealth holdings in a way that still enables them to receive 
the full pension supplement, for example by holding wealth in money accounts or low yielding/risk 
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financial instruments. Third, it is possible to combine some work income while retired and still be eligible 
to the supplement, especially if one’s spouse is still not a retiree. As such, supplement-eligible households 
might have relatively high income but still “optimize” their income sources and remain eligible to the 
pension supplement. This is evidence that a potential improvement to the means testing system could take 
place, though not without pervasive incentive effects compared to the current status quo. 
Given the results in Figures 4, we now look at balance sheet composition of those in the residual group 
and those not in it, as a proportion of disposable income. Because of this weighting of financial 
components, we start by showing the average disposable income for definitions 2 and 3 over those that are 
members and those that are not: 
Figure 5 – Average disposable income over residual group membership 
Figure 5 shows that both definitions 2 and 3 capture residual group members that are, on average, 
obtaining much less income compared to their non-residual group counterparts. Both income trajectories 
across cohorts have the usual hump-shape, but the residual group is indeed characterized by much lower 
peak earnings, averaging around 350.000kr. among those who save enough versus average peak earnings 
of just over 200.000kr. for individuals in the residual group. The former group attains their peak earnings 
at ages 45-54 whereas residual group members attain their peak one cohort before, between the ages 35-
44. 
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Figure 6 – Pension Assets over residual group membership
Turning to the accumulation rate of pension assets, the left-hand side of Figure 6 shows that, just before 
retirement, those outside the residual group under definition 2 accumulate pension assets to an amount of 
800% of disposable income, whereas their residual group counterparts accumulate less than 400% of their 
disposable income, on average. Though Definition 2 successfully captures saving differences between 
members and non-members, Definition 3 fails to account for diverging saving behavior among those in the 
residual group versus those not in it. especially at the age cohort 55-64. There, both residual group members 
and non-members accumulate pension assets to the order of 800% of disposable income. This reveals, 
again, the sensitivity of Definition 3 to the age range of measurement. Pension contributions simply have 
high variance over age. 
Figure 7 – Non-mortgage Debt over residual group membership 
Focusing now on the negative side of the balance sheet, the distribution of non-mortgage liabilities over 
age cohorts reveals an interesting relationship. For both Definitions, members of the residual group have 
more debt in proportion to their disposable income, and it increases among older cohorts. This could be an 
indication of under-saving behavior, where households reveal a proclivity towards over-consumption or it 
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refers to households that are hit with adverse economic shocks, lowering income and increasing relative 
indebtedness as a result.  
Figure 8 - Housing Assets and Mortgage Debt over residual group membership
Lastly, we show the accumulation structure of housing assets and corresponding mortgage debt. One 
reason under-saving could be taking place is due to choices of purchasing housing assets at the cost of 
contributing less to pension savings. If this were the case, one would expect residual group members to 
hold relatively more housing assets/higher mortgage debt compared to those not in the residual group. 
Figure 8 above shows no evidence of this. It does not seem to be the case that, for the average residual 
group member, housing is causing under-saving, as both groups have an average housing wealth of around 
400% of disposable income (this includes individuals with no housing assets). It should be noted that 
mortgage debt may be impacting saving rates at the age cohort 45-54 for residual group members, since 
the hump-shape distribution of mortgage debt peaks one cohort later for those in the residual group. Given 
the early flattening of disposable income for the average residual group member, mortgage debt repayment 
seems to be slower for these individuals, which may impact saving behavior well into older age. 
Overall, the results stemming from threshold techniques showed us that there is a general downwards 
trend in the residual group in Denmark. It also showed us some evidence that under-saving is likely 
occurring among individuals that could otherwise save sufficiently to not be members of the residual group. 
We also saw that residual group size estimates from pension contributions are sensitive to the age cohorts 
considered, and its performance becomes uncertain as a result. Definition 2 showed better stability in its 
estimates and resulting group characteristics. Nonetheless, these threshold techniques do not provide any 
information in the risk dimension, nor they control for individual characteristics other than the level of 
pension assets or pension contributions used in the dichotomous characterization of the residual group. For 
this, we now apply a Probit model for individuals aged 25-34 and 35-44 in the next sub-section. 
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5.2. Determinants of being in the residual group among younger workers 
The previous section analyzed working-age individuals and their saving behavior. Using the threshold 
techniques, based on pension wealth and contribution measurements, we identified those working-age 
individuals that are on a saving path such that they will likely end up becoming dependent on the full public 
pension supplement at retirement. 
Having identified the residual group, we can now measure how individual characteristics influence the 
probability that an individual find itself on an under-saving path. For this, we apply a Probit model, 
regressing a vector of individual characteristics (see Appendix C for the list of regressors) on whether the 
individual is a member of the residual group under definition 2. We use definition 2 since the analysis in 
the previous sub-section 5.1 indicates that it is superior to Definition 3, being more stable across age-
cohorts and far superior at identifying the accumulation of pension wealth. 
We display the average marginal effects for two different age-groups (see Appendix H for the coefficient 
tables). First, the youngest cohort in our sample, aged 25-34. This group can be conceptualized as still 
having low labor market stability, something that is observable in Figure 3 where this age cohort is the one 
that contributes the least into pension accounts above the 25.000kr. threshold. Given how widespread 
employer-made contributions are among the employed, the conclusion is that these younger individuals 
are either still studying, have low employability, or the work contracts offered to them do not typically 
include employer-made pension contributions. The second age-cohort we consider is the one between the 
ages of 35-44. Turning to figure 3 again, we see that this age group is roughly tied with the age group 45-
54 in making the most contributions above the threshold. This is in stark contrast with the age cohort 25-
34.  
The average marginal effects are now displayed for the two age groups 25-34 and 35-44. These marginal 
effects tell us how different characteristics impact the probability of not accumulating enough pension 
wealth above a certain threshold, or in other words, the probability of being part of the residual group under 
definition 2 (see Appendix B for the age-specific thresholds):  
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Figure 9 – Marginal effects at age groups 25-34 and 35-44
  
Starting with the top left quadrant of Figure 9, it shows the average marginal effects for basic 
characteristics of individuals. Overall, all margins are significant with very few exceptions, though not all 
characteristics have significant impacts in size. The characteristics yielding the most impact are being an 
immigrant, male, being in a couple, and having lower education than a university degree. 
On average, being an immigrant is associated with an increase in the probability of being in the residual 
group of 14pp. for those aged 25-34. This number increases to almost 20pp. for those aged 35-44. Since 
the regression equation controls for labor status, income, being self-employed, and other relevant 
dimensions, the explanation for this positive effect of being immigrant can be interpreted (at least in part) 
as low commitment to the Danish pension system. It can be that immigrants avoid contributing to the 
Danish pension system, by for example contributing to their foreign social security systems or saving in 
foreign accounts. In the data, some foreign assets are captured, but contributions to foreign social security 
systems are not. 
Being in a couple is associated with a lower probability of being in the residual group for both age 
groups equally. Since classifying people as being part of the residual group or not is done at the household 
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level, this result is not surprising since being in a couple provides a type of insurance against low 
contributions into pension accounts.  
Turning to the marginal effects related to education level, it is seen that not obtaining a university degree 
is associated with markedly lower probabilities of being in the residual group. This result seems counter-
intuitive, and the explanation lies with the following: those that do not pursue further education start 
working earlier. This means that they accumulate pension wealth at an earlier age, compared to those that 
are still studying at the age of 25 and above. Even if the low education group makes smaller contributions 
to pension accounts on average (which they do), starting work at an early age is associated with a lower 
probability of being in the residual group for the age-cohort 25-34. Since the low education group can 
expect a lower wage profile moving forward in time, this effect should start to disappear for older cohorts. 
This is seen in figure 9, where the marginal effects for the low education dummies is more than halved for 
those aged 35-44. 
Now focusing on the bottom left quadrant of figure 9, showing the average marginal effects associated 
with the work sector the individual is the most associated with throughout a given year, considering that 
the baseline case is an individual that works for the public administration (a sector with strong, widespread 
mandatory pension contributions), it is no surprise that being in any other sector than the public 
administration is associated with a higher probability of being in the residual group. The sectors with the 
largest probability margins are: 
• Agriculture, forestry and fishing; 
• Information and communication; 
• Associations, culture and other activities; 
• Low/No work sector attachment; 
• Mining and quarrying; 
• Accommodation and food services; 
• Real estate. 
These sectors are the ones most at risk among those aged 25-44, increasing the probability of being in 
the residual group in the range of 10-20pp. 
The top right quadrant of figure 9 shows the marginal effects in terms of labor status. The biggest effects 
are seen on those that are receiving cash benefits in the form of kontanthjælp (a poverty-alleviating transfer 
for those that cannot sustain themselves) and being an early retiree (so, those that lost their ability to work). 
Receiving cash benefits at a younger age has margins of around 8pp. For those aged 35-44, this margin 
reduces to almost 0. Bad outcomes earlier in life are thus more connected with low pension savings, as 
expected. Losing the ability to work penalizes those in the older age group, 35-44, by a positive margin of 
around 7pp. 
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Finally, the bottom right quadrant of figure 9 shows the marginal effects for financial measurements. 
All stock values were normalized by 1.000.000, and flow values by 100.000. Given this scaling, all 
regressors are relatively small, with two exceptions: income from private pension funds and pension 
contributions. In terms of income from private pension funds, people receiving this type of income are 
likely for the most part those that inherited the stock of wealth from spouses or ascendants, given the age 
of the recipients. Given this type of event, these individuals are then inheriting pension wealth. This 
explains the negative drop in the expected probability of being in the residual group of around 37pp. per 
100.000kr. of income received from pension accounts. For pension contributions, each 100.000kr. of 
pension contributions made by an employer in a year reduces the probability of being in the residual group 
almost entirely down to 0. This is not surprising, since 100.000kr. of contributions is a relatively large sum. 
As for pension contributions made voluntarily by the individual, it reduces the probability by around 60pp., 
which is also a very large number, though markedly lower compared to contributions made by an employer. 
This reveals a key detail: the spread of occupational pensions throughout the Danish population is the key 
driver of higher pension wealth. 
5.3. Determinants of being in the rest group – a risk approach 
We now turn to an evaluation of the residual group using a different approach than the one seen in the 
previous sub-section. We investigate the determinants of belonging to the residual group according to a 
probabilistic model. For this, we use a Probit model as described in Section 4, focusing on definition 1. 
We regress the Definition 1 residual group classifier onto the regressors specified in Table 4 for the newly 
retired aged 65 or 66. We fit the model for sets of regressors measured from age 52 to age 64. Appendix 
D shows the regression tables for ages 52, 58 and 64 with Probit coefficients (appendix E also shows the 
block-wise addition of variables and the associated Wald tables). The figures below summarize the average 
marginal effects for ages 52 and 60: 
Figure 10 – Marginal effects at ages 52 and 60 
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Above, we separate marginal effects according to the same regressor structure presented before. Starting 
with basic characteristics at the top left quadrant of Figure 10, being male, non-immigrant, having tertiary 
education and being in a couple are all characteristics associated with a lesser probability of being 
dependent on pension supplements at retirement. It should be underlined that, in terms of basic personal 
characteristics, the strongest effects can be seen from education, where those that have secondary education 
or less have an increased risk of belonging to the residual group in the range of 15 to 24pp. Recall that 
these marginal effects within education levels are controlled for all other personal characteristics. That 
means that education itself is a strong driver of under-saving behavior. The idea is not extreme, as 
education should somewhat be a good proxy for financial knowledge. 
In terms of work sector, the baseline category is working for the public administration. This baseline 
was chosen because it generally has strong implementation of occupational pensions. This is reflected in 
that, not being in the public administration is associated with a higher probability of belonging to the 
residual group, as Figure 10 (bottom left quadrant) shows. The smallest impacts to the probability of 
belonging to the residual group are observed among workers in the education and finance and insurance 
sectors, where marginal effects are in the order of 10pp. The biggest impacts are seen among those working 
in: 
• Manufacturing; 
• Mining and quarrying; 
• Accommodation and food services; 
• Construction; 
• Wholesale, retail; 
• Vehicle repair. 
Margins for these sectors are in the range of 25 to 30pp at age 52. These sectors do not exactly match 
the ones found under the Probit models of those aged 25-44 in sub-section 5.2. The sectors in common are 
mining and quarrying and accommodation and food services. Most sectors have increased average risk of 
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being part of the residual group upwards of 20 percentage points. Again, we underline that this increased 
risk comes after controlling for things like income level. It is not income that is driving this result, but the 
prevalent occupational pension contractual setup within these sectors coupled with low active saving 
decisions. 
Looking at the top right quadrant of Figure 10, being unemployed with unemployment insurance does 
not reveal a significant increase in risk but being dependent on cash transfers (kontanthjælp in Danish) 
does, increasing risk by roughly 8 pp. at age 52, dropping to 4 pp. at age 60.  Being self-employed is not 
largely associated with an increased risk of belonging to the residual group. Belonging to this labor 
category is associated with an increase in the probability of being in the residual group of 3 to 4pp.. SFI 
(2014) and ATP (2015) report that the self-employed group has low average pension contributions. 
According to that metric, one could be inclined to say that the self-employed are at higher risk of belonging 
to the residual group. But with the probabilistic approach, which accounts for income and wealth, being 
self-employed is not inherently associated with a markedly higher risk of becoming dependent on pension 
supplements. The prevalence of self-employed people in the residual group is thus driven by other events, 
such as low income, than the institutional setting they face in terms of saving for retirement. Surprisingly, 
becoming an early retiree under the public insurance scheme is not associated with an increase in 
probability of being in the residual group, even though those that become early retirees under the public 
scheme can only do so if their work capacity is reduced. Becoming an early retiree at age 60 is associated 
with a negative marginal effect of 8pp. Though entering the voluntary early retirement scheme efterløn is 
also associated with increased risk in the order of 3pp. 
In terms of financial measurements, the only item associated with increased risk of under-saving 
naturally is being dependent on public transfers. Those that actively save in other financial assets are also 
less at risk, where for each 100.000kr. in financial income decreases the risk of belonging to the residual 
group by around 12pp. Similarly, for each 100.000kr. extra in primary income decreases residual group 
risk by roughly 6pp. In terms of pension contributions, the marginal effects are similar between 
contributions made by the employer and ones voluntarily made. Contributions made earlier in life have 
stronger marginal effects, where contributions made at age 52 reduce risk by 13-19pp. for every 100.000kr. 
of contributions, but contributions made at age 60 only decrease risk in the order of 8-16pp. In terms of 
automatic vs. voluntarily made contributions, the latter is associated with stronger decreases to the 
probability of being in the residual group. 
We now project each Probit model, derived for characteristics recorded at ages 52-64 of the currently 
newly retired in 2016 onto individuals aged 52-64 in 2016. This yields an estimated probability curve for 
each age-cohort. The average probability for each age-cohort is then the estimated residual group size. We 
plot the average probability for each age-cohort below: 
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Figure 11 – Forecasts of residual group size by age cohort 
 
The expected residual group size for those aged 52-64 in 2016 is 40.7% (the green line in Figure 11). 
This contrasts with the residual group size among new retires aged 65-66 in 2016 of 43.4%. Thus, a drop 
in the residual group size is expected. But the analysis reveals an interesting characteristic beyond the mean 
probability. The image also reveals an interesting “carousel” shape to the evolution of the expected residual 
group size over each age-cohort. Interestingly, the age-cohorts that have an expected residual group size 
above the overall average (the green horizontal line) are exactly the cohorts aged 47-53 in 2009, the year 
where the unemployment rate nearly doubled in Denmark after the 2008 financial crisis hit. Coupling with 
the fact that the age cohort 45-54 is the one making the most pension contributions among all age cohorts 
(see Figure 3, under Definition 3, yellow line), our risk model picks up exactly that, an increased risk of 
belonging to the residual group due to the economic crisis. For all other ages, the impact of the economic 
crisis wasn’t so felt, as all other age points are below the overall average.  
One, the risk model shows here its power in considering each age cohort idiosyncratically. Second, 
given that the increased expected residual group size for those aged 57 and 58 in 2016 is statistically 
significantly different from the overall mean, the government should expect a slight increase in costs with 
pension supplements when these individuals retire. 
Another important question is in regard to the shape of the probability forecast distribution. Is it the case 
that most individuals bundle at the middle, or are most people bundling at the extremes? In the former 
case, policy directed at increasing saving is likely to be more effective at tilting individuals to lower risk 
groups. But if most individuals are bundling at the extremes, more structural, deep policy reforms will 
likely be required to shift the residual group paradigm. 
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Figure 12 – Forecast Probability distribution over age 
 
Figure 12 shows the probability forecast distribution density at three age points, 52, 58 and 64. The 
distribution at all ages can be found in Appendix G. From age 52 to age 64, the distribution of risk of 
belonging to the residual group flattens out in the middle. This makes sense, since at ages far away from 
the state pension age, there is still a higher degree of uncertainty on whether an individual will receive a 
full pension supplement. Even though the average expected residual group size is relatively stable around 
40%, as shown in Figure 11 above, many more people come from the middle point of the distribution to 
the lower risk side than to the higher risk side of it, as Figure 12 reveals. Note that the cohort aged 58 is 
the one at the top of the “carousel” shape in Figure 11. This is reflected in the distribution density, where 
less individuals are bundled towards probability 0, and more accumulate over the probability range of 40-
90%. 
In terms of goodness-of-fit, we focus on fit measurements that are focused on the classification power 
of the model. Here, note that our outcome variable of interest, eligibility for pension supplements at 
retirement (Definition 1), is relatively balanced between negative and positive outcomes. As such, 
measuring goodness-of-fit with the area under the ROC curve and accuracy/precision/sensitivity should 
properly inform us on the classification power of the model. At an age closer to the retirement age, the fit 
is expected to improve since there is less uncertainty in terms of how individual characteristics determine 
residual group membership risk. We obtain an area under ROC curve of 0.815 and an accuracy of 73.6% 
for our model at age 52, both values revealing good classification power for our most age-distant projection 
model. For the model at age 64, the area under the ROC curve improves to 0.858 and an accuracy of 78.4% 
for our age 64 model. See Appendix F for few other goodness-of-fit measures. 
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Having the probability forecast distribution, we can now evaluate the types of individuals at risk of 
belonging to the residual group at retirement. We start by splitting the distribution equally over three 
regions: individuals with probabilities lower than 33.3% are labeled as “Low Risk”, between 33.3% and 
66.7% are labeled “Mid Risk” and between 66.7% and 100% are labeled “High Risk”. We then reveal 
group characteristics across these three groups.
Figure 13 - Gender Figure 14 – Immigration status 
We start by showing gender over each risk group. Figure 13 reveals quite a balanced result in terms of 
proportions of females over each risk group, though for the age group 64, higher risk groups have 
proportionally more women in them in a 45-55 ratio to men. Figure 14 shows that immigrants are 
overrepresented in the higher risk group and underrepresented at lower risk. Recalling that the size of 
immigrants in Denmark stands at around 12% of the population, immigrants compose roughly the same 
proportion of the high-risk group among those aged 64 in 2016, increasing to nearly 30% for those aged 
52 in 2016. This increasing trend is consistent across all projected ages. Thus, this can be an indication of 
a trend of immigrants being amongst the lowest savers in Denmark. 
In terms of education, the marginal effects already indicated that low education is a relevant determinant 
of residual group membership. This result is further confirmed in Figure 15, where half of the group at 
high risk is comprised of individuals with primary or less education. Very little individuals with a 
university degree (short- or long-cycle) are a part of the high-risk group. A very prominent educational 
group in Denmark, those with vocational education (as well as normal secondary education), compose 
almost half of the low risk group and roughly 60-65% of the middle risk group. These individuals are thus 
prime candidates for targeted action, as most of them are on the fence between becoming part of the 
residual group and not. Figure 16 shows that couples are overwhelmingly represented in the low risk group. 
On the other side of that coin, singles are overrepresented in the high-risk group. Among those single, the 
proportion of divorcees and widowers does not significantly change across risk. Overall, one can 
hypothesize that being in a couple offers an important insurance mechanism between partners, or similarly, 
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higher economies of scale in sharing a life in terms of time and money spent on certain activities that 
benefit both partners in the couple.
Figure 15 -Education  Figure 16 – Couple/Marital Status 
Figure 17 below shows work sectors by proportional representation over each risk group. The main 
takeaway is that the top five work sectors that most represent the higher risk group are: 
• Individuals with low work sector attachment or early retired individuals 
• Manufacturing 
• Health and social institutions 
• Business and support services  
• Wholesale, retail, vehicle repair 
These work sectors do not exactly correspond to the most part with the results seen with the marginal 
effects. It should be noted that even if a work sector has strong representation in the higher risk group, it 
can also have strong representation in the other risk groups. The sector “Health and social institutions” is 
an example of this, where it is actually more represented in lower risk groups compared to the high one. 
This observation is congruent with what was found before, in that the sector “Health and social institutions” 
actually had one of the smallest marginal effects. Thus, care is warranted when drawing conclusions out 
of group proportions. The risk approach, and the associated marginal effects control for the entire set of 
individual characteristics. 
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Figure 17 – Work Sector Over Risk 
 
As for labor status and risk shown in Figure 18, employees are overrepresented at low and middle risk. 
This likely stems from the quasi-mandatory occupational pensions. At high risk and at age 52, early retirees 
dominate the group. Nonetheless, employees still comprise just over 20% of the highest risk group. This 
shows a combination of three possible mechanisms at play: occupational pensions are not being completely 
spread among all employees; these high-risk employees have a very unstable relationship with the labor 
market over time; or the contribution rates set in the contracts of these high risk employees is not high 
enough. At age 64, just before retirement, the high-risk group is almost completely dominated by 
individuals in both early retirement schemes, public and efterløn. This is, again, likely capturing bad 
outcomes in life in terms of either capacity to work, or susceptibility to unemployment (as efterløn is 
conditional on being unemployed). Note that individuals in the efterløn scheme also have strong presence 
in the middle and low risk groups, so that the scheme is not fundamentally associated with low saving 
behavior, on average. 
 
 
 
 
139 
 
Figure 18 – Labor Status Over Risk 
 
6. Discussion 
6.1. Risk-model performance versus threshold techniques 
Since Definition 1 is a certain measurement, the performance of definitions 2 and 3 can be measured by 
tabulating them against the certain outcome in Definition 1. To achieve this, we register residual group 
membership for Definitions 2 at age 64 for those newly retired in 2016 aged 65/66, the definition used in 
SFI (2014). For Definition 3, based on pension contributions only, we have data spanning 2002-2016 (we 
lose 2000 and 2001 since we are averaging 3 years of past contributions). This means that we can register 
contributions of the currently newly retired in 2016 when they were 52 years old and forward. We limit 
the age range to 52-59 years of age as in ATP (2015). The prediction quality is then averaged over each 
prediction quality over the age range. 
The following table summarizes the performance of the residual group definitions in Table 5 vs. the 
performance of the Probit risk model: 
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Table 7 – Accuracy comparison between methods 
 Measurement Rate 
Risk model 
(At ages 52-64) 
Wrong predictions 24.1% 
     False positives 10.8% 
     False negatives 13.3% 
Risk model 
(At age 64) 
Wrong predictions 21.7% 
     False positives 9.7% 
     False negatives 12.0% 
Definition 2 
(At age 64, SFI 2014) 
Wrong predictions 20.8% 
     False positives 16.2% 
     False negatives 4.6% 
Definition 3 
(At ages 52-59, ATP 
2015)* 
Wrong predictions 42.2% 
     False positives 39.0% 
     False negatives 3.2% 
Note: We do not have data to replicate the range in ATP (2015) of 30-59. 
We see that the classification power of our risk approach is slightly inferior to the performance of 
definition 2. Definition 3 displays the worst performance of all. Over the age range 52-64, the risk model 
predicts wrongly 24.1% of the time. Akin to the age range considered in SFI (2014), if we restrict the 
prediction to the age of highest certainty, age 64, the risk model’s wrong predictions drop to 21.7%. This 
value is contrasted with 20.8% of wrong predictions with Definition 2 and a much higher value of 42.2% 
for Definition 3. These results are in line with our conclusions on the instability of Definition 3 as opposed 
to Definition 2. Also important is that false negatives and false positives are balanced with the risk 
approach, something that is not observed in Definitions 2 and 3. These two definitions tends to overclassify 
individuals as members of the residual group. They wrongly capture individuals that save enough, though 
irregularly. 
6.2. Saving outside of pension accounts 
We now develop further Definition 2 in Table 5 by re-considering what types of wealth count for the 
wealth threshold. The idea is to explore whether people are saving in other accounts that are not earmarked 
for retirement. For this, we develop three new definitions: One that considers the net financial position, 
excluding housing wealth and mortgage debt; Another that adds to this 20% of net housing wealth, where 
the idea is that people may partially downgrade their housing situation at retirement when, for example, a 
bigger house in the city area makes less sense; Lastly, a definition that adds 100% of net housing wealth 
instead of 20%, to evaluate the situation where a household taps into their housing wealth completely for 
consumption purposes through, for example, a reverse mortgage. 
The definitions are laid in table 8 below: 
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Table 8 – Definitions over broad wealth measurements 
Definition 5 Same as Definition 2, but wealth is pension and 
net financial wealth (excluding mortgage debt) 
Stock Non-students, non-
retirees 
Years: 2014-2016 
Definition 6 Same as Definition 2, but wealth is pension, net 
financial (excl. mortgage debt) and 20% of net 
housing wealth 
Stock Non-students, non-
retirees 
Years: 2014-2016 
Definition 7 Same as Definition 2, but wealth is pension, net 
financial (excl. mortgage debt) and 100% of net 
housing wealth 
Stock Non-students, non-
retirees 
Years: 2014-2016 
The assumption being made here is that these extra items of wealth are equivalent to pension savings in 
that they also get annuitized at retirement. This would mean that both the investment income generated by 
the stock and capital withdrawals from the stock would count to the means-testing of pension supplements. 
In reality, wealth stocks do not count to the means-testing, only the income generated by it. For housing, 
the capital gains from selling can count to the means-testing, but not uniformly over the retirement period, 
only in the year the sell is made. As such, we are performing a policy experiment of considering what 
would happen if all these extra items of wealth were totally considered in the means-testing of the pension 
supplement. This also shows us a proxy measurement of under-saving, given that we are considering the 
entire household balance sheet. If higher income households are below the wealth threshold implied by 
equations (2) and (3) across all asset types, that is strong evidence for under-saving behavior. 
Introducing non-pension wealth into the means-testing of pension supplements would introduce a few 
significant incentives into the saving behavior of individuals: 
1. It would add incentives to save more through pension accounts as opposed to non-pension ones, 
since it would raise the effective tax rate for those individuals around eligibility to receive 
pension supplements. For these individuals, non-pension savings would effectively get double-
taxed, since private savings are generally accumulated from after-tax income.   
2. It would re-direct resources to those in real need, since the entire balance sheet is now considered 
to evaluate supplementation necessity of old-age income.  
3. Defining such means-testing would be technically difficult as well as potentially unpopular. 
When defining how much of non-pension wealth to consider in the means-testing, a part of the 
answer should consider that not all wealth is expected to be consumed by its holder, but given 
in the form of bequests to descendants/spouse. A solution would be to create an allowance under 
which select wealth holdings would not count for means-testing. Choosing the allowance 
amount and asset types that do not count to the means-testing is the technically difficult part, 
where a real solution would likely be a discretionary political choice. 
4. One would need to specify how debt items would count in the means-testing, along with asset 
items. Care should be taken here, as considering net wealth instead of assets only would 
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introduce incentives to do leveraged purchases, the most obvious example being housing 
purchases with a mortgage. 
Figure 19 below reveals residual group size under the new definitions 5-7 (against definition 2): 
Figure 19 – Residual group size estimates under broader wealth 
 
If non-pension financial wealth items were to be completely considered in the means-testing of the 
pension supplement, the estimated residual group size would drop from a range of 40-50% to a range of 
23-36%, a very significant drop. This is evidence that at least some people are saving throughout their lives 
into non-pension accounts between the ages 25-64, but also carrying those savings into retirement up to 
age 64, as shown in the right-hand side of Figure 19. When 20% of net housing wealth is considered, the 
residual group size lowers even further to a range of 21-33%. Even though households have relatively high 
mortgage debt, it is accompanied by even bigger housing wealth on average. The same is observed for 
definition 7. At age 64, if the average household applies a reverse mortgage on the entire housing equity, 
the estimated residual group size drops to 26%, where the housing wealth is alone responsible for removing 
10pp. of individuals out of the residual group. Thus, access to financial devices, such as reverse mortgages, 
could potentially have a tremendous impact in providing extra income at retirement, including those 
eligible to the full public pension supplement. 
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Figure 20 – Residual group with broader wealth over income quintiles 
 
The question remains on how these new definitions perform over disposable income quintiles. Since we 
are virtually considering the entire balance sheet of households, and given that a 10% saving rate is enough 
for the average household to not be considered part of the residual group for a contributory career of 40 
years, individuals that are still labeled as part of the residual group under definitions 5-7, for the 3rd quintile 
and up, are likely to be under-savers. Using this “proxy”, the degree of under-saving around the median 
income in Figure 20 is around 20%. Around the 4th quintile of income, this degree drops to around 10%, 
and at the very top of the income distribution around 4% of individuals seem to be under-saving to the 
point where they will become entitled to pension supplements. Thus, under-saving behavior on the top half 
of the income distribution is significantly high, given that our definition of under-saving is being eligible 
to full pension supplements. This means that higher income individuals just before retirement will suffer a 
tremendous income shock upon retirement, coming to living conditions associated with the very bottom of 
the income distribution. 
6.3. Including pension wealth in risk model 
In developing the risk approach in Section 5, we were constrained by data availability where pension 
asset data was not available. We instead used measures of total assets and liabilities that did not include 
pension assets. The measure of pension assets is a key regressor in the risk modelling we develop in this 
paper. As a robustness check, we can, first, evaluate the margins resulting from the risk model at age 64 
by adding a pension wealth regressor and compare it with the margins observed in Section 5, and second, 
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showcase how this model performs in estimating the probability of belonging to the residual group for 
those aged 64 in 2016. 
The estimation results are summarized in Appendix D, alongside the tabled results for the Probit models 
developed in Section 5. The margins are shown in Figure 21 below: 
Figure 21 – Average Marginal Effects, LQ vs. HQ wealth data
  
As can be observed in Figure 21 above, adding pension wealth to the model can have some significant 
effects on marginal effects, compared to the model without it. It reduces the effects stemming from being 
an immigrant and from education. Low education is still associated with a higher probability of belonging 
to the residual group, but now only bringing an increase of around 5-6pp. Being an immigrant is no longer 
inherently associated with a significant increase in the probability of being in the residual group. In terms 
of the work sector, all the marginal effects are reduced across the board, where most sectors now have 
marginal effects of around 3-6pp. For labor status, controlling for pension wealth turns the average 
marginal effects of being self-employed, on cash benefits, having low labor market attachment and 
unemployed insignificant and close to 0. In terms of financial marginal effects, the inclusion of pension 
wealth reduces the marginal effect from self-made pension contributions, though the one for employer-
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made contributions remain relatively the same. It seems that, at age 64, voluntarily contributing to a 
pension account is irrelevant for the determination of residual group membership after controlling for the 
pension stock one holds. The marginal effect for employer-made contributions is not reduced, remaining 
at around negative 8 percentage points for each 100.000kr. in contributions. This regressor is also capturing 
the fact that individuals with this type of pension contribution are still working at the age of 64, hence its 
non-zero effect. 
Another dimension that can be impacted by the model change is prediction power. Comparing goodness-
of-fit focused on classification power between the models in Section 5 at age 64 and the model described 
in this section, the Pseudo-R2 marginally improved from 0.319 to 0.476, the area under the ROC curve 
suffered a similar improvement from 0.86 to 0.93, and the accuracy also improved from 78.3% to 84.5%. 
In Section 5’s model, the percentage of false positives and negatives was respectively 9.7 and 12.0%. 
Under the current model, these numbers become 7.3 and 8.2%. Thus, the model became better at avoiding 
false negatives and false positives. This difference likely stems from controlling for pension assets, in that 
individuals with low labor market attachment and labor income at age 64 could be classified as a residual 
group member with Section 5’s model, though that individual could already have accumulated enough 
(pension) assets, loosing eligibility to pension supplements. The model presented here controls for this 
type of situations. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyzed individuals in Denmark with low savings as measured by those that are, or 
will likely become entitled to the full public pension supplement folkepensionstillæg. This group is termed 
the residual group in pensions in Denmark. We utilize two frameworks to analyze this issue. The first is 
based on threshold techniques for pension contributions and pension wealth, inspired by SFI (2014) and 
ATP (2015). The second is a framework based on a probabilistic approach, where characteristics associated 
with residual group “membership”, registered among those currently retired, is used to forecast the risk 
associated with belonging to the under-saving group among those in working age. We find an expected 
residual group size of 40 to 45% of those aged 25-64 in 2016 as measured by threshold techniques with 
pension contributions and pension wealth, respectively. Using the risk approach, we estimate the residual 
group size to be almost 41%. 
Furthermore, we identify the types of individuals at risk of belonging to the residual group. Overall, 
females, immigrants, individuals with less than a university degree, and single individuals are the most at 
risk. The insurance dimension between partners in a couple seems to be relevant for explaining residual 
group membership. This could be interplaying with gender, where, if females earn less income on average, 
they will be more likely to be part of the residual group, and more so if they remain single. The system 
currently characterizes individuals as being in a couple if they share an economy, it is not based on official 
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marital status. Separations between two individuals with different income histories can imply that one of 
the partners is left in a precarious situation, since unofficial couple separation is not regulated by law in 
terms of post-separation transfers. Another level of intervention is to increase financial education among 
those with lower education. For example, exposing individuals at a young age to knowledge on how the 
pension system works and the problematic of saving for retirement could be an effective strategy since the 
middle and high-risk groups are dominated by people with secondary education or equivalent. This is of 
course easier said than done, but the point being made here is that any financial education that takes place 
after the secondary education level will not reach most of its intended audience. 
In terms of work sector, the sectors most at risk are: 
• Manufacturing; 
• Mining and quarrying; 
• Accommodation and food services; 
• Construction; 
• Wholesale, retail; 
• Vehicle repair. 
Three possibilities emerge: One, these sectors have contract/job types that do not allow for setting up 
occupational pensions; Two, there is generally no culture of adding occupational pensions to labor 
contracts; Three, there are occupational pensions setup in labor contracts, but contribution rates are too 
low. In this last type of situation, a pervasive effect can happen, where an individual might know that the 
employer is making pension contributions, but the employee might not be aware that these contributions 
will not be enough to ensure proper income at retirement.  
In terms of labor status, people most at risk are those receiving cash benefits and the self-employed. In 
terms of risk group composition, most of those in the high-risk group are individuals with low labor market 
attachment. As such, policies that aim at increasing labor market participation would be a good strategy to 
reduce the size of the residual group. A rather high portion of employees are also part of this high-risk 
group. Setting up a truly mandatory occupational pension system would capture these employees and 
reduce the size of the residual group, if automatic contribution rates are set high enough. 
We show that our risk-based approach performs better in terms of its classification accuracy when 
pension assets are included in the model. In general, the risk approach offers a platform for policymakers 
and the like to inform and target policy directed at stimulating saving behavior, and as an early warning 
system for incoming generations of potential under-savers. We also considered other asset types as 
alternative sources of income at retirement. Namely, considering the full consumption of housing equity 
during retirement via, for example, a reverse mortgage can have a significant impact to the estimated 
residual group size, if that wealth was to be means-tested for the pension supplement. When looking at the 
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entire balance sheet of households, we see some evidence of under-saving behavior among the top half of 
the income distribution of those aged 64 of 4 to 20% of this high-income group.  
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Appendix A 
Below, summary statistics can be found for our population in the year 2016. Details on the meaning of 
variables can be found in the data section. Note that this table reports values in 2016. Monetary values are 
de-scaled by 1,000 and displayed in 2016 DKK. 
Table A1: Summary statistics 
 Mean SD 
Male (%) 49.1 50.0 
Immigrant (%) 12.0 32.5 
Age 53.1 17.0 
Education level obtained 
     Primary or less (%) 24.1 42.8 
     Secondary and equivalent (%) 41.0 49.2 
     Tertiary (%) 32.7 46.9 
Kids 1.742 1.149 
Unmarried (%) 27.7 44.7 
Married (%) 52.4 49.9 
Divorced (%) 12.7 33.3 
Widower (%) 7.2 25.9 
Couple (%) 64.7 47.8 
Main work sector (%) – among non-retirees 
     1: Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1.5 12.2 
     2: Mining and quarrying 0.1 3.8 
     3: Manufacturing 9.3 29.1 
     4: Utilities 0.7 8.3 
     5: Construction 4.8 21.3 
     6: Wholesale, retail; vehicle repair 10.2 30.3 
     7: Transportation and storage 3.9 19.3 
     8: Accommodation and food services 2.3 15.0 
     9: Information and communication 3.3 17.8 
     10: Finance and insurance 2.5 15.6 
     11: Real estate 1.2 10.7 
     12: Business and support services 9.6 29.5 
     13: Public administration 4.4 20.6 
     14: Education 7.4 26.1 
     15: Health and social institutions 16.5 37.1 
     16: Associations, culture, other activities 3.2 17.7 
     17: Not relevant 19.1 39.3 
 
     Employee 52.0 50.0 
     Unemployed 1.2 11.1 
     Self-employed 3.8 19.2 
     Cash benefits (kontanthjaelp) 4.3 20.3 
     Student 2.7 16.1 
     Sick/parental leave and education activation 1.0 10.0 
     Early retirement (public) 5.3 22.3 
     Early retirement (efterlon scheme) 1.9 13.5 
     Retiree 25.1 43.4 
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     Undefined main status 2.9 16.7 
Disposable Income 248.3 819.1 
Disposable Income (equivalized) 283.4 679.0 
Gross Income 347.7 1574.0 
Gross Income (equivalized) 395.7 1215.3 
     Primary income (equivalized) 267.6 1018.0 
          Salary income (equivalized) 247.5 309.2 
          Self-employment income (equivalized) 18.3 192.1 
          Honorarium income (equivalized) 1.8 950.0 
     Public transfers (equivalized) 77.4 76.0 
     Private pension income (equivalized) 31.2 82.1 
     Financial income (equivalized) 17.6 631.1 
     Residual income (equivalized) 1.9 149.2 
Total Net Wealth (equivalized) 2082.4 10800.0 
     Pension wealth (equivalized) 1208.4 1725.6 
     Housing wealth (equivalized) 1140.6 3224.2 
     Mortgage debt (equivalized) 542.1 1658.0 
     Financial Wealth (equivalized) 370.9 10000.0 
     Other debts (equivalized) 152.1 1090.0 
     Car wealth (equivalized) 56.7 68.0 
Pension contributions 
     Employer-made 32.2 47.2 
     Voluntarily-made 3.0 24.2 
     Zero employer-made contributions (%) 30.0  
     Zero voluntarily-made contributions (%) 86.7  
Housing wealth / Disposable income (%) 402%  
Mortgage debt / Disposable income (%) 191%  
Pension wealth / Disposable income (%) 426%  
Under poverty line (ages 25-101) (%) 8.1  
 
Number of individuals aged 25-100 4074652 
Number of families 2773839 
Note: Financial items are displayed in 1000’s, 2016 DKK; poverty line defined as 50% of equivalized 
median income/assets as a past three-year average. 
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Appendix B – Wealth thresholds 
These are the thresholds used in definitions 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7. They are derived as the natural progression 
implied by equation (3) in the text. The thresholds are derived for both singles and couples. We do not use 
equivalized wealth since these thresholds are being checked against legally defined thresholds in the 
means-test for pension supplement eligibility. 
Table B1 
Age Singles Couples  Age Singles Couples 
26 25249 50682  46 586759 1177807 
27 50750 101871  47 617875 1240267 
28 76506 153571  48 649302 1303351 
29 102520 205789  49 681044 1367067 
30 128794 258529  50 713103 1431419 
31 155330 311796  51 745483 1496415 
32 182132 365596  52 778186 1562061 
33 209202 419934  53 811217 1628364 
34 236543 474815  54 844578 1695329 
35 264157 530245  55 878272 1762964 
36 292047 586229  56 912304 1831276 
37 320216 642773  57 946675 1900271 
38 348667 699883  58 981391 1969955 
39 377402 757564  59 1016453 2040337 
40 406425 815821  60 1051866 2111422 
41 435738 874661  61 1087634 2183218 
42 465344 934090  62 1123759 2255732 
43 495246 994113  63 1160245 2328971 
44 525447 1054736  64 1197096 2402943 
45 555951 1115965  65 1234316 2477654 
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Appendix C – Regressors used 
The following table shows the entire list of regressors used in the Probit models. Note that the variable 
for the voluntary early retirement scheme only becomes available at the age of 60, so that it is included in 
the model at ages 60 and over. 
Table C1: Regressors used in Probit models 
Grouping Variables Definition 
B
as
ic
 
C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
MALE Dummy for sex being male 
IMMIGRANT Dummy for not having Danish origins 
BASIC_EDUCATION Dummy for having primary schooling or less 
MIDDLE_EDUCATION Dummy for having secondary or equivalent education 
KIDS Number of children 
COUPLE_xx Being in a couple (economy sharing) at age xx 
WIDOW_xx Widower not legally re-married (can be in a couple) at age xx 
DIVORCED_xx Divorcee not legally re-married (can be in a couple) at age xx 
W
o
rk
 S
ec
to
r 
WSECTOR_1_xx Dummy if in Agriculture, forestry and fishing at age xx 
WSECTOR_2_xx Dummy if in Mining and quarrying at age xx 
WSECTOR_3_xx Dummy if in Manufacturing at age xx 
WSECTOR_4_xx Dummy if in Utilities at age xx 
WSECTOR_5_xx Dummy if in Construction at age xx 
WSECTOR_6_xx Dummy if in Wholesale, retail; vehicle repair at age xx 
WSECTOR_7_xx Dummy if in Transportation and storage at age xx 
WSECTOR_8_xx Dummy if in Accommodation and food services at age xx 
WSECTOR_9_xx Dummy if in Information and communication at age xx 
WSECTOR_10_xx Dummy if in Finance and insurance at age xx 
WSECTOR_11_xx Dummy if in Real estate at age xx 
WSECTOR_12_xx Dummy if in Business and support services at age xx 
WSECTOR_14_xx Dummy if in Education at age xx 
WSECTOR_15_xx Dummy if in Health and social institutions at age xx 
WSECTOR_16_xx Dummy if in Associations, culture, other activities at age xx 
WSECTOR_17_xx Dummy if in Not relevant at age xx 
L
ab
o
r 
St
at
u
s 
UNEMP_xx Dummy if Unemployed at age xx 
ENTREP_xx Dummy if Self-employed at age xx 
CASHBENEFITS_xx Dummy if Cash benefits (kontanthjaelp) at age xx 
STUDENT_xx Dummy if Student at age xx 
SICK_EDUC_PARENTAL_xx Dummy if Sick/parental leave and educ. activation at age xx 
EARLY_RETIREE_xx Dummy if Early retirement (public) at age xx 
EARLY_RETIREE_EL_xx Dummy if Early retirement (efterlon scheme) at age xx 
STATUS_UNDEFINED_xx Dummy if Undefined main status at age xx 
W
ea
l
th
 RE_ASSETS_xx Assets value in millions in 2016 DKK at age xx 
RE_LIABILITIES_xx Liabilities value in millions in 2016 DKK at age xx 
RE_PENSION_WEALTH_xx Pension assets that count to means-testing in 2016 DKK at age xx 
In
co
m
e RE_PRIM_INC_xx Primary income in 100.000 in 2016 DKK at age xx 
RE_PUB_TRANSF_xx Public transfers in 100.000 in 2016 DKK at age xx 
RE_FIN_INC_xx Financial income in 100.000 in 2016 DKK at age xx 
RE_RESID_INC_xx Residual income in 100.000 in 2016 DKK at age xx 
P
en
si
o
n
 
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s RE_PCONT_OP_SUP_xx Employer-made pension contributions in 100.000 in 2016 DKK at 
age xx 
RE_PCONT_PRIV_SUP_xx Self-made pension contributions in 100.000 in 2016 DKK at age xx 
Note: for regressions over the younger cohorts aged 25-34, these regressors are simply measured at their 
respective age in 2016.  
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Appendix D – Regression tables for projections 
The Probit coefficient table follows for ages 52, 58, and 64. The last column is the same model as for age 
64 in column 3, except that the pension wealth regressor is added to the model. 
Probit coefficients for projections, exemplary ages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Age 52 Age 58 Age 64 Age 64,  
HQ wealth 
Definition 1     
     
Male=1 -0.184*** -0.144*** -0.0745*** -0.0432** 
 (0.0135) (0.0139) (0.0149) (0.0151) 
     
Immigrant=1 0.256*** 0.201*** 0.180*** 0.0691* 
 (0.0275) (0.0274) (0.0292) (0.0292) 
     
Primary 
education or less=1 
0.716*** 0.629*** 0.371*** 0.257*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0191) (0.0213) (0.0218) 
     
Secondary 
(Vocational) 
Education=1 
0.525*** 0.469*** 0.262*** 0.177*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0171) (0.0197) (0.0203) 
     
In Couple=1 -0.311*** -0.314*** -0.290*** -0.291*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0185) (0.0221) (0.0219) 
     
Widower=1 0.0741 -0.0179 -0.0158 -0.0526 
 (0.0473) (0.0383) (0.0373) (0.0369) 
     
Divorced=1 -0.0193 0.0122 0.0360 0.0148 
 (0.0194) (0.0205) (0.0235) (0.0234) 
     
Number of 
Children 
0.00157 0.0144* 0.0173* 0.0136* 
 (0.00605) (0.00621) (0.00672) (0.00674) 
     
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
fishing=1 
0.772*** 0.681*** 0.512*** 0.280*** 
 (0.0511) (0.0584) (0.0849) (0.0847) 
     
Mining and 
quarrying=1 
1.038*** 0.950*** 0.553 0.429 
 (0.174) (0.160) (0.333) (0.359) 
     
Manufacturing=1 1.033*** 0.938*** 0.486*** 0.290*** 
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 (0.0312) (0.0335) (0.0609) (0.0623) 
     
Utilities=1 0.677*** 0.700*** 0.390*** 0.243* 
 (0.0812) (0.0697) (0.114) (0.116) 
     
Construction=1 0.908*** 0.852*** 0.333*** 0.139* 
 (0.0374) (0.0390) (0.0675) (0.0686) 
     
Wholesale, retail; 
vehicle repair=1 
0.859*** 0.790*** 0.441*** 0.258*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0345) (0.0591) (0.0605) 
     
Transportation 
and storage=1 
0.592*** 0.365*** 0.0343 -0.128 
 (0.0390) (0.0397) (0.0661) (0.0671) 
     
Accommodation 
and food services=1 
0.923*** 0.748*** 0.427*** 0.234* 
 (0.0600) (0.0620) (0.0931) (0.0945) 
     
Information and 
communication=1 
-0.0176 0.596*** 0.610*** 0.533*** 
 (0.0559) (0.0581) (0.106) (0.110) 
     
Finance and 
insurance=1 
0.375*** 0.361*** 0.526*** 0.546*** 
 (0.0463) (0.0491) (0.0959) (0.0990) 
     
Real estate=1 0.797*** 0.673*** 0.399*** 0.237** 
 (0.0567) (0.0566) (0.0885) (0.0899) 
     
Business and 
support services=1 
0.816*** 0.755*** 0.417*** 0.267*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0364) (0.0620) (0.0640) 
     
Education=1 0.322*** 0.257*** 0.132* 0.0570 
 (0.0348) (0.0365) (0.0642) (0.0666) 
     
Health and social 
institutions=1 
0.663*** 0.575*** 0.347*** 0.198*** 
 (0.0304) (0.0318) (0.0556) (0.0569) 
     
Associations, 
culture, other 
activities=1 
0.671*** 0.506*** 0.249*** 0.101 
 (0.0378) (0.0422) (0.0671) (0.0683) 
     
Low/No Work 
Sector 
0.756*** 0.597*** 0.330*** 0.196*** 
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Attachment=1 
 (0.0433) (0.0484) (0.0562) (0.0567) 
     
Unemployed=1 -0.0435 0.234*** -0.0212 -0.00639 
 (0.0411) (0.0576) (0.0737) (0.0723) 
     
Self-
Employed=1 
0.131*** 0.0750* 0.0925* 0.0506 
 (0.0274) (0.0304) (0.0441) (0.0451) 
     
Cash Benefits 
(kontanthjaelp)=1 
0.178** -0.0195 0.00251 -0.00520 
 (0.0634) (0.0613) (0.0605) (0.0586) 
     
Student=1 -0.130 -0.317 0.717 0.897 
 (0.130) (0.234) (0.416) (0.503) 
     
Leave/Activation
=1 
-0.102 -0.0871 -0.206* -0.178 
 (0.0616) (0.0624) (0.0945) (0.0938) 
     
Early 
Retiree(Public 
Scheme)=1 
0.141** -0.0126 -0.103** -0.135*** 
 (0.0429) (0.0455) (0.0374) (0.0377) 
     
Early Retiree 
(Voluntary 
Scheme)=1 
  -0.234*** -0.166*** 
   (0.0319) (0.0323) 
     
Low/No Labor 
Status 
Attachment=1 
-0.0361 -0.112* 0.263*** 0.313*** 
 (0.0521) (0.0533) (0.0524) (0.0535) 
     
Total Assets -0.130*** -0.0867*** -0.0853*** -0.0543*** 
 (0.0112) (0.00761) (0.0101) (0.0101) 
     
Total Liabilities -0.0294 -0.0667*** -0.0817*** -0.0888*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0140) (0.0172) (0.0175) 
     
Primary Income -0.215*** -0.288*** -0.400*** -0.313*** 
 (0.00659) (0.00887) (0.0154) (0.0155) 
     
Public Transfers 0.299*** 0.388*** 0.498*** 0.550*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0242) (0.0266) (0.0266) 
     
Financial Income -0.581*** -0.507*** -1.045*** -0.917*** 
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 (0.0555) (0.0454) (0.0648) (0.0655) 
     
Income from 
Private Pension 
-1.779*** -1.703*** -2.033*** -1.525*** 
 (0.0527) (0.0368) (0.0378) (0.0413) 
     
Residual Income -0.501*** -0.913*** -0.836*** -0.873*** 
 (0.131) (0.133) (0.144) (0.143) 
     
Employer-made 
pension 
contributions 
-0.483*** -0.324*** -0.684*** -0.370*** 
 (0.0372) (0.0295) (0.0781) (0.0882) 
     
Self-made 
pension 
contributions 
-0.691*** -0.372*** -0.332* 0.0962 
 (0.0792) (0.0604) (0.133) (0.135) 
     
Pension Wealth    -0.364*** 
    (0.0169) 
     
Constant -0.147*** 0.183*** 0.474*** 0.736*** 
 (0.0429) (0.0490) (0.0733) (0.0757) 
Observations 59606 59899 60289 60289 
Pseudo R2 0.263 0.311 0.462 0.476 
AIC 60145.5 56478.3 44471.1 43259.6 
BIC 60514.3 56847.3 44849.4 43646.9 
df_m 40 40 41 42 
chi2 13605.5 13575.8 13282.0 12029.1 
p 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix E – Block-wise addition of variables and their significance 
Here, a nested testing of regressors is shown only for age 52: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Definitio
n 1 
Definitio
n 1 
Definitio
n 1 
Definitio
n 1 
Definitio
n 1 
Definitio
n 1 
Pension-aged 
individuals 
receiving full 
pension 
supplement 
      
Male -
0.0699*** 
-
0.0732*** 
-
0.0780*** 
-
0.0782*** 
-0.165*** -0.171*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0133) (0.0133) 
       
Immigrant 0.711*** 0.388*** 0.384*** 0.362*** 0.326*** 0.308*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0260) (0.0263) (0.0268) 
       
Primary 
education or less 
1.222*** 0.920*** 0.900*** 0.882*** 0.767*** 0.771*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0170) (0.0183) (0.0184) 
       
Secondary 
(Vocational) 
Education 
0.774*** 0.660*** 0.642*** 0.635*** 0.553*** 0.555*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0166) (0.0166) 
       
In Couple -0.513*** -0.336*** -0.328*** -0.321*** -0.339*** -0.339*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0175) (0.0175) 
       
Widower -0.231*** -0.169*** -0.166*** -0.136** -0.139** -0.137** 
 (0.0395) (0.0429) (0.0427) (0.0432) (0.0440) (0.0440) 
       
Divorced 0.0766**
* 
0.0108 0.00473 -0.0149 -0.0179 -0.0222 
 (0.0175) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0188) (0.0190) (0.0191) 
       
Number of 
Children 
-
0.0160** 
0.00777 0.00694 0.00997 0.00544 0.00377 
 (0.00541
) 
(0.00575
) 
(0.00576
) 
(0.00583
) 
(0.00591
) 
(0.00595
) 
       
Primary 
Income 
 -0.239*** -0.207*** -0.204*** -0.189*** -0.188*** 
  (0.00588
) 
(0.00612
) 
(0.00632
) 
(0.00646
) 
(0.00661
) 
       
Public 
Transfers 
 0.296*** 0.307*** 0.284*** 0.291*** 0.293*** 
  (0.0164) (0.0165) (0.0169) (0.0178) (0.0207) 
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Financial 
Income 
 -0.696*** -0.583*** -0.372*** -0.411*** -0.400*** 
  (0.0443) (0.0447) (0.0451) (0.0450) (0.0448) 
       
Residual 
Income 
 -0.483*** -0.435*** -0.413*** -0.444*** -0.444*** 
  (0.0762) (0.0763) (0.0766) (0.0765) (0.0767) 
       
Employer-
made pension 
contributions 
  -0.469*** -0.473*** -0.470*** -0.453*** 
   (0.0341) (0.0350) (0.0358) (0.0358) 
       
Self-made 
pension 
contributions 
  -0.724*** -0.509*** -0.591*** -0.628*** 
   (0.0692) (0.0692) (0.0706) (0.0709) 
       
Total Assets    -0.125*** -0.132*** -0.135*** 
    (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0109) 
       
Total 
Liabilities 
   0.00984 0.00413 -0.00280 
    (0.0142) (0.0144) (0.0144) 
       
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
fishing 
    0.885*** 0.818*** 
     (0.0495) (0.0510) 
       
Mining and 
quarrying 
    1.004*** 1.005*** 
     (0.173) (0.174) 
       
Manufacturing     1.042*** 1.039*** 
     (0.0310) (0.0310) 
       
Utilities     0.690*** 0.691*** 
     (0.0812) (0.0812) 
       
Construction     0.928*** 0.909*** 
     (0.0368) (0.0370) 
       
Wholesale, 
retail; vehicle 
repair 
    0.881*** 0.865*** 
     (0.0326) (0.0327) 
       
Transportation 
and storage 
    0.598*** 0.586*** 
     (0.0385) (0.0386) 
       
Accommodatio     0.946*** 0.915*** 
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n and food 
services 
     (0.0587) (0.0591) 
       
Information 
and 
communication 
    -0.0241 -0.0269 
     (0.0557) (0.0558) 
       
Finance and 
insurance 
    0.359*** 0.356*** 
     (0.0459) (0.0459) 
       
Real estate     0.821*** 0.805*** 
     (0.0566) (0.0565) 
       
Business and 
support services 
    0.827*** 0.813*** 
     (0.0367) (0.0368) 
       
Education     0.329*** 0.329*** 
     (0.0345) (0.0345) 
       
Health and 
social institutions 
    0.683*** 0.679*** 
     (0.0302) (0.0302) 
       
Associations, 
culture, other 
activities 
    0.686*** 0.674*** 
     (0.0373) (0.0374) 
       
Low/No Work 
Sector 
Attachment 
    0.746*** 0.740*** 
     (0.0342) (0.0422) 
       
Unemployed      -
0.000546 
      (0.0404) 
       
Self-Employed      0.139*** 
      (0.0270) 
       
Cash Benefits 
(kontanthjaelp) 
     0.261*** 
      (0.0622) 
       
Student      -0.0600 
      (0.130) 
       
Leave/Activati
on 
     -0.0908 
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      (0.0597) 
       
Early Retiree 
(Public Scheme) 
     -0.0223 
      (0.0405) 
       
Low/No Labor 
Status 
Attachment 
     -0.0533 
      (0.0512) 
       
Constant -0.472*** 0.211*** 0.201*** 0.286*** -0.316*** -0.313*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0304) (0.0306) (0.0320) (0.0424) (0.0429) 
Observations 59608 59606 59606 59606 59606 59606 
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.207 0.211 0.216 0.241 0.242 
AIC 72392.2 64662.7 64281.6 63953.7 61897.5 61846.0 
BIC 72473.1 64779.6 64416.5 64106.7 62194.3 62205.9 
df_m 8 12 14 16 32 39 
chi2 8209.9 11373.5 11153.8 11090.4 12916.2 12909.7 
p 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
The corresponding Wald table: 
Block Wald Chi2 df Pr > F 
1 8208.38
  
8 0.0000 
2 5540.54
  
4 0.0000 
3 301.76  2 0.0000 
4 224.97  2 0.0000 
5 1995.33
  
16 0.0000 
6 60.72  7 0.0000 
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Appendix F – Fit of projections  
The table below shows the goodness-of-fit with a perspective of prediction (whenever relevant, a 50% 
cutoff point is used): 
Measure At age Value 
McFadden’s Pseudo 
R2 
52 0.242 
64 0.319 
Area under ROC curve 
52 0.815 
64 0.858 
Count R2 (Accuracy) 
52 73.55% 
64 78.4% 
Adjusted count R2 
52 0.386 
64 0.500 
False positives 
52 11.8% 
64 9.6% 
False negatives 
52 14.6% 
64 12.0% 
These goodness-of-fit results show that the fit at both the age 52 and age 64 models is good. Even though 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 is relatively low at age 52, the classifying performance is still elevated with an 
accuracy of 73.5%. One should take into account that we are predicting an outcome separated by 13 years 
between the measurement year and the year where the outcome is registered. Adjusted count R2 measures 
the proportion of correct predictions compared to a baseline model of always guessing the most common 
binary outcome. It is 0.386 at age 52 and 0.5 at age 64.  
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Appendix G – Probability forecast distribution over ages 
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Appendix H – Regression tables for analysis of young individuals 
Probit coefficients and margins for the young cohorts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 25-34 
Cohort 
Coefficients 
25-34 
Cohort 
Margins 
35-44 
Cohort 
Coefficients 
35-44 
Cohort 
Margins 
     
Male=1 0.264*** 0.0610*** 0.194*** 0.0411*** 
 (0.00447) (0.00103) (0.00437) (0.000924) 
     
Immigrant=1 0.559*** 0.135*** 0.814*** 0.194*** 
 (0.00531) (0.00132) (0.00557) (0.00142) 
     
Primary 
education or less=1 
-0.495*** -0.108*** -0.140*** -0.0291*** 
 (0.00645) (0.00131) (0.00643) (0.00129) 
     
Secondary 
(Vocational) 
Education=1 
-0.698*** -0.164*** -0.274*** -0.0581*** 
 (0.00494) (0.00113) (0.00473) (0.000995) 
     
In Couple=1 -0.301*** -0.0715*** -0.331*** -0.0734*** 
 (0.00433) (0.00106) (0.00487) (0.00112) 
     
Widower=1 0.162 0.0373 0.0457 0.00975 
 (0.1000) (0.0231) (0.0419) (0.00897) 
     
Divorced=1 0.0504*** 0.0116*** -0.0322*** -0.00679*** 
 (0.0132) (0.00304) (0.00657) (0.00138) 
     
Number of 
Children 
-0.0323*** -0.00742*** -0.0495*** -0.0105*** 
 (0.00191) (0.000438) (0.00199) (0.000421) 
     
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
fishing=1 
0.615*** 0.142*** 0.930*** 0.211*** 
 (0.0192) (0.00438) (0.0205) (0.00473) 
     
Mining and 
quarrying=1 
0.434*** 0.100*** 0.778*** 0.176*** 
 (0.0727) (0.0167) (0.0629) (0.0146) 
     
Manufacturing=1 0.199*** 0.0457*** 0.394*** 0.0852*** 
 (0.0138) (0.00316) (0.0138) (0.00301) 
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Utilities=1 0.309*** 0.0713*** 0.439*** 0.0969*** 
 (0.0304) (0.00701) (0.0274) (0.00625) 
     
Construction=1 -0.00976 -0.00224 0.352*** 0.0768*** 
 (0.0145) (0.00334) (0.0146) (0.00323) 
     
Wholesale, retail; 
vehicle repair=1 
0.175*** 0.0401*** 0.689*** 0.152*** 
 (0.0128) (0.00292) (0.0133) (0.00295) 
     
Transportation 
and storage=1 
0.250*** 0.0577*** 0.535*** 0.119*** 
 (0.0161) (0.00371) (0.0156) (0.00356) 
     
Accommodation 
and food services=1 
0.345*** 0.0800*** 0.707*** 0.160*** 
 (0.0152) (0.00354) (0.0174) (0.00406) 
     
Information and 
communication=1 
0.592*** 0.137*** 0.865*** 0.194*** 
 (0.0151) (0.00343) (0.0156) (0.00352) 
     
Finance and 
insurance=1 
0.276*** 0.0636*** 0.693*** 0.155*** 
 (0.0211) (0.00485) (0.0204) (0.00464) 
     
Real estate=1 0.344*** 0.0794*** 0.728*** 0.164*** 
 (0.0245) (0.00565) (0.0218) (0.00504) 
     
Business and 
support services=1 
0.400*** 0.0926*** 0.711*** 0.159*** 
 (0.0128) (0.00295) (0.0135) (0.00306) 
     
Education=1 0.390*** 0.0897*** 0.551*** 0.120*** 
 (0.0136) (0.00309) (0.0141) (0.00309) 
     
Health and social 
institutions=1 
0.144*** 0.0329*** 0.455*** 0.0972*** 
 (0.0124) (0.00282) (0.0130) (0.00277) 
     
Associations, 
culture, other 
activities=1 
0.493*** 0.114*** 0.723*** 0.162*** 
 (0.0158) (0.00363) (0.0161) (0.00369) 
     
Low/No Work 
Sector 
Attachment=1 
0.418*** 0.101*** 0.584*** 0.136*** 
 (0.0135) (0.00338) (0.0149) (0.00373) 
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Unemployed=1 -0.0463** -0.0106** -0.130*** -0.0271*** 
 (0.0143) (0.00327) (0.0156) (0.00319) 
     
Self-
Employed=1 
0.0502*** 0.0116*** 0.177*** 0.0384*** 
 (0.0137) (0.00317) (0.0101) (0.00223) 
     
Cash Benefits 
(kontanthjaelp)=1 
0.340*** 0.0798*** 0.101*** 0.0217*** 
 (0.0118) (0.00283) (0.0119) (0.00261) 
     
Student=1 -0.0154* -0.00354* -0.0341* -0.00721* 
 (0.00760) (0.00174) (0.0156) (0.00327) 
     
Leave/Activation
=1 
-0.248*** -0.0565*** -0.303*** -0.0616*** 
 (0.0129) (0.00289) (0.0180) (0.00350) 
     
Early 
Retiree(Public 
Scheme)=1 
0.161*** 0.0372*** 0.339*** 0.0750*** 
 (0.0176) (0.00410) (0.0155) (0.00355) 
     
Low/No Labor 
Status 
Attachment=1 
0.0657*** 0.0152*** 0.162*** 0.0350*** 
 (0.0117) (0.00272) (0.0148) (0.00328) 
     
Financial Assets -0.129*** -0.0297*** -0.204*** -0.0431*** 
 (0.0152) (0.00349) (0.00924) (0.00196) 
     
Housing Wealth 0.0425*** 0.00977*** -0.00460 -0.000974 
 (0.00575) (0.00132) (0.00379) (0.000804) 
     
Mortgage Debt -0.287*** -0.0660*** -0.177*** -0.0376*** 
 (0.00872) (0.00200) (0.00581) (0.00123) 
     
Non-Mortgage 
Debt 
0.176*** 0.0404*** 0.261*** 0.0554*** 
 (0.0124) (0.00286) (0.00883) (0.00187) 
     
Primary Income -0.107*** -0.0246*** -0.0656*** -0.0139*** 
 (0.00279) (0.000637) (0.00217) (0.000457) 
     
Public Transfers -0.107*** -0.0245*** 0.0357*** 0.00756*** 
 (0.00616) (0.00142) (0.00631) (0.00134) 
     
Financial Income 0.151*** 0.0348*** 0.0763*** 0.0162*** 
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 (0.0238) (0.00548) (0.0124) (0.00263) 
     
Income from 
Private Pension 
-1.603*** -0.369*** -1.549*** -0.328*** 
 (0.105) (0.0242) (0.0362) (0.00759) 
     
Residual Income -0.00977 -0.00225 -0.421*** -0.0893*** 
 (0.0465) (0.0107) (0.0497) (0.0105) 
     
Employer-made 
pension 
contributions 
-4.091*** -0.941*** -3.564*** -0.755*** 
 (0.0200) (0.00396) (0.0171) (0.00303) 
     
Self-made 
pension 
contributions 
-2.716*** -0.624*** -2.881*** -0.611*** 
 (0.0735) (0.0168) (0.0403) (0.00839) 
     
Constant 1.059***  0.758***  
 (0.0149)  (0.0157)  
Observations 620261 620261 728184 728184 
Pseudo R2 0.405  0.429  
AIC 508545.9 . 548774.8 . 
BIC 509033.4 . 549269.3 . 
df_m 42  42  
chi2 193163.6  197460.2  
p 0  0  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
TITLER I PH.D.SERIEN:
2004
1. Martin Grieger
Internet-based Electronic Marketplaces
and Supply Chain Management
2. Thomas Basbøll
LIKENESS
A Philosophical Investigation
3. Morten Knudsen
Beslutningens vaklen
En systemteoretisk analyse of mo-
derniseringen af et amtskommunalt
sundhedsvæsen 1980-2000
4. Lars Bo Jeppesen
Organizing Consumer Innovation
A product development strategy that
is based on online communities and
allows some ﬁrms to beneﬁt from a
distributed process of innovation by
consumers
5. Barbara Dragsted
SEGMENTATION IN TRANSLATION
AND TRANSLATION MEMORY
SYSTEMS
An empirical investigation of cognitive
segmentation and effects of integra-
ting a TM system into the translation
process
6. Jeanet Hardis
Sociale partnerskaber
Et socialkonstruktivistisk casestudie
af partnerskabsaktørers virkeligheds-
opfattelse mellem identitet og
legitimitet
7. Henriette Hallberg Thygesen
System Dynamics in Action
8. Carsten Mejer Plath
Strategisk Økonomistyring
9. Annemette Kjærgaard
Knowledge Management as Internal
Corporate Venturing
– a Field Study of the Rise and Fall of a
Bottom-Up Process
10. Knut Arne Hovdal
De profesjonelle i endring
Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem
Samfundslitteratur
11. Søren Jeppesen
Environmental Practices and Greening
Strategies in Small Manufacturing
Enterprises in South Africa
– A Critical Realist Approach
12. Lars Frode Frederiksen
Industriel forskningsledelse
– på sporet af mønstre og samarbejde
i danske forskningsintensive virksom-
heder
13. Martin Jes Iversen
The Governance of GN Great Nordic
– in an age of strategic and structural
transitions 1939-1988
14. Lars Pynt Andersen
The Rhetorical Strategies of Danish TV
Advertising
A study of the ﬁrst ﬁfteen years with
special emphasis on genre and irony
15. Jakob Rasmussen
Business Perspectives on E-learning
16. Sof Thrane
The Social and Economic Dynamics
of Networks
– a Weberian Analysis of Three
Formalised Horizontal Networks
17. Lene Nielsen
Engaging Personas and Narrative
Scenarios – a study on how a user-
 centered approach inﬂuenced the 
perception of the design process in 
the e-business group at AstraZeneca
18. S.J Valstad
Organisationsidentitet
Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem
Samfundslitteratur
19. Thomas Lyse Hansen
Six Essays on Pricing and Weather risk
in Energy Markets
20. Sabine Madsen
Emerging Methods – An Interpretive
Study of ISD Methods in Practice
21. Evis Sinani
The Impact of Foreign Direct Inve-
stment on Efﬁciency, Productivity
Growth and Trade: An Empirical Inve-
stigation
22. Bent Meier Sørensen
Making Events Work Or,
How to Multiply Your Crisis
23. Pernille Schnoor
Brand Ethos
Om troværdige brand- og
virksomhedsidentiteter i et retorisk og
diskursteoretisk perspektiv
24. Sidsel Fabech
Von welchem Österreich ist hier die
Rede?
Diskursive forhandlinger og magt-
kampe mellem rivaliserende nationale
identitetskonstruktioner i østrigske
pressediskurser
25. Klavs Odgaard Christensen
Sprogpolitik og identitetsdannelse i
ﬂersprogede forbundsstater
Et komparativt studie af Schweiz og
Canada
26. Dana B. Minbaeva
Human Resource Practices and
Knowledge Transfer in Multinational
Corporations
27. Holger Højlund
Markedets politiske fornuft
Et studie af velfærdens organisering i
perioden 1990-2003
28. Christine Mølgaard Frandsen
A.s erfaring
Om mellemværendets praktik i en
transformation af mennesket og 
 subjektiviteten
29. Sine Nørholm Just
The Constitution of Meaning
– A Meaningful Constitution?
Legitimacy, identity, and public opinion
in the debate on the future of Europe
2005
1. Claus J. Varnes
Managing product innovation through
rules – The role of formal and structu-
red methods in product development
2. Helle Hedegaard Hein
Mellem konﬂikt og konsensus
– Dialogudvikling på hospitalsklinikker
3. Axel Rosenø
Customer Value Driven Product Inno-
vation – A Study of Market Learning in
New Product Development
4. Søren Buhl Pedersen
Making space
An outline of place branding
5. Camilla Funck Ellehave
Differences that Matter
An analysis of practices of gender and
organizing in contemporary work-
places
6. Rigmor Madeleine Lond
Styring af kommunale forvaltninger
7. Mette Aagaard Andreassen
Supply Chain versus Supply Chain
Benchmarking as a Means to
Managing Supply Chains
8. Caroline Aggestam-Pontoppidan
From an idea to a standard
The UN and the global governance of
accountants’ competence
9. Norsk ph.d.
10. Vivienne Heng Ker-ni
An Experimental Field Study on the
Effectiveness of Grocer Media 
 Advertising 
Measuring Ad Recall and Recognition, 
Purchase Intentions and Short-Term 
Sales
11. Allan Mortensen
Essays on the Pricing of Corporate
Bonds and Credit Derivatives
12. Remo Stefano Chiari
Figure che fanno conoscere
Itinerario sull’idea del valore cognitivo
e espressivo della metafora e di altri
tropi da Aristotele e da Vico ﬁno al
cognitivismo contemporaneo
13. Anders McIlquham-Schmidt
Strategic Planning and Corporate
Performance
An integrative research review and a
meta-analysis of the strategic planning
and corporate performance literature
from 1956 to 2003
14. Jens Geersbro
The TDF – PMI Case
Making Sense of the Dynamics of
Business Relationships and Networks
15 Mette Andersen
Corporate Social Responsibility in
Global Supply Chains
Understanding the uniqueness of ﬁrm
behaviour
16. Eva Boxenbaum
Institutional Genesis: Micro – Dynamic
Foundations of Institutional Change
17. Peter Lund-Thomsen
Capacity Development, Environmental
Justice NGOs, and Governance: The
Case of South Africa
18. Signe Jarlov
Konstruktioner af offentlig ledelse
19. Lars Stæhr Jensen
Vocabulary Knowledge and Listening
Comprehension in English as a Foreign
Language
An empirical study employing data 
elicited from Danish EFL learners
20. Christian Nielsen
Essays on Business Reporting
Production and consumption of
strategic information in the market for
information
21. Marianne Thejls Fischer
Egos and Ethics of Management
Consultants
22. Annie Bekke Kjær
Performance management i Proces-
 innovation 
– belyst i et social-konstruktivistisk
perspektiv
23. Suzanne Dee Pedersen
GENTAGELSENS METAMORFOSE
Om organisering af den kreative gøren
i den kunstneriske arbejdspraksis
24. Benedikte Dorte Rosenbrink
Revenue Management
Økonomiske, konkurrencemæssige &
organisatoriske konsekvenser
25. Thomas Riise Johansen
Written Accounts and Verbal Accounts
The Danish Case of Accounting and
Accountability to Employees
26. Ann Fogelgren-Pedersen
The Mobile Internet: Pioneering Users’
Adoption Decisions
27. Birgitte Rasmussen
Ledelse i fællesskab – de tillidsvalgtes
fornyende rolle
28. Gitte Thit Nielsen
Remerger
– skabende ledelseskræfter i fusion og
opkøb
29. Carmine Gioia
A MICROECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
30. Ole Hinz
Den effektive forandringsleder: pilot,
pædagog eller politiker?
Et studie i arbejdslederes meningstil-
skrivninger i forbindelse med vellykket
gennemførelse af ledelsesinitierede
forandringsprojekter
31. Kjell-Åge Gotvassli
Et praksisbasert perspektiv på dynami-
ske
læringsnettverk i toppidretten
Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem
Samfundslitteratur
32. Henriette Langstrup Nielsen
Linking Healthcare
An inquiry into the changing perfor-
 mances of web-based technology for 
 asthma monitoring
33. Karin Tweddell Levinsen
Virtuel Uddannelsespraksis
Master i IKT og Læring – et casestudie
i hvordan proaktiv proceshåndtering
kan forbedre praksis i virtuelle lærings-
miljøer
34. Anika Liversage
Finding a Path
Labour Market Life Stories of
Immigrant Professionals
35. Kasper Elmquist Jørgensen
Studier i samspillet mellem stat og
 erhvervsliv i Danmark under
1. verdenskrig
36. Finn Janning
A DIFFERENT STORY
Seduction, Conquest and Discovery
37. Patricia Ann Plackett
Strategic Management of the Radical
Innovation Process
Leveraging Social Capital for Market
Uncertainty Management
2006
1. Christian Vintergaard
Early Phases of Corporate Venturing
2. Niels Rom-Poulsen
Essays in Computational Finance
3. Tina Brandt Husman
Organisational Capabilities,
Competitive Advantage & Project-
Based Organisations
The Case of Advertising and Creative
Good Production
4. Mette Rosenkrands Johansen
Practice at the top
– how top managers mobilise and use
non-ﬁnancial performance measures
5. Eva Parum
Corporate governance som strategisk
kommunikations- og ledelsesværktøj
6. Susan Aagaard Petersen
Culture’s Inﬂuence on Performance
Management: The Case of a Danish
Company in China
7. Thomas Nicolai Pedersen
The Discursive Constitution of Organi-
zational Governance – Between unity
and differentiation
The Case of the governance of
environmental risks by World Bank
environmental staff
8. Cynthia Selin
Volatile Visions: Transactons in
Anticipatory Knowledge
9. Jesper Banghøj
Financial Accounting Information and
 Compensation in Danish Companies
10. Mikkel Lucas Overby
Strategic Alliances in Emerging High-
Tech Markets: What’s the Difference
and does it Matter?
11. Tine Aage
External Information Acquisition of
Industrial Districts and the Impact of
Different Knowledge Creation Dimen-
sions
A case study of the Fashion and  
Design Branch of the Industrial District 
of Montebelluna, NE Italy
12. Mikkel Flyverbom
Making the Global Information Society
Governable
On the Governmentality of Multi-
Stakeholder Networks
13. Anette Grønning
Personen bag
Tilstedevær i e-mail som inter-
aktionsform mellem kunde og med-
arbejder i dansk forsikringskontekst
14. Jørn Helder
One Company – One Language?
The NN-case
15. Lars Bjerregaard Mikkelsen
Differing perceptions of customer
value
Development and application of a tool
for mapping perceptions of customer
value at both ends of customer-suppli-
er dyads in industrial markets
16. Lise Granerud
Exploring Learning
Technological learning within small
manufacturers in South Africa
17. Esben Rahbek Pedersen
Between Hopes and Realities:
Reﬂections on the Promises and
Practices of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR)
18. Ramona Samson
The Cultural Integration Model and
European Transformation.
The Case of Romania
2007
1. Jakob Vestergaard
Discipline in The Global Economy
Panopticism and the Post-Washington
Consensus
2. Heidi Lund Hansen
Spaces for learning and working
A qualitative study of change of work,
management, vehicles of power and
social practices in open ofﬁces
3. Sudhanshu Rai
Exploring the internal dynamics of
software development teams during
user analysis
A tension enabled Institutionalization
Model; ”Where process becomes the
objective”
4. Norsk ph.d.
Ej til salg gennem Samfundslitteratur
5. Serden Ozcan
EXPLORING HETEROGENEITY IN
ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIONS AND
OUTCOMES
A Behavioural Perspective
6. Kim Sundtoft Hald
Inter-organizational Performance
Measurement and Management in
Action
– An Ethnography on the Construction
of Management, Identity and
Relationships
7. Tobias Lindeberg
Evaluative Technologies
Quality and the Multiplicity of
Performance
8. Merete Wedell-Wedellsborg
Den globale soldat
Identitetsdannelse og identitetsledelse
i multinationale militære organisatio-
ner
9. Lars Frederiksen
Open Innovation Business Models
Innovation in ﬁrm-hosted online user
communities and inter-ﬁrm project
ventures in the music industry
– A collection of essays
10. Jonas Gabrielsen
Retorisk toposlære – fra statisk ’sted’
til persuasiv aktivitet
11. Christian Moldt-Jørgensen
Fra meningsløs til meningsfuld
evaluering.
Anvendelsen af studentertilfredsheds-
 målinger på de korte og mellemlange  
 videregående uddannelser set fra et 
 psykodynamisk systemperspektiv
12. Ping Gao
Extending the application of
actor-network theory
Cases of innovation in the tele-
 communications industry
13. Peter Mejlby
Frihed og fængsel, en del af den
samme drøm?
Et phronetisk baseret casestudie af
frigørelsens og kontrollens sam-
eksistens i værdibaseret ledelse!
14. Kristina Birch
Statistical Modelling in Marketing
15. Signe Poulsen
Sense and sensibility:
The language of emotional appeals in
insurance marketing
16. Anders Bjerre Trolle
Essays on derivatives pricing and dyna-
mic asset allocation
17. Peter Feldhütter
Empirical Studies of Bond and Credit
Markets
18. Jens Henrik Eggert Christensen
Default and Recovery Risk Modeling
and Estimation
19. Maria Theresa Larsen
Academic Enterprise: A New Mission
for Universities or a Contradiction in
Terms?
Four papers on the long-term impli-
cations of increasing industry involve-
ment and commercialization in acade-
mia
20. Morten Wellendorf
Postimplementering af teknologi i den
 offentlige forvaltning
Analyser af en organisations konti-
nuerlige arbejde med informations-
teknologi
21. Ekaterina Mhaanna
Concept Relations for Terminological
Process Analysis
22. Stefan Ring Thorbjørnsen
Forsvaret i forandring
Et studie i ofﬁcerers kapabiliteter un-
der påvirkning af omverdenens foran-
dringspres mod øget styring og læring
23. Christa Breum Amhøj
Det selvskabte medlemskab om ma-
nagementstaten, dens styringstekno-
logier og indbyggere
24. Karoline Bromose
Between Technological Turbulence and
Operational Stability
– An empirical case study of corporate
venturing in TDC
25. Susanne Justesen
Navigating the Paradoxes of Diversity
in Innovation Practice
– A Longitudinal study of six very
different innovation processes – in
practice
26. Luise Noring Henler
Conceptualising successful supply
chain partnerships
– Viewing supply chain partnerships
from an organisational culture per-
spective
27. Mark Mau
Kampen om telefonen
Det danske telefonvæsen under den
tyske besættelse 1940-45
28. Jakob Halskov
The semiautomatic expansion of
existing terminological ontologies
using knowledge patterns discovered
on the WWW – an implementation 
and evaluation
29. Gergana Koleva
European Policy Instruments Beyond
Networks and Structure: The Innova-
tive Medicines Initiative
30. Christian Geisler Asmussen
Global Strategy and International
Diversity: A Double-Edged Sword?
31. Christina Holm-Petersen
Stolthed og fordom
Kultur- og identitetsarbejde ved ska-
belsen af en ny sengeafdeling gennem
fusion
32. Hans Peter Olsen
Hybrid Governance of Standardized
States
Causes and Contours of the Global
Regulation of Government Auditing
33. Lars Bøge Sørensen
Risk Management in the Supply Chain
34. Peter Aagaard
Det unikkes dynamikker
De institutionelle mulighedsbetingel-
ser bag den individuelle udforskning i
professionelt og frivilligt arbejde
35. Yun Mi Antorini
Brand Community Innovation
An Intrinsic Case Study of the Adult
Fans of LEGO Community
36. Joachim Lynggaard Boll
Labor Related Corporate Social Perfor-
mance in Denmark
Organizational and Institutional Per-
spectives
2008
1. Frederik Christian Vinten
Essays on Private Equity
2. Jesper Clement
Visual Inﬂuence of Packaging Design
on In-Store Buying Decisions
3. Marius Brostrøm Kousgaard
Tid til kvalitetsmåling?
– Studier af indrulleringsprocesser i
forbindelse med introduktionen af
kliniske kvalitetsdatabaser i speciallæ-
gepraksissektoren
4. Irene Skovgaard Smith
Management Consulting in Action
Value creation and ambiguity in
client-consultant relations
5. Anders Rom
Management accounting and inte-
grated information systems
How to exploit the potential for ma-
nagement accounting of information
technology
6. Marina Candi
Aesthetic Design as an Element of
Service Innovation in New Technology-
based Firms
7. Morten Schnack
Teknologi og tværfaglighed
– en analyse af diskussionen omkring
indførelse af EPJ på en hospitalsafde-
ling
8. Helene Balslev Clausen
Juntos pero no revueltos – un estudio
sobre emigrantes norteamericanos en
un pueblo mexicano
9. Lise Justesen
Kunsten at skrive revisionsrapporter.
En beretning om forvaltningsrevisio-
nens beretninger
10. Michael E. Hansen
The politics of corporate responsibility:
CSR and the governance of child labor
and core labor rights in the 1990s
11. Anne Roepstorff
Holdning for handling – en etnologisk
undersøgelse af Virksomheders Sociale
Ansvar/CSR
12. Claus Bajlum
Essays on Credit Risk and
Credit Derivatives
13. Anders Bojesen
The Performative Power of Competen-
ce  – an Inquiry into Subjectivity and
Social Technologies at Work
14. Satu Reijonen
Green and Fragile
A Study on Markets and the Natural
Environment
15. Ilduara Busta
Corporate Governance in Banking
A European Study
16. Kristian Anders Hvass
A Boolean Analysis Predicting Industry
Change: Innovation, Imitation & Busi-
ness Models
The Winning Hybrid: A case study of
isomorphism in the airline industry
17. Trine Paludan
De uvidende og de udviklingsparate
Identitet som mulighed og restriktion
blandt fabriksarbejdere på det aftaylo-
riserede fabriksgulv
18. Kristian Jakobsen
Foreign market entry in transition eco-
nomies: Entry timing and mode choice
19. Jakob Elming
Syntactic reordering in statistical ma-
chine translation
20. Lars Brømsøe Termansen
Regional Computable General Equili-
brium Models for Denmark
Three papers laying the foundation for
regional CGE models with agglomera-
tion characteristics
21. Mia Reinholt
The Motivational Foundations of
Knowledge Sharing
22. Frederikke Krogh-Meibom
The Co-Evolution of Institutions and
Technology
– A Neo-Institutional Understanding of
Change Processes within the Business
Press – the Case Study of Financial
Times
23. Peter D. Ørberg Jensen
OFFSHORING OF ADVANCED AND
HIGH-VALUE TECHNICAL SERVICES:
ANTECEDENTS, PROCESS DYNAMICS
AND FIRMLEVEL IMPACTS
24. Pham Thi Song Hanh
Functional Upgrading, Relational
Capability and Export Performance of
Vietnamese Wood Furniture Producers
25. Mads Vangkilde
Why wait?
An Exploration of ﬁrst-mover advanta-
ges among Danish e-grocers through a
resource perspective
26. Hubert Buch-Hansen
Rethinking the History of European
Level Merger Control
A Critical Political Economy Perspective
2009
1. Vivian Lindhardsen
From Independent Ratings to Commu-
nal Ratings: A Study of CWA Raters’
Decision-Making Behaviours
2. Guðrið Weihe
Public-Private Partnerships: Meaning
and Practice
3. Chris Nøkkentved
Enabling Supply Networks with Colla-
borative Information Infrastructures
An Empirical Investigation of Business
Model Innovation in Supplier Relation-
ship Management
4. Sara Louise Muhr
Wound, Interrupted – On the Vulner-
ability of Diversity Management
5. Christine Sestoft
Forbrugeradfærd i et Stats- og Livs-
formsteoretisk perspektiv
6. Michael Pedersen
Tune in, Breakdown, and Reboot: On
the production of the stress-ﬁt self-
managing employee
7. Salla Lutz
Position and Reposition in Networks
– Exempliﬁed by the Transformation of
the Danish Pine Furniture Manu-
 facturers
8. Jens Forssbæck
Essays on market discipline in
commercial and central banking
9. Tine Murphy
Sense from Silence – A Basis for Orga-
nised Action
How do Sensemaking Processes with
Minimal Sharing Relate to the Repro-
duction of Organised Action?
10. Sara Malou Strandvad
Inspirations for a new sociology of art:
A sociomaterial study of development
processes in the Danish ﬁlm industry
11. Nicolaas Mouton
On the evolution of social scientiﬁc
metaphors:
A cognitive-historical enquiry into the
divergent trajectories of the idea that
collective entities – states and societies,
cities and corporations – are biological
organisms.
12. Lars Andreas Knutsen
Mobile Data Services:
Shaping of user engagements
13. Nikolaos Theodoros Korﬁatis
Information Exchange and Behavior
A Multi-method Inquiry on Online
Communities
14. Jens Albæk
Forestillinger om kvalitet og tværfaglig-
hed på sygehuse
– skabelse af forestillinger i læge- og
plejegrupperne angående relevans af
nye idéer om kvalitetsudvikling gen-
nem tolkningsprocesser
15. Maja Lotz
The Business of Co-Creation – and the
Co-Creation of Business
16. Gitte P. Jakobsen
Narrative Construction of Leader Iden-
tity in a Leader Development Program
Context
17. Dorte Hermansen
”Living the brand” som en brandorien-
teret dialogisk praxis:
Om udvikling af medarbejdernes
brandorienterede dømmekraft
18. Aseem Kinra
Supply Chain (logistics) Environmental
Complexity
19. Michael Nørager
How to manage SMEs through the
transformation from non innovative to
innovative?
20. Kristin Wallevik
Corporate Governance in Family Firms
The Norwegian Maritime Sector
21. Bo Hansen Hansen
Beyond the Process
Enriching Software Process Improve-
ment with Knowledge Management
22. Annemette Skot-Hansen
Franske adjektivisk aﬂedte adverbier,
der tager præpositionssyntagmer ind-
ledt med præpositionen à som argu-
menter
En valensgrammatisk undersøgelse
23. Line Gry Knudsen
Collaborative R&D Capabilities
In Search of Micro-Foundations
24. Christian Scheuer
Employers meet employees
Essays on sorting and globalization
25. Rasmus Johnsen
The Great Health of Melancholy
A Study of the Pathologies of Perfor-
mativity
26. Ha Thi Van Pham
Internationalization, Competitiveness
Enhancement and Export Performance
of Emerging Market Firms:
Evidence from Vietnam
27. Henriette Balieu
Kontrolbegrebets betydning for kausa-
tivalternationen i spansk
En kognitiv-typologisk analyse
2010
1. Yen Tran
Organizing Innovationin Turbulent
Fashion Market
Four papers on how fashion ﬁrms crea-
te and appropriate innovation value
2. Anders Raastrup Kristensen
Metaphysical Labour
Flexibility, Performance and Commit-
ment in Work-Life Management
3. Margrét Sigrún Sigurdardottir
Dependently independent
Co-existence of institutional logics in
the recorded music industry
4. Ásta Dis Óladóttir
Internationalization from a small do-
mestic base:
An empirical analysis of Economics and
Management
5. Christine Secher
E-deltagelse i praksis – politikernes og
forvaltningens medkonstruktion og
konsekvenserne heraf
6. Marianne Stang Våland
What we talk about when we talk
about space:
End User Participation between Proces-
ses of Organizational and Architectural 
Design
7. Rex Degnegaard
Strategic Change Management
Change Management Challenges in
the Danish Police Reform
8. Ulrik Schultz Brix
Værdi i rekruttering – den sikre beslut-
ning
En pragmatisk analyse af perception
og synliggørelse af værdi i rekrutte-
rings- og udvælgelsesarbejdet
9. Jan Ole Similä
Kontraktsledelse
Relasjonen mellom virksomhetsledelse
og kontraktshåndtering, belyst via ﬁre
norske virksomheter
10. Susanne Boch Waldorff
Emerging Organizations: In between
local translation, institutional logics
and discourse
11. Brian Kane
Performance Talk
Next Generation Management of
Organizational Performance
12. Lars Ohnemus
Brand Thrust: Strategic Branding and
Shareholder Value
An Empirical Reconciliation of two
Critical Concepts
13. Jesper Schlamovitz
Håndtering af usikkerhed i ﬁlm- og
byggeprojekter
14. Tommy Moesby-Jensen
Det faktiske livs forbindtlighed
Førsokratisk informeret, ny-aristotelisk
τηθος-tænkning hos Martin Heidegger
15. Christian Fich
Two Nations Divided by Common
Values
French National Habitus and the
Rejection of American Power
16. Peter Beyer
Processer, sammenhængskraft
og ﬂeksibilitet
Et empirisk casestudie af omstillings-
forløb i ﬁre virksomheder
17. Adam Buchhorn
Markets of Good Intentions
Constructing and Organizing
Biogas Markets Amid Fragility
and Controversy
18. Cecilie K. Moesby-Jensen
Social læring og fælles praksis
Et mixed method studie, der belyser
læringskonsekvenser af et lederkursus
for et praksisfællesskab af offentlige
mellemledere
19. Heidi Boye
Fødevarer og sundhed i sen- 
modernismen
– En indsigt i hyggefænomenet og
de relaterede fødevarepraksisser
20. Kristine Munkgård Pedersen
Flygtige forbindelser og midlertidige
mobiliseringer
Om kulturel produktion på Roskilde
Festival
21. Oliver Jacob Weber
Causes of Intercompany Harmony in
Business Markets – An Empirical Inve-
stigation from a Dyad Perspective
22. Susanne Ekman
Authority and Autonomy
Paradoxes of Modern Knowledge
Work
23. Anette Frey Larsen
Kvalitetsledelse på danske hospitaler
– Ledelsernes indﬂydelse på introduk-
tion og vedligeholdelse af kvalitetsstra-
tegier i det danske sundhedsvæsen
24. Toyoko Sato
Performativity and Discourse: Japanese
Advertisements on the Aesthetic Edu-
cation of Desire
25. Kenneth Brinch Jensen
Identifying the Last Planner System
Lean management in the construction
industry
26. Javier Busquets
Orchestrating Network Behavior
for Innovation
27. Luke Patey
The Power of Resistance: India’s Na-
tional Oil Company and International
Activism in Sudan
28. Mette Vedel
Value Creation in Triadic Business Rela-
tionships. Interaction, Interconnection
and Position
29. Kristian Tørning
Knowledge Management Systems in
Practice – A Work Place Study
30. Qingxin Shi
An Empirical Study of Thinking Aloud
Usability Testing from a Cultural
Perspective
31. Tanja Juul Christiansen
Corporate blogging: Medarbejderes
kommunikative handlekraft
32. Malgorzata Ciesielska
Hybrid Organisations.
A study of the Open Source – business
setting
33. Jens Dick-Nielsen
Three Essays on Corporate Bond
Market Liquidity
34. Sabrina Speiermann
Modstandens Politik
Kampagnestyring i Velfærdsstaten.
En diskussion af traﬁkkampagners sty-
ringspotentiale
35. Julie Uldam
Fickle Commitment. Fostering political
engagement in 'the ﬂighty world of
online activism’
36. Annegrete Juul Nielsen
Traveling technologies and
transformations in health care
37. Athur Mühlen-Schulte
Organising Development
Power and Organisational Reform in
the United Nations Development
Programme
38. Louise Rygaard Jonas
Branding på butiksgulvet
Et case-studie af kultur- og identitets-
arbejdet i Kvickly
2011
1. Stefan Fraenkel
Key Success Factors for Sales Force
Readiness during New Product Launch
A Study of Product Launches in the
Swedish Pharmaceutical Industry
2. Christian Plesner Rossing
International Transfer Pricing in Theory
and Practice
3. Tobias Dam Hede
Samtalekunst og ledelsesdisciplin
– en analyse af coachingsdiskursens
genealogi og governmentality
4. Kim Pettersson
Essays on Audit Quality, Auditor Choi-
ce, and Equity Valuation
5. Henrik Merkelsen
The expert-lay controversy in risk
research and management. Effects of
institutional distances. Studies of risk
deﬁnitions, perceptions, management
and communication
6. Simon S. Torp
Employee Stock Ownership:
Effect on Strategic Management and
Performance
7. Mie Harder
Internal Antecedents of Management
Innovation
8. Ole Helby Petersen
Public-Private Partnerships: Policy and
Regulation – With Comparative and
Multi-level Case Studies from Denmark
and Ireland
9. Morten Krogh Petersen
’Good’ Outcomes. Handling Multipli-
city in Government Communication
10. Kristian Tangsgaard Hvelplund
Allocation of cognitive resources in
translation - an eye-tracking and key-
logging study
11. Moshe Yonatany
The Internationalization Process of
Digital Service Providers
12. Anne Vestergaard
Distance and Suffering
Humanitarian Discourse in the age of
Mediatization
13. Thorsten Mikkelsen
Personligsheds indﬂydelse på forret-
ningsrelationer
14. Jane Thostrup Jagd
Hvorfor fortsætter fusionsbølgen ud-
over ”the tipping point”?
– en empirisk analyse af information
og kognitioner om fusioner
15. Gregory Gimpel
Value-driven Adoption and Consump-
tion of Technology: Understanding
Technology Decision Making
16. Thomas Stengade Sønderskov
Den nye mulighed
Social innovation i en forretningsmæs-
sig kontekst
17. Jeppe Christoffersen
Donor supported strategic alliances in
developing countries
18. Vibeke Vad Baunsgaard
Dominant Ideological Modes of
Rationality: Cross functional
integration in the process of product
 innovation
19. Throstur Olaf Sigurjonsson
Governance Failure and Icelands’s
Financial Collapse
20. Allan Sall Tang Andersen
Essays on the modeling of risks in
interest-rate and inﬂ ation markets
21. Heidi Tscherning
Mobile Devices in Social Contexts
22. Birgitte Gorm Hansen
Adapting in the Knowledge Economy
 Lateral Strategies for Scientists and
Those Who Study Them
23. Kristina Vaarst Andersen
Optimal Levels of Embeddedness
 The Contingent Value of Networked
Collaboration
24. Justine Grønbæk Pors
Noisy Management
 A History of Danish School Governing
from 1970-2010
25. Stefan Linder
 Micro-foundations of Strategic
Entrepreneurship
 Essays on Autonomous Strategic Action
26. Xin Li
 Toward an Integrative Framework of
National Competitiveness
An application to China
27. Rune Thorbjørn Clausen
Værdifuld arkitektur
 Et eksplorativt studie af bygningers
rolle i virksomheders værdiskabelse
28. Monica Viken
 Markedsundersøkelser som bevis i
varemerke- og markedsføringsrett
29. Christian Wymann
 Tattooing
 The Economic and Artistic Constitution
of a Social Phenomenon
30. Sanne Frandsen
Productive Incoherence
 A Case Study of Branding and
Identity Struggles in a Low-Prestige
Organization
31. Mads Stenbo Nielsen
Essays on Correlation Modelling
32. Ivan Häuser
Følelse og sprog
 Etablering af en ekspressiv kategori,
eksempliﬁ ceret på russisk
33. Sebastian Schwenen
Security of Supply in Electricity Markets
2012
1. Peter Holm Andreasen
 The Dynamics of Procurement
Management
- A Complexity Approach
2. Martin Haulrich
 Data-Driven Bitext Dependency
Parsing and Alignment
3. Line Kirkegaard
 Konsulenten i den anden nat
 En undersøgelse af det intense
arbejdsliv
4. Tonny Stenheim
 Decision usefulness of goodwill
under IFRS
5. Morten Lind Larsen
 Produktivitet, vækst og velfærd
 Industrirådet og efterkrigstidens
Danmark 1945 - 1958
6. Petter Berg
 Cartel Damages and Cost Asymmetries
7. Lynn Kahle
Experiential Discourse in Marketing
 A methodical inquiry into practice
and theory
8. Anne Roelsgaard Obling
 Management of Emotions
in Accelerated Medical Relationships
9. Thomas Frandsen
 Managing Modularity of
Service Processes Architecture
10. Carina Christine Skovmøller
 CSR som noget særligt
 Et casestudie om styring og menings-
skabelse i relation til CSR ud fra en
intern optik
11. Michael Tell
 Fradragsbeskæring af selskabers
ﬁ nansieringsudgifter
 En skatteretlig analyse af SEL §§ 11,
11B og 11C
12. Morten Holm
 Customer Proﬁ tability Measurement
Models
 Their Merits and Sophistication
across Contexts
13. Katja Joo Dyppel
 Beskatning af derivater
En analyse af dansk skatteret
14. Esben Anton Schultz
 Essays in Labor Economics
Evidence from Danish Micro Data
15. Carina Risvig Hansen
 ”Contracts not covered, or not fully
covered, by the Public Sector Directive”
16. Anja Svejgaard Pors
Iværksættelse af kommunikation
 - patientﬁ gurer i hospitalets strategiske
kommunikation
17. Frans Bévort
 Making sense of management with
logics
 An ethnographic study of accountants
who become managers
18. René Kallestrup
 The Dynamics of Bank and Sovereign
Credit Risk
19. Brett Crawford
 Revisiting the Phenomenon of Interests
in Organizational Institutionalism
 The Case of U.S. Chambers of
Commerce
20. Mario Daniele Amore
 Essays on Empirical Corporate Finance
21. Arne Stjernholm Madsen
 The evolution of innovation strategy
 Studied in the context of medical
device activities at the pharmaceutical
company Novo Nordisk A/S in the
period 1980-2008
22. Jacob Holm Hansen
 Is Social Integration Necessary for
Corporate Branding?
 A study of corporate branding
strategies at Novo Nordisk
23. Stuart Webber
 Corporate Proﬁ t Shifting and the
Multinational Enterprise
24. Helene Ratner
 Promises of Reﬂ exivity
 Managing and Researching
Inclusive Schools
25. Therese Strand
 The Owners and the Power: Insights
from Annual General Meetings
26. Robert Gavin Strand
 In Praise of Corporate Social
Responsibility Bureaucracy
27. Nina Sormunen
Auditor’s going-concern reporting
 Reporting decision and content of the
report
28. John Bang Mathiasen
 Learning within a product development
working practice:
 - an understanding anchored
in pragmatism
29. Philip Holst Riis
 Understanding Role-Oriented Enterprise
Systems: From Vendors to Customers
30. Marie Lisa Dacanay
Social Enterprises and the Poor
 Enhancing Social Entrepreneurship and
Stakeholder Theory
31. Fumiko Kano Glückstad
 Bridging Remote Cultures: Cross-lingual
concept mapping based on the
information receiver’s prior-knowledge
32. Henrik Barslund Fosse
 Empirical Essays in International Trade
33. Peter Alexander Albrecht
 Foundational hybridity and its
reproduction
Security sector reform in Sierra Leone
34. Maja Rosenstock
CSR  - hvor svært kan det være?
 Kulturanalytisk casestudie om
udfordringer og dilemmaer med at
forankre Coops CSR-strategi
35. Jeanette Rasmussen
Tweens, medier og forbrug
 Et studie af 10-12 årige danske børns
brug af internettet, opfattelse og for-
ståelse af markedsføring og forbrug
36. Ib Tunby Gulbrandsen
 ‘This page is not intended for a
US Audience’
 A ﬁ ve-act spectacle on online
communication, collaboration
& organization.
37. Kasper Aalling Teilmann
 Interactive Approaches to
Rural Development
38. Mette Mogensen
 The Organization(s) of Well-being
and Productivity
 (Re)assembling work in the Danish Post
39. Søren Friis Møller
 From Disinterestedness to Engagement
 Towards Relational Leadership In the
Cultural Sector
40. Nico Peter Berhausen
 Management Control, Innovation and
Strategic Objectives – Interactions and
Convergence in Product Development
Networks
41. Balder Onarheim
Creativity under Constraints
 Creativity as Balancing
‘Constrainedness’
42. Haoyong Zhou
Essays on Family Firms
43. Elisabeth Naima Mikkelsen
Making sense of organisational conﬂ ict
 An empirical study of enacted sense-
making in everyday conﬂ ict at work
2013
1. Jacob Lyngsie
 Entrepreneurship in an Organizational
Context
2. Signe Groth-Brodersen
Fra ledelse til selvet
 En socialpsykologisk analyse af
forholdet imellem selvledelse, ledelse
og stress i det moderne arbejdsliv
3. Nis Høyrup Christensen
 Shaping Markets: A Neoinstitutional
Analysis of the Emerging
Organizational Field of Renewable
Energy in China
4. Christian Edelvold Berg
As a matter of size
 THE IMPORTANCE OF CRITICAL
MASS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF
SCARCITY FOR TELEVISION MARKETS
5. Christine D. Isakson
 Coworker Inﬂ uence and Labor Mobility
Essays on Turnover, Entrepreneurship
and Location Choice in the Danish
Maritime Industry
6. Niels Joseph Jerne Lennon
 Accounting Qualities in Practice
Rhizomatic stories of representational
faithfulness, decision making and
control
7. Shannon O’Donnell
Making Ensemble Possible
 How special groups organize for
collaborative creativity in conditions
of spatial variability and distance
8. Robert W. D. Veitch
 Access Decisions in a
Partly-Digital World
Comparing Digital Piracy and Legal
Modes for Film and Music
9. Marie Mathiesen
Making Strategy Work
An Organizational Ethnography
10. Arisa Shollo
The role of business intelligence in
organizational decision-making
11. Mia Kaspersen
 The construction of social and
environmental reporting
12. Marcus Møller Larsen
The organizational design of offshoring
13. Mette Ohm Rørdam
EU Law on Food Naming
The prohibition against misleading
names in an internal market context
14. Hans Peter Rasmussen
GIV EN GED!
Kan giver-idealtyper forklare støtte
til velgørenhed og understøtte
relationsopbygning?
15. Ruben Schachtenhaufen
Fonetisk reduktion i dansk
16. Peter Koerver Schmidt
Dansk CFC-beskatning
 I et internationalt og komparativt
perspektiv
17. Morten Froholdt
Strategi i den offentlige sektor
En kortlægning af styringsmæssig
kontekst, strategisk tilgang, samt
anvendte redskaber og teknologier for
udvalgte danske statslige styrelser
18. Annette Camilla Sjørup
Cognitive effort in metaphor translation
An eye-tracking and key-logging study
19. Tamara Stucchi
 The Internationalization
of Emerging Market Firms:
A Context-Speciﬁ c Study
20. Thomas Lopdrup-Hjorth
“Let’s Go Outside”:
The Value of Co-Creation
21. Ana Ala?ovska
Genre and Autonomy in Cultural
Production
The case of travel guidebook
production
22. Marius Gudmand-Høyer
 Stemningssindssygdommenes historie
i det 19. århundrede
 Omtydningen af melankolien og
manien som bipolære stemningslidelser
i dansk sammenhæng under hensyn til
dannelsen af det moderne følelseslivs
relative autonomi.
 En problematiserings- og erfarings-
analytisk undersøgelse
23. Lichen Alex Yu
Fabricating an S&OP Process
 Circulating References and Matters
of Concern
24. Esben Alfort
The Expression of a Need
Understanding search
25. Trine Pallesen
Assembling Markets for Wind Power
An Inquiry into the Making of
Market Devices
26. Anders Koed Madsen
Web-Visions
Repurposing digital traces to organize
social attention
27. Lærke Højgaard Christiansen
BREWING ORGANIZATIONAL
RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS
28. Tommy Kjær Lassen
EGENTLIG SELVLEDELSE
 En ledelsesﬁ losoﬁ sk afhandling om
selvledelsens paradoksale dynamik og
eksistentielle engagement
29. Morten Rossing
Local Adaption and Meaning Creation
in Performance Appraisal
30. Søren Obed Madsen
Lederen som oversætter
Et oversættelsesteoretisk perspektiv
på strategisk arbejde
31. Thomas Høgenhaven
Open Government Communities
Does Design Affect Participation?
32. Kirstine Zinck Pedersen
Failsafe Organizing?
A Pragmatic Stance on Patient Safety
33. Anne Petersen
Hverdagslogikker i psykiatrisk arbejde
En institutionsetnograﬁ sk undersøgelse
af hverdagen i psykiatriske
organisationer
34. Didde Maria Humle
Fortællinger om arbejde
35. Mark Holst-Mikkelsen
Strategieksekvering i praksis
– barrierer og muligheder!
36. Malek Maalouf
Sustaining lean
Strategies for dealing with
organizational paradoxes
37. Nicolaj Tofte Brenneche
Systemic Innovation In The Making
The Social Productivity of
Cartographic Crisis and Transitions
in the Case of SEEIT
38. Morten Gylling
The Structure of Discourse
A Corpus-Based Cross-Linguistic Study
39. Binzhang YANG
Urban Green Spaces for Quality Life
 - Case Study: the landscape
architecture for people in Copenhagen
40. Michael Friis Pedersen
Finance and Organization:
The Implications for Whole Farm
Risk Management
41. Even Fallan
Issues on supply and demand for
environmental accounting information
42. Ather Nawaz
Website user experience
A cross-cultural study of the relation
between users´ cognitive style, context
of use, and information architecture
of local websites
43. Karin Beukel
The Determinants for Creating
Valuable Inventions
44. Arjan Markus
External Knowledge Sourcing
and Firm Innovation
Essays on the Micro-Foundations
of Firms’ Search for Innovation
2014
1. Solon Moreira
 Four Essays on Technology Licensing
and Firm Innovation
2. Karin Strzeletz Ivertsen
Partnership Drift in Innovation
Processes
A study of the Think City electric
car development
3. Kathrine Hoffmann Pii
Responsibility Flows in Patient-centred
Prevention
4. Jane Bjørn Vedel
Managing Strategic Research
An empirical analysis of
science-industry collaboration in a
pharmaceutical company
5. Martin Gylling
Processuel strategi i organisationer
Monograﬁ  om dobbeltheden i
tænkning af strategi, dels som
vidensfelt i organisationsteori, dels
som kunstnerisk tilgang til at skabe
i erhvervsmæssig innovation
6. Linne Marie Lauesen
Corporate Social Responsibility
in the Water Sector:
How Material Practices and their
Symbolic and Physical Meanings Form
a Colonising Logic
7. Maggie Qiuzhu Mei
LEARNING TO INNOVATE:
The role of ambidexterity, standard,
and decision process
8. Inger Høedt-Rasmussen
Developing Identity for Lawyers
Towards Sustainable Lawyering
9. Sebastian Fux
Essays on Return Predictability and
Term Structure Modelling
10. Thorbjørn N. M. Lund-Poulsen
Essays on Value Based Management
11. Oana Brindusa Albu
Transparency in Organizing:
A Performative Approach
12. Lena Olaison
Entrepreneurship at the limits
13. Hanne Sørum
DRESSED FOR WEB SUCCESS?
 An Empirical Study of Website Quality
in the Public Sector
14. Lasse Folke Henriksen
Knowing networks
How experts shape transnational
governance
15. Maria Halbinger
Entrepreneurial Individuals
Empirical Investigations into
Entrepreneurial Activities of
Hackers and Makers
16. Robert Spliid
Kapitalfondenes metoder
og kompetencer
17. Christiane Stelling
Public-private partnerships & the need,
development and management
of trusting
A processual and embedded
exploration
18. Marta Gasparin
Management of design as a translation
process
19. Kåre Moberg
Assessing the Impact of
Entrepreneurship Education
From ABC to PhD
20. Alexander Cole
Distant neighbors
Collective learning beyond the cluster
21. Martin Møller Boje Rasmussen
Is Competitiveness a Question of
Being Alike?
How the United Kingdom, Germany
and Denmark Came to Compete
through their Knowledge Regimes
from 1993 to 2007
22. Anders Ravn Sørensen
Studies in central bank legitimacy,
currency and national identity
Four cases from Danish monetary
history
23. Nina Bellak
 Can Language be Managed in
International Business?
Insights into Language Choice from a
Case Study of Danish and Austrian
Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
24. Rikke Kristine Nielsen
Global Mindset as Managerial
Meta-competence and Organizational
Capability: Boundary-crossing
Leadership Cooperation in the MNC
The Case of ‘Group Mindset’ in
Solar A/S.
25. Rasmus Koss Hartmann
User Innovation inside government
Towards a critically performative
foundation for inquiry
26. Kristian Gylling Olesen
 Flertydig og emergerende ledelse i
folkeskolen
 Et aktør-netværksteoretisk ledelses-
studie af politiske evalueringsreformers
betydning for ledelse i den danske
folkeskole
27. Troels Riis Larsen
 Kampen om Danmarks omdømme
1945-2010
Omdømmearbejde og omdømmepolitik
28. Klaus Majgaard
 Jagten på autenticitet i offentlig styring
29. Ming Hua Li
Institutional Transition and
Organizational Diversity:
Differentiated internationalization
strategies of emerging market
state-owned enterprises
30. Soﬁ e Blinkenberg Federspiel
IT, organisation og digitalisering:
Institutionelt arbejde i den kommunale
digitaliseringsproces
31. Elvi Weinreich
Hvilke offentlige ledere er der brug for
når velfærdstænkningen ﬂ ytter sig
– er Diplomuddannelsens lederproﬁ l
svaret?
32. Ellen Mølgaard Korsager
Self-conception and image of context
in the growth of the ﬁ rm
– A Penrosian History of Fiberline
Composites
33. Else Skjold
 The Daily Selection
34. Marie Louise Conradsen
 The Cancer Centre That Never Was
The Organisation of Danish Cancer
Research 1949-1992
35. Virgilio Failla
 Three Essays on the Dynamics of
Entrepreneurs in the Labor Market
36. Nicky Nedergaard
Brand-Based Innovation
 Relational Perspectives on Brand Logics
and Design Innovation Strategies and
Implementation
37. Mads Gjedsted Nielsen
Essays in Real Estate Finance
38. Kristin Martina Brandl
 Process Perspectives on
Service Offshoring
39. Mia Rosa Koss Hartmann
In the gray zone
With police in making space
for creativity
40. Karen Ingerslev
 Healthcare Innovation under
The Microscope
 Framing Boundaries of Wicked
Problems
41. Tim Neerup Themsen
 Risk Management in large Danish
public capital investment programmes
2015
1. Jakob Ion Wille
Film som design
 Design af levende billeder i
ﬁ lm og tv-serier
2. Christiane Mossin
Interzones of Law and Metaphysics
 Hierarchies, Logics and Foundations
of Social Order seen through the Prism
of EU Social Rights
3. Thomas Tøth
 TRUSTWORTHINESS: ENABLING
GLOBAL COLLABORATION
 An Ethnographic Study of Trust,
Distance, Control, Culture and
Boundary Spanning within Offshore
Outsourcing of IT Services
4. Steven Højlund
Evaluation Use in Evaluation Systems –
The Case of the European Commission
5. Julia Kirch Kirkegaard
AMBIGUOUS WINDS OF CHANGE – OR
FIGHTING AGAINST WINDMILLS IN
CHINESE WIND POWER
A CONSTRUCTIVIST INQUIRY INTO
CHINA’S PRAGMATICS OF GREEN
MARKETISATION MAPPING
CONTROVERSIES OVER A POTENTIAL
TURN TO QUALITY IN CHINESE WIND
POWER
6. Michelle Carol Antero
 A Multi-case Analysis of the
Development of Enterprise Resource
Planning Systems (ERP) Business
Practices
Morten Friis-Olivarius
The Associative Nature of Creativity
7. Mathew Abraham
New Cooperativism:
 A study of emerging producer
organisations in India
8. Stine Hedegaard
Sustainability-Focused Identity: Identity
work performed to manage, negotiate
and resolve barriers and tensions that
arise in the process of constructing or
ganizational identity in a sustainability
context
9. Cecilie Glerup
Organizing Science in Society – the
conduct and justiﬁ cation of resposible
research
10. Allan Salling Pedersen
Implementering af ITIL®  IT-governance
- når best practice konﬂ ikter med
kulturen Løsning af implementerings- 
 problemer gennem anvendelse af  
kendte CSF i et aktionsforskningsforløb.
11. Nihat Misir
A Real Options Approach to
Determining Power Prices
12. Mamdouh Medhat
MEASURING AND PRICING THE RISK
OF CORPORATE FAILURES
13. Rina Hansen
Toward a Digital Strategy for
Omnichannel Retailing
14. Eva Pallesen
In the rhythm of welfare creation
 A relational processual investigation
moving beyond the conceptual horizon
of welfare management
15. Gouya Harirchi
In Search of Opportunities: Three
Essays on Global Linkages for Innovation
16. Lotte Holck
Embedded Diversity: A critical
ethnographic study of the structural
tensions of organizing diversity
17. Jose Daniel Balarezo
Learning through Scenario Planning
18. Louise Pram Nielsen
 Knowledge dissemination based on
terminological ontologies. Using eye
tracking to further user interface
design.
19. Soﬁ e Dam
 PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR
INNOVATION AND SUSTAINABILITY
TRANSFORMATION
 An embedded, comparative case study
of municipal waste management in
England and Denmark
20. Ulrik Hartmyer Christiansen
 Follwoing the Content of Reported Risk
Across the Organization
21. Guro Refsum Sanden
 Language strategies in multinational
corporations. A cross-sector study
of ﬁ nancial service companies and
manufacturing companies.
22. Linn Gevoll
 Designing performance management
for operational level
 - A closer look on the role of design
choices in framing coordination and
motivation
23. Frederik Larsen
 Objects and Social Actions
– on Second-hand Valuation Practices
24. Thorhildur Hansdottir Jetzek
 The Sustainable Value of Open
Government Data
 Uncovering the Generative Mechanisms
of Open Data through a Mixed
Methods Approach
25. Gustav Toppenberg
 Innovation-based M&A
 – Technological-Integration
Challenges – The Case of
Digital-Technology Companies
26. Mie Plotnikof
 Challenges of Collaborative
Governance
 An Organizational Discourse Study
of Public Managers’ Struggles
with Collaboration across the
Daycare Area
27. Christian Garmann Johnsen
 Who Are the Post-Bureaucrats?
 A Philosophical Examination of the
Creative Manager, the Authentic Leader
and the Entrepreneur
28. Jacob Brogaard-Kay
 Constituting Performance Management
 A ﬁ eld study of a pharmaceutical
company
29. Rasmus Ploug Jenle
 Engineering Markets for Control:
Integrating Wind Power into the Danish
Electricity System
30. Morten Lindholst
 Complex Business Negotiation:
Understanding Preparation and
Planning
31. Morten Grynings
TRUST AND TRANSPARENCY FROM AN
ALIGNMENT PERSPECTIVE
32. Peter Andreas Norn
 Byregimer og styringsevne: Politisk
lederskab af store byudviklingsprojekter
33. Milan Miric
 Essays on Competition, Innovation and
Firm Strategy in Digital Markets
34. Sanne K. Hjordrup
The Value of Talent Management
 Rethinking practice, problems and
possibilities
35. Johanna Sax
Strategic Risk Management
 – Analyzing Antecedents and
Contingencies for Value Creation
36. Pernille Rydén
Strategic Cognition of Social Media
37. Mimmi Sjöklint
The Measurable Me
- The Inﬂ uence of Self-tracking on the
User Experience
38. Juan Ignacio Staricco
Towards a Fair Global Economic
Regime? A critical assessment of Fair
Trade through the examination of the
Argentinean wine industry
39. Marie Henriette Madsen
Emerging and temporary connections
in Quality work
40. Yangfeng CAO
Toward a Process Framework of
Business Model Innovation in the
Global Context
Entrepreneurship-Enabled Dynamic
Capability of Medium-Sized
Multinational Enterprises
41. Carsten Scheibye
 Enactment of the Organizational Cost
Structure in Value Chain Conﬁ guration
A Contribution to Strategic Cost
Management
2016
1. Signe Soﬁ e Dyrby
Enterprise Social Media at Work
2. Dorte Boesby Dahl
 The making of the public parking
attendant
 Dirt, aesthetics and inclusion in public
service work
3. Verena Girschik
 Realizing Corporate Responsibility
Positioning and Framing in Nascent
Institutional Change
4. Anders Ørding Olsen
 IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS
 Inertia, Knowledge Sources and Diver-
sity in Collaborative Problem-solving
5. Pernille Steen Pedersen
 Udkast til et nyt copingbegreb
 En kvaliﬁ kation af ledelsesmuligheder
for at forebygge sygefravær ved
psykiske problemer.
6. Kerli Kant Hvass
 Weaving a Path from Waste to Value:
Exploring fashion industry business
models and the circular economy
7. Kasper Lindskow
 Exploring Digital News Publishing
Business Models – a production
network approach
8. Mikkel Mouritz Marfelt
 The chameleon workforce:
Assembling and negotiating the
content of a workforce
9. Marianne Bertelsen
Aesthetic encounters
 Rethinking autonomy, space & time
in today’s world of art
10. Louise Hauberg Wilhelmsen
EU PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
11. Abid Hussain
 On the Design, Development and
Use of the Social Data Analytics Tool
(SODATO):  Design Propositions,
Patterns, and Principles for Big
Social Data Analytics
12. Mark Bruun
 Essays on Earnings Predictability
13. Tor Bøe-Lillegraven
BUSINESS PARADOXES, BLACK BOXES,
AND BIG DATA: BEYOND
ORGANIZATIONAL AMBIDEXTERITY
14. Hadis Khonsary-Atighi
 ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF
DOMESTIC INVESTMENT IN AN OIL-
BASED ECONOMY: THE CASE OF IRAN
(1965-2010)
15. Maj Lervad Grasten
 Rule of Law or Rule by Lawyers?
On the Politics of Translation in Global
Governance
16. Lene Granzau Juel-Jacobsen
SUPERMARKEDETS MODUS OPERANDI
– en hverdagssociologisk undersøgelse
af forholdet mellem rum og handlen
og understøtte relationsopbygning?
17. Christine Thalsgård Henriques
In search of entrepreneurial learning
– Towards a relational perspective on
incubating practices?
18. Patrick Bennett
Essays in Education, Crime, and Job
Displacement
19. Søren Korsgaard
Payments and Central Bank Policy
20. Marie Kruse Skibsted
 Empirical Essays in Economics of
Education and Labor
21. Elizabeth Benedict Christensen
 The Constantly Contingent Sense of
Belonging of the 1.5 Generation
Undocumented Youth
An Everyday Perspective
22. Lasse J. Jessen
 Essays on Discounting Behavior and
Gambling Behavior
23. Kalle Johannes Rose
Når stifterviljen dør…
Et retsøkonomisk bidrag til 200 års
juridisk konﬂ ikt om ejendomsretten
24. Andreas Søeborg Kirkedal
Danish Stød and Automatic Speech
Recognition
25. Ida Lunde Jørgensen
Institutions and Legitimations in
Finance for the Arts
26. Olga Rykov Ibsen
An empirical cross-linguistic study of
directives: A semiotic approach to the
sentence forms chosen by British,
Danish and Russian speakers in native
and ELF contexts
27. Desi Volker
Understanding Interest Rate Volatility
28. Angeli Elizabeth Weller
Practice at the Boundaries of Business
Ethics & Corporate Social Responsibility
29. Ida Danneskiold-Samsøe
Levende læring i kunstneriske
organisationer
En undersøgelse af læringsprocesser
mellem projekt og organisation på
Aarhus Teater
30. Leif Christensen
 Quality of information – The role of
internal controls and materiality
31. Olga Zarzecka
 Tie Content in Professional Networks
32. Henrik Mahncke
De store gaver
 - Filantropiens gensidighedsrelationer i
teori og praksis
33. Carsten Lund Pedersen
 Using the Collective Wisdom of
Frontline Employees in Strategic Issue
Management
34. Yun Liu
 Essays on Market Design
35. Denitsa Hazarbassanova Blagoeva
 The Internationalisation of Service Firms
36. Manya Jaura Lind
 Capability development in an off-
shoring context: How, why and by
whom
37. Luis R. Boscán F.
 Essays on the Design of Contracts and
Markets for Power System Flexibility
38. Andreas Philipp Distel
Capabilities for Strategic Adaptation:
 Micro-Foundations, Organizational
Conditions, and Performance
Implications
39. Lavinia Bleoca
 The Usefulness of Innovation and
Intellectual Capital in Business
Performance:  The Financial Effects of
Knowledge Management vs. Disclosure
40. Henrik Jensen
 Economic Organization and Imperfect
Managerial Knowledge: A Study of the
Role of Managerial Meta-Knowledge
in the Management of Distributed
Knowledge
41. Stine Mosekjær
The Understanding of English Emotion
Words by Chinese and Japanese
Speakers of English as a Lingua Franca
An Empirical Study
42. Hallur Tor Sigurdarson
The Ministry of Desire - Anxiety and
entrepreneurship in a bureaucracy
43. Kätlin Pulk
Making Time While Being in Time
A study of the temporality of
organizational processes
44. Valeria Giacomin
Contextualizing the cluster Palm oil in
Southeast Asia in global perspective
(1880s–1970s)
45. Jeanette Willert
 Managers’ use of multiple
Management Control Systems:
 The role and interplay of management
control systems and company
performance
46. Mads Vestergaard Jensen
 Financial Frictions: Implications for Early
Option Exercise and Realized Volatility
47. Mikael Reimer Jensen
Interbank Markets and Frictions
48. Benjamin Faigen
Essays on Employee Ownership
49. Adela Michea
Enacting Business Models
 An Ethnographic Study of an Emerging
Business Model Innovation within the
Frame of a Manufacturing Company.
50. Iben Sandal Stjerne
 Transcending organization in
temporary systems
 Aesthetics’ organizing work and
employment in Creative Industries
51. Simon Krogh
Anticipating Organizational Change
52. Sarah Netter
Exploring the Sharing Economy
53. Lene Tolstrup Christensen
 State-owned enterprises as institutional
market actors in the marketization of
public service provision:
 A comparative case study of Danish
and Swedish passenger rail 1990–2015
54. Kyoung(Kay) Sun Park
Three Essays on Financial Economics
2017
1. Mari Bjerck
 Apparel at work. Work uniforms and
women in male-dominated manual
occupations.
2. Christoph H. Flöthmann
 Who Manages Our Supply Chains?
 Backgrounds, Competencies and
Contributions of Human Resources in
Supply Chain Management
3. Aleksandra Anna Rzez´nik
Essays in Empirical Asset Pricing
4. Claes Bäckman
Essays on Housing Markets
5. Kirsti Reitan Andersen
 Stabilizing Sustainability
in the Textile and Fashion Industry
6. Kira Hoffmann
Cost Behavior: An Empirical Analysis
of Determinants and Consequences
of Asymmetries
7. Tobin Hanspal
Essays in Household Finance
8. Nina Lange
Correlation in Energy Markets
9. Anjum Fayyaz
Donor Interventions and SME
Networking in Industrial Clusters in
Punjab Province, Pakistan
10. Magnus Paulsen Hansen
 Trying the unemployed. Justiﬁ ca-
tion and critique, emancipation and
coercion towards the ‘active society’.
A study of contemporary reforms in
France and Denmark
11. Sameer Azizi
 Corporate Social Responsibility in
Afghanistan
 – a critical case study of the mobile
telecommunications industry
12. Malene Myhre
 The internationalization of small and
medium-sized enterprises:
A qualitative study
13. Thomas Presskorn-Thygesen
 The Signiﬁ cance of Normativity –
 Studies in Post-Kantian Philosophy and
Social Theory
14. Federico Clementi
 Essays on multinational production and
international trade
15. Lara Anne Hale
 Experimental Standards in Sustainability
Transitions: Insights from the Building
Sector
16. Richard Pucci
 Accounting for Financial Instruments in
an Uncertain World
 Controversies in IFRS in the Aftermath
of the 2008 Financial Crisis
17. Sarah Maria Denta
 Kommunale offentlige private
partnerskaber
Regulering I skyggen af Farumsagen
18. Christian Östlund
 Design for e-training
19. Amalie Martinus Hauge
 Organizing Valuations – a pragmatic
inquiry
20. Tim Holst Celik
 Tension-ﬁ lled Governance? Exploring
the Emergence, Consolidation and
Reconﬁ guration of Legitimatory and
Fiscal State-crafting
21. Christian Bason
 Leading Public Design: How managers
engage with design to transform public
governance
22. Davide Tomio
 Essays on Arbitrage and Market
Liquidity
23. Simone Stæhr
 Financial Analysts’ Forecasts
 Behavioral Aspects and the Impact of
Personal Characteristics
24. Mikkel Godt Gregersen
 Management Control, Intrinsic
Motivation and Creativity
– How Can They Coexist
25. Kristjan Johannes Suse Jespersen
 Advancing the Payments for Ecosystem
Service Discourse Through Institutional
Theory
26. Kristian Bondo Hansen
 Crowds and Speculation: A study of
crowd phenomena in the U.S. ﬁ nancial
markets 1890 to 1940
27. Lars Balslev
 Actors and practices – An institutional
study on management accounting
change in Air Greenland
28. Sven Klingler
 Essays on Asset Pricing with
Financial Frictions
29. Klement Ahrensbach Rasmussen
Business Model Innovation
The Role of Organizational Design
30. Giulio Zichella
 Entrepreneurial Cognition.
Three essays on entrepreneurial
behavior and cognition under risk
and uncertainty
31. Richard Ledborg Hansen
 En forkærlighed til det eksister-
ende – mellemlederens oplevelse af
forandringsmodstand i organisatoriske
forandringer
32. Vilhelm Stefan Holsting
Militært chefvirke: Kritik og
retfærdiggørelse mellem politik og
profession
33. Thomas Jensen
Shipping Information Pipeline:
 An information infrastructure to
improve international containerized
shipping
34. Dzmitry Bartalevich
Do economic theories inform policy?
 Analysis of the inﬂ uence of the Chicago
School on European Union competition
policy
35. Kristian Roed Nielsen
 Crowdfunding for Sustainability: A
study on the potential of reward-based
crowdfunding in supporting sustainable
entrepreneurship
36. Emil Husted
 There is always an alternative: A study
of control and commitment in political
organization
37. Anders Ludvig Sevelsted
 Interpreting Bonds and Boundaries of
Obligation. A genealogy of the emer-
gence and development of Protestant
voluntary social work in Denmark as
shown through the cases of the Co-
penhagen Home Mission and the Blue
Cross (1850 – 1950)
38. Niklas Kohl
Essays on Stock Issuance
39. Maya Christiane Flensborg Jensen
 BOUNDARIES OF
PROFESSIONALIZATION AT WORK
 An ethnography-inspired study of care
workers’ dilemmas at the margin
40. Andreas Kamstrup
 Crowdsourcing and the Architectural
Competition as Organisational
Technologies
41. Louise Lyngfeldt Gorm Hansen
 Triggering Earthquakes in Science,
Politics and Chinese Hydropower
- A Controversy Study
2018
?? ?????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
?????????????? ????????????????????
?????????????????????????????
????????
?? ????????????
? ???????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????
?????????????
?? ????????????
?????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????
?? ??????????????????
????????????????????????????
???????????????????
?? ?????? ??????????
????????????????????
?? ??????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????
?? ?????????????
?????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????
?? ????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
??????????????????
?? ? ????????????
?????????????????????????????????
???????????????????
??? ??????????????????????
??????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????
?????????????????
??? ????????????????????
???????????? ????????????????
????????????????
??? ???????????????????????
????????????????????????????????
? ?????????????????????
??? ?????????????????
????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????
??? ?????????????????????
??????????????????????? ?????
????????????????????
????????????????????
??? ????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
??????
??? ??????? ??????
???????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????
??????
??? ???????????
???????????????? ?????????????????
???????????????????
??????????????? ?????????
????????????????????
????????????????????
??? ???????????????????
???????????????????????????
??? ???????????????? ?????
????????????????????? ???
???????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????
??? ??????????????
??????????????????????
??? ???????????? ???????????????????
?????????????????????????????????
??? ????????????
???????????????????????????????
??????????????????
??? ?????????????????
??????????????????????????
??????????????????????
?????????
??? ??????????????????
???????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????
??? ??????????
?????????????????????????????????????
?????
??? ????????????????????
??????????????????????????????
???????????
??? ??????????
???????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
??? ???????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
????????????
??? ??????????????????
???????????????? ???????
??????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
??? ???????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????
??? ??????????????????
????????????????????????????????
???????? ??????
??? ?????????????????????
???????????????????????
??? ?????????????
???????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????
??????????????????
34.  Maitane Elorriaga-Rubio
 The behavioral foundations of
 strategic decision-making: A
 contextual perspective
35.  Roddy Walker
 Leadership Development as
 Organisational Rehabilitation:
 Shaping Middle-Managers as
 Double Agents
36.  Jinsun Bae
 Producing Garments for Global
 Markets Corporate social
 responsibility (CSR) in
 Myanmar’s export garment
 industry 2011–2015
37.  Queralt Prat-i-Pubill
 Axiological knowledge in a knowledge
 driven world. Considerations for
 organizations.
38.  Pia Mølgaard
 Essays on Corporate Loans and
 Credit Risk
39.  Marzia Aricò
 Service Design as a
 Transformative Force:
 Introduction and Adoption in an
 Organizational Context
40.  Christian Dyrlund Wåhlin-
 Jacobsen
 Constructing change initiatives
 in workplace voice activities
 Studies from a social interaction
 perspective
41.  Peter Kalum Schou
 Institutional Logics in
 Entrepreneurial Ventures: How
 Competing Logics arise and
 shape organizational processes
 and outcomes during scale-up
42.  Per Henriksen
 Enterprise Risk Management
 Rationaler og paradokser i en
 moderne ledelsesteknologi
43.  Maximilian Schellmann
 The Politics of Organizing
 Refugee Camps
44. Jacob Halvas Bjerre
 Excluding the Jews: The
 Aryanization of Danish-
 German Trade and German
 Anti-Jewish Policy in
 Denmark 1937-1943
45.  Ida Schrøder
 Hybridising accounting and
 caring: A symmetrical study
 of how costs and needs are
 connected in Danish child
 protection work
46.  Katrine Kunst
 Electronic Word of Behavior:
 Transforming digital traces of
 consumer behaviors into
 communicative content in
 product design
47.  Viktor Avlonitis
 Essays on the role of
 modularity in management:
 Towards a uniﬁed
 perspective of modular and
 integral design
48.  Anne Soﬁe Fischer
 Negotiating Spaces of
 Everyday Politics:
 -An ethnographic study of
 organizing for social
 transformation for women in
 urban poverty, Delhi, India
2019
1.  Shihan Du
 ESSAYS IN EMPIRICAL STUDIES
 BASED ON ADMINISTRATIVE
 LABOUR  MARKET DATA
2.  Mart Laatsit
 Policy learning in innovation
 policy: A comparative analysis of
 European Union member states
3.  Peter J. Wynne
 Proactively Building Capabilities for
 the Post-Acquisition Integration
 of Information Systems
4.  Kalina S. Staykova
 Generative Mechanisms for Digital
 Platform Ecosystem Evolution
5.  Ieva Linkeviciute
 Essays on the Demand-Side
 Management in Electricity Markets
6.  Jonatan Echebarria Fernández
 Jurisdiction and Arbitration
 Agreements in Contracts for the
 Carriage of Goods by Sea –
 Limitations on Party Autonomy
7.  Louise Thorn Bøttkjær
 Votes for sale. Essays on
 clientelism in new democracies.
8.  Ditte Vilstrup Holm
 The Poetics of Participation:
 the organizing of participation in
 contemporary art
9.  Philip Rosenbaum
 Essays in Labor Markets –
 Gender, Fertility and Education
10.  Mia Olsen
 Mobile Betalinger - Succesfaktorer
 og Adfærdsmæssige Konsekvenser
11.  Adrián Luis Mérida Gutiérrez
 Entrepreneurial Careers:
 Determinants, Trajectories, and
 Outcomes
12. Frederik Regli 
 Essays on Crude Oil Tanker Markets
13. Cancan Wang
 Becoming Adaptive through Social
 Media: Transforming Governance and
 Organizational Form in Collaborative
 E-government
14. Lena Lindbjerg Sperling
 Economic and Cultural Development:
 Empirical Studies of Micro-level Data
15. Xia Zhang
 Obligation, face and facework:
 An empirical study of the communi-
 cative act of cancellation of an
 obligation by Chinese, Danish and
 British business professionals in both
 L1 and ELF contexts
16. Stefan Kirkegaard Sløk-Madsen
 Entrepreneurial Judgment and 
 Commercialization
17. Erin Leitheiser
 The Comparative Dynamics of Private
 Governance 
 The case of the Bangladesh Ready-
 Made Garment Industry
18. Lone Christensen
 STRATEGIIMPLEMENTERING: 
 STYRINGSBESTRÆBELSER, IDENTITET
 OG AFFEKT
19. Thomas Kjær Poulsen
 Essays on Asset Pricing with Financial 
 Frictions
20. Maria Lundberg
 Trust and self-trust in leadership iden-
 tity constructions: A qualitative explo-
 ration of narrative ecology in the dis-
 cursive aftermath of heroic discourse 
21. Tina Joanes
Sufficiency for sustainability
Determinants and strategies for reducing 
clothing consumption
22. Benjamin Johannes Flesch
Social Set Visualizer (SoSeVi): Design,
Development and Evaluation of a Visual 
Analytics Tool for Computational Set
Analysis of Big Social Data
23. Henriette Sophia Groskopff
Tvede Schleimann
Creating innovation through collaboration
– Partnering in the maritime sector
24. Kristian Steensen Nielsen
The Role of Self-Regulation in
Environmental Behavior Change
25. Lydia L. Jørgensen
Moving Organizational Atmospheres
26. Theodor Lucian Vladasel
Embracing Heterogeneity: Essays in
Entrepreneurship and Human Capital
27. Seidi Suurmets
Contextual Effects in Consumer Research: 
An Investigation of Consumer Information 
Processing and Behavior via the Applicati 
on of Eye-tracking Methodology
28. Marie Sundby Palle Nickelsen
Reformer mellem integritet og innovation:
Reform af reformens form i den danske
centraladministration fra 1920 til 2019
29. Vibeke Kristine Scheller
The temporal organizing of same-day 
discharge: A tempography of a Cardiac 
Day Unit
30. Qian Sun
Adopting Artificial Intelligence in 
Healthcare in the Digital Age: Perceived 
Challenges, Frame Incongruence, and 
Social Power
31. Dorthe Thorning Mejlhede
Artful change agency and organizing for 
innovation – the case of a Nordic fintech 
cooperative
32. Benjamin Christoffersen
Corporate Default Models:
Empirical Evidence and Methodical
Contributions
33. Filipe António Eslau Bonito Vieira
Essays on Pensions and Fiscal Sustainability
TITLER I ATV PH.D.-SERIEN
1992
1. Niels Kornum
 Servicesamkørsel – organisation, øko-
nomi og planlægningsmetode
1995
2. Verner Worm
Nordiske virksomheder i Kina
Kulturspeciﬁ kke interaktionsrelationer
ved nordiske virksomhedsetableringer i
Kina
1999
3. Mogens Bjerre
Key Account Management of Complex
Strategic Relationships
An Empirical Study of the Fast Moving
Consumer Goods Industry
2000
4. Lotte Darsø
Innovation in the Making
 Interaction Research with heteroge-
neous Groups of Knowledge Workers
creating new Knowledge and new
Leads
2001
5. Peter Hobolt Jensen
Managing Strategic Design Identities
 The case of the Lego Developer Net-
work
2002
6. Peter Lohmann
The Deleuzian Other of Organizational
Change – Moving Perspectives of the
Human
7. Anne Marie Jess Hansen
To lead from a distance: The dynamic
 interplay between strategy and strate-
gizing – A case study of the strategic
management process
2003
8. Lotte Henriksen
Videndeling
 – om organisatoriske og ledelsesmæs-
sige udfordringer ved videndeling i
praksis
9. Niels Christian Nickelsen
 Arrangements of Knowing: Coordi-
nating Procedures Tools and Bodies in
Industrial Production – a case study of
the collective making of new products
2005
10. Carsten Ørts Hansen
 Konstruktion af ledelsesteknologier og
effektivitet
TITLER I DBA PH.D.-SERIEN
2007
1. Peter Kastrup-Misir
Endeavoring to Understand Market
Orientation – and the concomitant
co-mutation of the researched, the
re searcher, the research itself and the
truth
2009
1. Torkild Leo Thellefsen
 Fundamental Signs and Signiﬁ cance
effects
A Semeiotic outline of Fundamental
Signs, Signiﬁ cance-effects, Knowledge
Proﬁ ling and their use in Knowledge
Organization and Branding
2. Daniel Ronzani
When Bits Learn to Walk Don’t Make
Them Trip. Technological Innovation
and the Role of Regulation by Law
in Information Systems Research: the
Case of Radio Frequency Identiﬁ cation
(RFID)
2010
1. Alexander Carnera
Magten over livet og livet som magt
Studier i den biopolitiske ambivalens
